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Introduction	  	  	  In	   the	   past	   three	   decades	   the	   world	   has	   witnessed	   unprecedented	   economic	  growth	  in	  China.	  Following	  far-­‐reaching	  reforms,	  Gross	  Domestic	  Product	  (GDP)	  increased	   at	   an	   average	   rate	   of	   9.5%	   between	   1978	   and	   2005,	   often	   reaching	  double	   digits	   during	   the	   past	   decade.	   The	   contribution	   of	   total	   factor	  productivity	  to	  this	  growth	  rose	  from	  11%	  to	  over	  40%	  during	  the	  Reform	  Era.	  Over	   40%	  of	   rural	   population	   lived	   in	   poverty	   in	   1980.	   That	   number	   declined	  within	   only	   ten	   years	   to	   10%	   and	   again	   to	   4.8%	   another	   decade	   later.	   China’s	  participation	   in	  world	   trade,	  measured	   in	   the	   share	   of	   imports	   and	   exports	   of	  total	  GDP	  has	   jumped	  from	  under	  10%	  pre-­‐reform,	  to	  64%	  in	  2005.1	  These	  are	  just	   a	   few	   striking	   figures	   that	   illustrate	   the	   extent	   of	   transformation.	   In	   2010	  China	   replaced	   Japan	   as	   the	   world’s	   second	   largest	   economy,	   even	   though	   its	  average	   income	   is	   still	   a	   fraction	  of	   that	   in	   the	   leading	   industrial	  nations.2	  This	  raises	   the	   important	   question,	   what	   level	   of	   development	   can	   China	   reach	  eventually?	  	  	  Preceding	  China’s	  rise	  were	  the	  remarkable	  success	  stories	  of	  South	  Korea	  and	  Taiwan. 3 	  In	   1960	   the	   two	   nations	   had	   a	   GDP	   per	   capita	   comparable	   to	  Mozambique	   or	   Jamaica	   and	   below	   any	   Latin	   American	   or	   Middle	   Eastern	  country.4	  Currently,	  both	  range	  among	  the	  25	  richest	  nations,	  again	   in	  GDP	  per	  capita,	   and	   among	   the	   25	   most	   developed	   according	   to	   the	   UN	   Human	  Development	   Index,	   which	   takes	   into	   account	   general	   indicators	   of	   well-­‐being	  such	  as	  life	  expectancy	  and	  education.	  What	  is	  more,	  not	  a	  single	  country	  apart	  from	   the	   two	   city-­‐states	   of	   Hong	   Kong	   and	   Singapore,	   have	   accomplished	   this	  level	  of	  ‘catching-­‐up	  growth’	  in	  the	  second	  half	  of	  the	  twentieth	  century.5	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Figures	  from:	  Rawski/Brandt	  2008	  2	  One	  report	  by	  the	  BBC:	  http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-­‐12427321	  (Aug	  2012)	  3	  Instead	   of	   „Republic	   of	   Korea“	   and	   „Republic	   of	   China“	   the	   familiar	   country	   terms	   of	   „South	  Korea“	  or	  even	  just	  „Korea“	  and	  „Taiwan“	  are	  used	  troughout	  	  the	  text	  to	  avoid	  confusion.	  4	  GDP	  data	  from	  Maddison,	  Angus:	  	  http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/Maddison.htm	  (June	  2012)	  5	  Among	  the	  wealthiest	  twenty-­‐five	  nations	  are	  of	  course	  the	  oil	  rich	  states	  of	  Qatar,	  Brunei,	  UAE	  and	   Kuwait	   but	   none	   of	   these	   made	   the	   top	   league	   of	   the	   HDI.	   Latest	   GDP	   figures	   from:	   IMF	  http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2012/01/weodata/index.aspx	   (Aug	   2012);	   Human	  Development	  Index	  from:	  http://hdr.undp.org/en/	  (Aug	  2012)	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The	   recent	   rise	   of	   China	   on	   the	   one	   hand	   and	   the	   preceding	   and	   exceptional	  development	  of	   two	  other	  nations	   from	  the	  region	  on	  the	  other,	  raise	  the	   issue	  whether	   the	   People’s	   Republic	   has	   followed	   a	   similar	   path.	   The	   most	   widely	  purported	   explanation	   that	   takes	   the	   specific	   experience	   of	   South	   Korea	   and	  Taiwan	   into	   account	   is	   best	   subsumed	   as	   Developmental	   State	   model.	   The	  central	  task	  of	  this	  thesis	  is	  to	  apply	  this	  model	  to	  the	  Chinese	  case	  and	  ask:	  Can	  
China’s	   economic	   growth	   be	   attributed	   to	   an	   emulation	   of	   the	   Developmental	  
State?	  	  	  To	  this	  end	  a	  broad	  array	  of	  literature	  is	  reviewed	  to	  construct	  an	  answer.	  As	  the	  research	  task	  concerns	  a	  comparative	  aspect	  with	  historical	  precedents	  and	  the	  specific	  nature	  of	  political	  institutions	  to	  account	  for	  economic	  development,	  an	  interdisciplinary	   selection	   of	   literature	   was	   chosen:	   research	   of	   the	   economic	  history	   of	   South	   Korea,	   Taiwan	   and	   their	   precursor	   and	   role-­‐model	   Japan	   are	  essential	   to	  build	   a	   general	  model	   or	   analytical	   template	  of	   the	  Developmental	  State.	   Research	   on	   China’s	   economic	   performance	   and	   the	   structure	   and	   its	  political	  institutions	  provide	  the	  basis	  for	  application	  of	  the	  Developmental	  State	  model.	   With	   the	   exception	   of	   some	   limited	   evaluation	   of	   economic	   data,	   this	  thesis	   relies	   on	   the	   critical	   re-­‐evaluation	   of	   secondary	   sources.	   Apart	   from	  concerns	  with	   limited	   scope,	   it	   is	   important	   to	   consider	   the	   ongoing	   nature	   of	  China’s	   rapid	  economic	  development,	   including	   structural	   changes	  of	   state	   and	  economic	   institutions.	  Therefore,	   research	  will	   focus	   roughly	  on	   the	   initial	   two	  decades	   of	   economic	   modernization	   from	   1978	   to	   2001.	   This	   timespan	   that	  starts	   with	   the	   onset	   of	   reforms	   fathered	   by	   Deng	   Xiaoping,	   covers	   two	   top	  leadership	  generations	  of	  Zhao	  Ziyang	  and	  Hu	  Yaobang	  during	   the	   first	  decade	  and	   Jiang	  Zemin	  and	  Zhu	  Rongji	  after	  1989.	   It	  ends	  with	  the	  changeover	   to	   the	  third	  post-­‐reform	  administration	  of	  Hu	   Jinato	  and	  Wen	   Jiabao,	  which	  coincides	  with	  China’s	  accession	  to	  the	  World	  Trade	  Organization	  (WTO).	  	  	  The	  addendum	  to	  the	  title,	   ‘between	  plan	  and	  market’	  refers	  to	  two	  underlying	  themes	  of	  the	  research	  question:	  First,	  it	  reflects	  the	  main	  points	  of	  contestation	  concerning	   the	   East	   Asian	   Developmental	   States,	   namely	   the	   degree	   and	  effectiveness	   of	   a	   development	   plan	   that	   implies	   targeted	   intervention	   in	   the	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market.	   Second,	   it	   alludes	   to	   the	   fact	   that	  China	   is	   indeed	   transferring	   from	  an	  actual	  planned	  economy	  to	  a	  market-­‐economy.	  This	  general	  point	  is	  so	  important	  that	  it	  is	  worth	  highlighting	  here:	  A	  Developmental	  State	  is	  based	  on	  a	  capitalist	  market	  economy	  in	  which	  it	  interferes	  to	  a	  certain	  degree.	  	  	  	  Broadly,	   this	   thesis	   is	   split	   into	   two	   parts.	   Part	   I	   will	   examine	   the	   theoretical	  debate	  surrounding	  the	  main	  research	  task	  and	  examine	  the	  cases	  of	  initial	  East	  Asian	  success.	  Part	  II	  is	  dedicated	  to	  applying	  the	  foregoing	  findings	  to	  China.	  	  	  To	  begin	  with,	  chapter	  1	  provides	  an	  overview	  of	  the	  broader	  historical	  debate	  on	  the	  nature	  of	  economic	  transformation	  or	  industrialization,	  which	  frames	  the	  issue	   of	   East	   Asian	   development.	   Chapters	   2	   through	   4	   each	   combine	   a	  discussion	  of	  one	  nation	  and	  a	  corresponding	  preeminent	  work	  of	  scholarship	  on	  the	  Developmental	   State.	   Chapter	   5	   concludes	   Part	   I	   and	   sets	   out	   to	   distill	   the	  previous	   results	   into	   a	   model	   of	   the	   Developmental	   State	   and	   discusses	   each	  attribute	  along	  with	  its	  significance	  when	  applied	  to	  another	  setting.	  	  That	   model	   maps	   out	   the	   successive	   chapter	   configuration.	   The	   logic	   of	  comparison	   needs	   to	   briefly	   assess	   historical	   vantage	   points	   in	   order	   to	   grasp	  how	  and	  from	  what	  basis	  the	  Chinese	  state	  has	  evolved.	  Thus	  chapter	  6	  reviews	  the	  Maoist	  legacies	  of	  industrialization	  and	  political	  setup.	  	  	  Subsequently,	  chapter	  7	  considers	  China’s	  political	  economy	  during	  the	  Reform	  Era	  by	  first	   introducing	  the	  general	  organization	  of	  the	  Chinese	  Party-­‐state	  and	  its	  main	  institutions,	  and	  second	  through	  a	  chronological	  discussion	  focusing	  on	  reforms	  of	  the	  state	  apparatus,	  formulation	  of	  a	  development	  strategy	  and	  actual	  involvement	  in	  the	  economy.	  	  In	   chapter	   8	   the	   state	   structure	   is	   analyzed	   in	   light	   of	   properties	   of	   a	  Developmental	  State:	  A	  meritocratic	  form	  of	  recruitment	  of	  state	  officials	  and	  the	  degree	  of	  embedded	  autonomy,	  and	  insulation	  of	  state	  organizations.	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Chapter	   9	   will	   round	   off	   Part	   II	   by	   briefly	   assessing	   the	   actual	   development	  achievements	   produced	   by	   the	   preceding	   institutions	   and	   offer	   some	   direct	  comparisons	  with	  South	  Korea	  and	  Taiwan.	  Finally,	  the	  conclusion	  will	  critically	  asses	  to	  what	  degree	  China	  followed	  the	  path	  of	  an	  Developmental	  State	  in	  two	  decades	  of	  economic	  transition	  and	  rapid	  growth.	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PART	  I	  –	  Theories	  of	  the	  Developmental	  State	  
	  
Introduction	  	  There	  is	  not	  one	  single	  theory	  describing	  in	  general	  how	  East	  Asian	  states	  have	  successfully	   promoted	   development	   but	   rather	   a	   series	   of	   case	   studies	  identifying	   various	   factors	   usually	   pertaining	   to	   a	   certain	   country	   during	   its	  period	  of	  growth.	  What	  I	  shall	  define	  as	  a	  Developmental	  State	  may	  be	  regarded	  as	  combination	  of	  various	  studies	  in	  order	  to	  have	  a	  guiding	  model	  against	  which	  the	  Chinese	  case	  will	  be	  tested.	  Therefore,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  review	  the	  history	  of	  the	  concept	  and	  some	  of	  its	  most	  prominent	  exponents	  in	  turn.	  	  	  
Chapter	  1	  –	  The	  historical	  debate	  on	  economic	  modernization	  	  A	  central	  issue	  of	  economic	  history	  is	  the	  transition	  from	  pre-­‐modern	  agrarian	  to	  modern	  industrialized	  economies.	  Starting	  with	  England	  in	  the	  late	  18th	  century,	  spreading	   over	   Europe,	   its	   settler	   colonies	   and	   Japan,	   this	   process	   spread	   to	   a	  number	  of	  smaller	  Asian	  countries	  after	  the	  Second	  World	  War	  and	  has	  engulfed	  China	   during	   the	   past	   thirty	   years	   as	   well.	   Numerous	   theories	   have	   tried	   to	  account	   for	   two	   phenomena:	  What	   was	   special	   about	   Europe?	   Did	   latecomers	  take	  a	  universal	  path	  of	  economic	  development	  or	  did	  they	  succeed	  following	  a	  different	  one?	  	  A	   Eurocentric	   approach	   to	   the	   first	   question	   (e.g.	   Landes	   1998)	   ascribes	   a	  dominant	   role	   to	   a	   culture,	   which	   has	   fostered	   an	   environment	   of	   liberal	  commercial	  and	  market	  forces	  since	  the	  Middle	  Ages	  and	  first	  bore	  fruit	  in	  18th	  century	  England.	  The	  contending	  view	  is	  offered	  by	  the	  "California	  School"	  (e.g.	  Pomeranz	  2000;	  Wong	  1997)	  by	  maintaining	  that	  the	  core	  regions	  at	  both	  ends	  of	   Eurasia	   possessed	   similar	   preconditions	   for	   an	   emerging	   market	   economy,	  which	  were	  necessary	  but	  not	  sufficient	  for	  industrialization.	  Access	  to	  resources	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and	   fortunate	   technological	   innovation	   are	   examples	   offered	   for	   the	   critical	  condition	  separating	  the	  West	  from	  the	  Rest.	  	  	  Transferred	   to	   the	   second	   question	   whether	   later	   industrializers	   followed	   the	  European	   path	   or	   not,	   one	   can	   find	   a	   similar	   divide.	   A	   Eurocentric	   approach	  focuses	  on	  the	  development	  of	  market	  forces	  in	  late	  industrializing	  countries	  or	  put	   differently:	   Economic	   development	  means	   adopting	   the	   relevant	   European	  institutions.	  Whether	  this	  happened	  voluntarily	  by	  opening	  home	  markets	  as	  the	  neo-­‐classical	   theory	  of	   economics	   suggests	   (e.g.	  Williamson	  2000)	  or	   forcefully	  as	  a	  neo-­‐Marxist	   (e.g.	  Wallerstein	  2004)	  view	  would	  have	   it,	  does	  not	  alter	   the	  lens	  of	  Eurocentrism.	  The	  World	  Bank’s	  1991	  Development	  Report	  summarized	  its	   “market	   friendly”	   view,	  which	  was	   applied	   to	   its	   famous	   study	   of	   the	   “East	  Asian	  Miracle”	  two	  years	  later:	  	   	  “The	   appropriate	   role	   of	   government	   in	   a	  market-­‐friendly	   strategy	   is	   to	   ensure	  adequate	  investments	  in	  people,	  provision	  of	  a	  competitive	  climate	  for	  enterprise,	  openness	   to	   international	   trade,	   and	   stable	   macroeconomic	   management.	   But	  beyond	  these	  roles,	  governments	  are	   likely	  to	  do	  more	  harm	  than	  good.”	  (World	  Bank	  1991;	  1993:	  84)	  	  One	   of	   the	   report’s	   authors,	   Joseph	   Stiglitz,	   later	   offered	   a	   criticism	   of	   the	  reductionist	   approach	   by	   the	   “market-­‐friendly”	   view,	   namely	   that	   the	   neo-­‐classical	   approach	   is	   the	   statistical	   measurements	   of	   inputs	   –	   human	   and	  physical	  capital	  and	  expenditure	  on	  technology	  –	  resulting	  in	  economic	  growth.	  While	   this	   provides	   valuable	   insights	   it	   also	   leaves	   unanswered	   what	   unique	  factors	  were	   responsible	  within	   a	   country	   to	   drastically	   augment	   these	   inputs	  (1996:	  152).	  Here	  it	  is	  worth	  to	  interpret	  the	  huge	  differences	  of	  state	  action	  but	  also	  the	  similarities	  of	  those	  countries	  that	  were	  most	  successful:	  	  	   “Governments	   intervened	   actively	   in	   the	   market,	   but	   used,	   complemented,	  regulated,	   and	   indeed	   created	   markets,	   rather	   than	   supplanted	   them.	  Governments	   created	   an	   environment	   in	   which	   markets	   could	   thrive.	  Governments	   promoted	   exports,	   education,	   and	   technology;	   encouraged	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cooperation	   between	   government	   and	   industry	   and	   between	   firms	   and	   their	  workers;	  and	  at	  the	  same	  time	  encouraged	  competition.”	  (Stiglitz	  1996:	  174)	  	  Examining	   the	   potentially	   positive	   effects	   of	  more	   interventionist	   policies	   is	  central	   for	   the	   economic	   debate,	   but	   asking	   how	   and	   why	   they	   could	   be	  implemented	   in	   the	   first	   place	   requires	   a	   more	   general	   socio-­‐political	  approach.	   Adding	   up	   state	   actions	   does	   not	   answer	   what	   kind	   of	   state	   lies	  behind	   them	   (Howell	   2006:	  275).	  This	  was	   the	   essential	   contribution	  of	   the	  theory	  of	   the	  Developmental	   State	   (e.g.	  Chang	  2006;	  Amsden	  2001;	   Johnson	  1999;	   Woo-­‐Cumings	   1999	   Wade	   1990).	   This	   approach	   describes	   a	   kind	   of	  state	   that	   drove	   industrialization	   in	   a	  way	   that	  was	   prevalent	   in	   East-­‐Asian	  countries,	   above	   all	   Japan,	   South	   Korea	   and	   Taiwan.	   As	   the	   subsequent	  discussion	   will	   reveal,	   the	   focus	   on	   East	   Asia	   does	   not	   necessarily	   imply	  another	   cultural	   explanation.	  Rather,	   at	   the	   core	  of	   the	  Developmental	   State	  model	   is	   an	   institutional	   explanation	   of	   growth	   in	   industrial	   late-­‐comers	  based	  on	  the	  positive	  role	  of	  the	  state.	  	  Before	  one	  can	  discuss	  various	  theories	  describing	  the	  East-­‐Asian	  states’	  role	  in	  fostering	  their	  economy	  it	   is	   important	  to	  define	  what	  constitutes	  development.	  Compared	   to	   economic	   growth	   the	   term	   is	   rather	   fuzzy	   and	   different	   authors	  include	   varying	   criteria.	   Economic	   growth	   can	   simply	   be	   described	   and	  measured	   as	   the	   inflation-­‐adjusted	   per	   capita	   value	   of	   goods	   and	   services.	  However,	   economic	   development	   is	   a	   normative	   term	   and	   can	   go	   beyond	  aggregate	   output	   by	   including	   for	   example	   such	   criteria	   as:	   Improvements	   in	  healthcare,	   education,	   welfare	   and	   the	   environment;	   greater	   social	   and/or	  political	  equality;	  a	  change	  in	  dominant	  sectors	  of	  production	  from	  agriculture	  to	  industry	   and	   services;	   (Perkins/Radelet/Lindauer	   2006:	   31).	   Analytically	   it	   is	  useful	   to	  set	   the	  bar	  higher	  and	   thus	  arrive	  at	  developmental	  criteria	   that	  only	  few	  economies	  have	  met	  historically.	  Howell	  (2006:	  276)	  defines	  Developmental	  States	  in	  addition	  to	  their	  normative	  agendas	  and	  social,	  political	  and	  economic	  institutional	  setup,	  by	  their	  capacity	  to	  deliver	  not	  only	  rapid	  economic	  growth	  but	   also	   	   “general	   well-­‐being,	   measured	   in	   terms	   of	   social	   indicators	   such	   as	  literacy,	  health	  status,	   life	  expectancy	  and	  per	  capita	   income.”	  This	  approach	  to	  
	   14	  
development	  will	  be	  taken	  into	  account	  after	  considering	  the	  main	  theories	  that	  focus	  on	  state	  institutions.	  	  
Chapter	  2	  –	  Japan:	  Chalmers	  Johnson’s	  Developmental	  State	  	  The	   Developmental	   States	   first	   appearance	   both	   historically	   and	   as	   a	   concept	  was	  the	  case	  of	  Japan.6	  In	  his	  seminal	  work	  about	  industrial	  policy	  in	  the	  mid	  20th	  century	  Japan,	  Chalmers	  Johnson	  coined	  the	  term	  Developmental	  State	  (Johnson	  1982).	   Writing	   during	   the	   Cold	   War,	   he	   emphasized	   a	   form	   of	   state-­‐led	  capitalism	  that	  fell	  between	  the	  dichotomy	  of	  the	  western	  liberal	  model	  and	  the	  Soviet	   planned	   economy	   (Johnson	   1990:	   32).	   As	   the	   Japanese	   faced	   a	   world	  dominated	   by	  western	   powers,	   nationalism	   focused	   on	   economic	   strength	   and	  justified	  a	  powerful	   state,	  which	   could	  pursue	   this	  goal	   (Woo-­‐Cummings	  1999:	  5–7).	   This	   has	   not	   changed	   before,	   during	   or	   after	   the	   Second	   World	   War.	  “Overcoming	   depression”,	   “war	   preparation	   and	   war	   fighting”,	   “postwar	  reconstruction”	   and	   “independence	   from	   U.S.	   aid”	   all	   required	   economic	  development	   (Johnson	   1982:	   380).	   The	   wartime	   period	   did	   not	   only	   spawn	  Japanese	   nationalism,	   but	   also	   Chinese	   communist	   nationalism	   and	   helps	   in	  understanding	   other	   prominent	   cases	   of	   the	   East	   Asian	   Developmental	   State	  such	   as	  Korea	   and	  Taiwan	   (Woo-­‐Cummings	  1999:	   8).	   Thus,	   for	   Johnson,	   Japan	  becoming	   the	   second	   largest	   economy	   in	   the	   world	   is	   rooted	   in	   “consistent	  government	   policies,	   dating	   from	   at	   least	   the	   1920s.”	   (Johnson	   1999:	   37)	   His	  Developmental	  State	  model	  has	  the	  following	  characteristics:	  	  The	   state’s	   highest	   and	   consistent	   priority	   is	   economic	   development	   and	  potentially	  conflicting	  goals	  take	  a	  back	  seat	  (Maier	  2009:	  41).	  Intervention	  per	  se	  does	  not	  distinguish	  Developmental	  States,	  but	  rather	  its	  nature:	  When	  states	  in	  western	  liberal	  market	  economies	  perform	  regulatory	  intervention,	  they	  focus	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  This	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  theories	  about	  state	  involvement	  in	  economic	  transformation	  go	  back	  to	  Johnson,	  but	  the	  term	  ‚Developmental	  State’	  and	  several	  specific	  features	  discussed	  here	  do.	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on	   maintaining	   rules,	   but	   without	   following	   a	   particular	   developmental	   goal	  (Johnson	  1982:	  17–19).7	  	  	  The	  development	  priority	  leads	  to	  the	  problem	  of	  how	  the	  bureaucracy	  interacts	  with	  private	  enterprise.	  Japan	  has	  experimented	  with	  three	  options:	  	  	   1) Self-­‐control:	  Private	  business	  may	  operate	  more	  freely	  but	  is	  required	  to	  report	   to	   the	   bureaucracy.	   The	   Zaibatsu8	  performs	   important	   economic	  functions	  by	  receiving	  a	  cartel	  granted	  by	  the	  state	  within	  an	  industry.	  2) State	   control:	   Official	   direction	   of	   enterprise	   and	   industry	   especially	  during	  wartime	  in	  order	  to	  meet	  military	  needs.	  3) Cooperation:	   The	   form	  of	   bureaucracy-­‐civilian	   interaction	   accomplished	  by	  an	  institution	  such	  as	  the	  Ministry	  of	  International	  Trade	  and	  Industry	  (MITI).	  	  	  The	  later	  forms	  emerged	  after	  World	  War	  II	  and	  during	  the	  American	  occupation,	  when	  the	  military	  ceased	  to	  play	  an	  important	  role	  and	  the	  Zaibatsu’s	  economic	  functions	  became	  exclusively	  that	  of	  the	  state	  (Johnson	  1999:	  38).	  	  	  State	  guidance	  of	  the	  economy	  is	  exercised	  through	  a	  meritocratic	  elite	  forming	  a	  small	  but	  efficient	  body	  of	  officials	  who	  identify	  prospective	  industries,	  select	  the	  instruments	  that	   lead	  to	  fast	  development	  and	  regulate	  competition	  in	  order	  to	  retain	  market	   forces	   (Johnson	  1982:	  315).	   In	   Japan’s	   case	  MITI	  performed	   this	  function.	  Methods	   used	   include	   control	   of	   trade	   and	   capital	   controls.	   The	   first	  had	   been	   implemented	   already	   in	   1949	   through	   a	   law	   requiring	   all	   foreign	  exchange	   earned	   through	   exports	   to	   be	   sold	   to	   a	   central	   bank.	   This	   foreign	  exchange	   budget	   would	   be	   used	   for	   targeted	   industrial	   policy.	   The	   Foreign	  Capital	  Law	  of	  1950	  established	  a	  committee	  by	  which	  basically	  all	  foreign	  direct	  investment	  (FDI)	  had	  to	  be	  licensed	  by	  the	  State	  and	  thus	  conditions	  could	  easily	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  This	   notion	   is	   highly	   debatable	   since	  Western	   states	   have	  historically	   intervened	  heavily	   and	  continue	  to	  do	  so,	  often	  on	  behalf	  of	  special	  interests	  (comp.	  Chang	  2006).	  Nevertheless	  the	  point	  stands	  that	  intervention	  didn’t	  serve	  a	  long-­‐term	  development	  strategy.	  8	  Zaibatsu	   is	   the	   Japanese	   term	   for	   the	   large	   business	   and	   financial	   conglomerates,	   which	  dominated	  the	  economy	  especially	  during	  the	  inter-­‐war	  period.	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be	   attached.	   These	   two	   instruments	   resulted	   in	   a	   trade	   policy	   geared	   towards	  import	   substitution	   of	   finished	   goods	   and	   acquisition	   of	   foreign	   technology	  (Johnson	  1988:	  194;	  217).	  	  	  A	  successful	  Developmental	  State	   further	  needs	  a	  political	  system	  that	  restricts	  legislative	   and	   judicial	   interference	   with	   the	   economy-­‐guiding	   bureaucracy	   by	  acting	   only	   as	   “safety	   valves”	   (Johnson	   1999:	   38).	   This	   means,	   that	   the	  bureaucracy	   is	   effectively	   insulated	   from	   interest	   groups	   that	   would	   seek	   to	  lobby	  the	  state	  for	  individual	  rather	  than	  general	  benefits.	  	  	  Finally	   Johnson	   underlines	   “the	   perfection	   of	   market-­‐conforming	   methods	   of	  state	   intervention	   in	   the	   economy”	   (Johnson	   1999:	   39).	   This	   would	   include	  government	   financial	   institutions,	   the	   use	   of	   tax	   incentives	   and	   the	   setting	   of	  goals	   for	   the	   economy,	   public-­‐	   and	   mixed	   public-­‐private	   corporations	   and	  government	   licensing.	   The	   label	   “market-­‐conforming”	   seems	   misleading	   as	   is	  best	  illustrated	  by	  the	  notion	  that:	  	  	   “Perhaps	   the	   most	   important	   market-­‐conforming	   method	   of	   intervention	   is	  administrative	  guidance.	  …	  It	  is	  necessary	  to	  avoid	  overly	  detailed	  laws	  that	  …	  put	  a	   strait	   jacket	   on	   creative	   administration.	   …	   Highly	   detailed	   statutes	   serve	   the	  interests	  of	  lawyers,	  not	  of	  development.”	  (Johnson	  1999:39)	  	  What	   essentially	   conforms	   to	   the	   market	   is	   the	   freedom	   of	   a	   managerial	   and	  bureaucratic	  elite,	  consisting	  of	  public	  and	  private	  elements,	  to	  pursue	  a	  national	  development	   goal	   using	   the	   above-­‐mentioned	   instruments	   at	   their	   own	  discretion.	  MITI	  supposedly	  realized	  these	  features	  to	  a	  degree	  hitherto	  not	  seen	  in	  any	  other	  industrialized	  state	  (Johnson	  1999:39).	  The	  important	  question	  then	  becomes	  whether	  the	  Japanese	  Developmental	  State	  is	  a	  reproducible	  model	  or	  somehow	   unique.	   Johnson	   suggests	   something	   in	   between:	   In	   order	   to	   be	  effective,	   the	   Japanese	   model	   needs	   a	   society	   committed	   to	   industrial	  development.	   In	   effect,	   the	   economy	   was	   “mobilized	   for	   war	   but	   never	  demobilized	   during	   peacetime”	   (Johnson	   1999:	   41).	   This	   implies	   two	   sets	   of	  hurdles	   for	   potential	   emulators.	   For	   relatively	   more	   liberal	   societies	   such	   a	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departure	  from	  free	  markets	  would	  go	  hand	  in	  hand	  with	  high	  political	  costs.	  For	  relatively	   less	   liberal	   countries	   in	  most	   of	   the	   developing	  world,	   concentrating	  more	   economic	   power	   in	   state	   hands	   without	   the	   societal	   commitment	   to	   a	  common	  development	  goal	  is	  prone	  to	  corruption	  and	  monopolistic	  practices.	  It	  is	   therefore	   necessary	   to	   examine	   the	   only	   two	   countries	   that	   fit	   the	   label	  together	  with	  important	  studies	  of	  their	  successful	  economic	  development.	  	  	  
Chapter	  3	  –	  Taiwan:	  Robert	  Wade’s	  theory	  of	  the	  Governed	  Market	  	  Wade	   pointed	   out	   that	   Johnson	   had	   successfully	   characterized	   the	   Japanese	  Developmental	   State,	   but	   did	   not	   offer	   a	   proper	   theory	   of	   it.	  Wade’s	  governed	  
market	  theory	  builds	  on	  the	  basic	  ideas	  of	  Johnson,	  but	  is	  set	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  controversy	  of	  developmental	  economics	  between	  the	  neo-­‐liberal	  or	  Washington	  Consensus	   view	   and	   the	   proponents	   of	   varying	   degrees	   of	   state	   intervention	  (Wade	  1993:	  26).	  	  The	  main	  conclusion	  offered	  was	  that	  East-­‐Asian	  success	  was	  based	  on:	  	  	   1) Very	   high	   levels	   of	   productive	   investment,	   making	   for	   fast	   transfer	   of	  newer	  techniques	  into	  actual	  production	  	  2) More	   investment	   in	   certain	   key	   industries	   than	  would	  have	  occurred	   in	  the	  absence	  of	  government	  intervention	  	  3) Exposure	   of	   many	   industries	   to	   international	   competition,	   in	   foreign	  markets	  if	  not	  at	  home.	  	  (Wade	  1993:	  26;	  exact	  quotes)	  	  The	  key	  point	  is	  that	  a	  governed	  market	  consciously	  strays	  from	  pareto-­‐efficient	  resource	  allocation	  in	  the	  short	  run	  in	  order	  to	  accommodate	  a	  successful	  long-­‐	  term	  growth	  strategy	  that	  would	  not	  have	  been	  the	  outcome	  of	  a	  completely	  free	  market.	   The	   East-­‐Asian	   experience	   of	   Japan,	   South	   Korea	   and	   Taiwan	   have	  followed	   this	   strategy	   in	   various	   configurations	   and	   they	   have	   seen	   high	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economic	   growth	   rates	   in	   the	   second	  half	   of	   the	  20th	   century.	  Wade’s	   research	  tries	  to	  move	  beyond	  this	  correlation	  to	  find	  a	  causative	  structure.	  	  	  It	   is	   further	   necessary	   to	   distinguish	   between	   a	   corpus	   of	   economic	   policy	  measures,	   which	   promise	   certain	   effects	   and	   the	   political	   economy	   capable	   of	  enacting	   them.	   It	   is	   helpful	   to	   consider	   the	   kinds	   of	   measures	   determined	   by	  Wade	   as	   underlying	   Taiwan’s	   success	   before	   turning	   to	   the	   structure	   of	   the	  bureaucracy	  and	  the	  state	  in	  general:	  	  Regulation	  of	   foreign	   trade	  and	   capital	   flows	  was	  used	  by	   the	   state	   to	  mediate	  between	   a	   need	   for	   national	   capacity	   building	   without	   curbing	   incentives	   by	  sheltering	   local	   producers	   from	   international	   competition.	   Therefore	  protectionist	   measures	   were	   neither	   erected	   uniformly	   nor	   under	   pressure	   of	  powerful	   interest	   groups.	   Rather	   an	   industry-­‐bias	   emerged,	   consistent	   with	   a	  wider	  development	  goal.	   Selected	  export	   industries	  had	  no	  anti-­‐export	  bias,	   as	  was	   the	   case	   with	   other	   developing	   countries,	   while	   the	   import-­‐competing	  industry	   received	   ample	   incentive	   to	   sell	   domestically	   (Wade	   1990:	   116–117).	  FDI	  was	  channeled	  towards	  joint	  ventures	  and	  technology	  transfer.	  Local	  content	  requirements	   and	   restrictions	   on	   remittances	   were	   subject	   to	   negotiation,	  depending	   on	   the	   interest	   of	   the	   government	   in	   the	   respective	   foreign	   firm	  (Wade	  1990:	  148–157).	  	  A	   policy	   of	   stable	   exchange-­‐rate	   devaluation	   served	   as	   an	   export	   incentive	  together	  with	  concrete	  policies	  such	  as	  allowing	  exporters	  larger	  entitlements	  to	  foreign	  exchange	  or	  concessional	  export	  credits.	  In	  addition,	  tax	  alleviations	  for	  specific	  industrial	  goods	  were	  tied	  to	  export	  volume	  requirements	  (Wade	  1990:	  119).	  	  	  The	   tariff	   regime	   was	   designed	   in	   a	   way	   not	   to	   hinder	   raw	   materials	   and	  components	  necessary	  for	  export	  goods,	  while	  duties	  on	  machinery	  were	  tied	  to	  the	  existence	  of	  local	  suppliers	  or	  whether	  they	  were	  used	  in	  specific	  industries	  wherein	   expansion	   was	   pushed	   strongest.	   The	   items	   permissible	   for	   duty	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exemption	  were	  specifically	  listed.	  Non-­‐tariff	  barriers	  accompanied	  this	  regime,	  geared	  towards	  export	  promotion	  (Wade	  1990:	  127ff.)	  	  Besides	   selective	   protection,	   the	   Taiwanese	   government	   has	   engaged	   in	   active	  export	   promotion,	   especially	   during	   the	   1960s	   and	   70s,	   which	   had	   been	  gradually	   scaled	   back	   since	   then.	   Export	   processing	   zones	   were	   established,	  wherein	   firms	  had	  been	  required	  to	  export	  all	  of	   their	  production	   in	  return	   for	  tariff	   exemptions,	   access	   to	   infrastructure	   and	   simplified	   administrative	  procedures.	   Furthermore,	   even	   if	   producers	   were	   required	   to	   favor	   local	  providers	  of	   inputs,	  their	  protection	  was	  conditional	  on	  converging	  their	  prices	  with	   the	   world	   market	   (Wade	   1990:	   139–41).	   The	   already	   mentioned	   export	  credits	  were	  provided	  with	  regard	  to	  firms	  export	  performance	  and	  future	  plans.	  Even	   export	   cartels	  were	   promoted	   by	   setting	   quotas	   for	   individual	  members.	  Wade	  concludes	  that:	  	  	   “The	   state	   has	   interfered	   in	   trade	   not	   less,	   but	   differently,	   than	   many	   other	  developing	   countries.	   As	   gatekeeper	   of	   the	   national	   economy,	   it	   has	   scrutinized	  inflows	  and	  outflows	  and	  affected	  the	  terms	  of	   transactions	   in	   line	  with	  national	  objectives.”	  	  (Wade	  1990:	  157)	  	  Considering	   the	   evident	   incompatibility	   with	   neo-­‐classical	   theory	   of	   trade	  distortions,	   it	   is	   important	   to	   remember	   that	   the	   governed-­‐market	   theory	  focuses	  on	  the	  interplay	  of	  several	  components	  of	  state	  initiative,	  which	  have	  to	  work	  together	  in	  order	  to	  function.	  The	  Taiwanese	  government	  has	  pursued	  its	  development	   goal	   with	   other	  methods,	   complementing	   the	   policies	   on	   foreign	  trade	   and	   investment.	   Complimentary	   arrangements	   involved	   the	   banking	  system,	  national	  enterprises,	  a	  fiscal	  investment	  scheme	  and	  the	  national	  budget	  directly	  (Wade	  1990:	  159).	  	  The	  Taiwanese	  financial	  system	  had	  not	  been	  diversified,	  but	  was	  dominated	  by	  state	   owned	   banks.	   While	   a	   curb	   market	   existed,	   mainly	   small	   businesses	  depended	  on	   it,	  while	   large	   and	  medium	  size	   firms	   received	   financing	   through	  the	   banks.	   All	   their	   transactions	   had	   to	   be	   reported	   to	   the	   central	   bank	   on	   a	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weekly	  basis.	  	  	  Bank	  loans	  were	  preferential	  since	  they	  came	  at	  a	  lower	  cost	  than	  the	   curb	   market;	   the	   government	   had	   set	   priority	   industries	   for	   them	   (Wade	  1990:	  161–8).	  	  	  	  In	  the	  three	  decades	  from	  1950–1980	  public	  enterprises	  had	  an	  average	  share	  of	  11.7%	  of	  GDP	  at	  factor	  cost.9	  They	  were	  concentrated	  in	  capital-­‐intensive	  sectors	  with	   high	   linkages	   to	   downstream	   markets	   such	   as	   petroleum	   refining,	  petrochemicals,	   steel,	   shipbuilding	   etc.	   Historically	   these	   enterprises	   had	   been	  linked	   to	   strategic	   considerations	   and	   the	   military.	   But	   they	   also	   served	   the	  purpose	   of	   easing	   access	   for	   private	   firms	   to	   sectors	  with	   high	   entry	   barriers.	  During	   the	   1970s	   public	   enterprises	   have	   accounted	   for	   10%	   of	   the	  government’s	  net	  revenue	  (Wade	  1990:	  180).	  	  	  Another	   industry	  promoting	  tool	  were	  specialized	  funds	  out	  of	  the	  government	  budget.	   The	   Sino-­‐American	   Fund	   for	   Economic	   and	   Social	   Development,	  established	  in	  1965,	  was	  intended	  to	  foster	  innovation	  and	  increase	  productivity	  and	   trade.	   The	   Development	   Fund	   from	   1973	   targeted	   specific	   technology-­‐intensive	  enterprises	  in	  accordance	  with	  economic	  planning	  (Wade	  1990:	  169).	  Tax	   incentives	   favor	   technology-­‐intensive	   enterprises	   as	   well.	   Eligibility	  combined	  a	  strategic	  pre-­‐selection	  of	  products	  with	  performance	  standards.	  	  	  Together	   these	   measures	   amount	   to	   a	   high	   degree	   of	   interference	   in	   the	   free	  market,	  but	  as	  Wade	  points	  out:	  	   “Taiwan’s	  industrial	  policies	  affect	  firms	  in	  the	  small	  scale	  sector	  very	  little,	  at	   least	  until	  those	   firms	  wish	  to	  deal	  with	  the	   international	  economy;	  and	  even	  then	  the	  potential	  for	  
discretionary	  intervention	   is	  by	  no	  means	  generally	  used.	  For	   large	  parts	  of	   the	  economy,	  the	   policy	   strategy	   has	   been	   to	   structure	   the	   incentive	   environment	   in	   such	   a	  way	   that	  
autonomous	  profit-­‐seeking	  will	   lead	   firms	  to	  behave	   in	  ways	  that	  aggregate	  up	  to	  national	  
goals	  —	  or	  at	  least	  not	  aggregate	  to	  something	  inconsistent	  with	  national	  goals.”	  	  (Wade	  1990:	  192–3;	  emphasis	  mine)	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  Calculated	  from	  three	  year	  averages	  provided	  in	  Wade	  1990:	  177;	  orig.	  in	  Short,	  R:	  The	  role	  of	  public	   enterprises:	   an	   international	   statistical	   comparison	   (Department	   Memorandum	   Series	  83/84/International	   Monetary	   Fund/Washington	   D.C./	   1983);	   The	   calculation	   at	   factor	   cost	  rather	  than	  at	  market	  prices	  excludes	  subsidies	  and	  indirect	  taxes.	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  The	   two	   arguments	   emphasized	   here	   again	   point	   to	   the	   central	   feature	   of	   the	  governed	  market	   theory,	   namely	   the	   use	   of	   a	   general	   economic	   plan	   requiring	  resource	   allocations	   which	   differ	   from	   short-­‐term	   oriented	   market	   forces,	  without	  stifling	  free	  enterprise.	  This	  seems	  like	  a	  walk	  on	  a	  tightrope.	  The	  second	  aspect	  of	  Wade’s	  theory,	  and	  the	  one	  central	   to	   Johnson’s	  study	  of	   Japan,	   is	   the	  institutional	  arrangements	  and	  the	  polity	  that	  upholds	  them.	  The	  specific	  policy	  mix	  is	  less	  important	  than	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  state	  with	  the	  capacity	  to	  implement,	  coordinate	   and	   adjust	   it	   in	   pursuit	   of	   national	   development.	   In	   practice,	   this	  requires	  the	  state	  to	  have	  a	  bureaucracy	  specialized	  for	  this	  purpose.	  	  There	  was	  no	  single	  pilot	  agency	  in	  Taiwan	  such	  as	  MITI	  in	  Japan,	  but	  rather	  one	  informal	  and	  one	  formal	  body	  acted	  as	  the	  “economic	  general	  staff”.	  The	  Council	  for	  Economic	  Planning	  and	  Development	  (CEPD)	  was	  advisory	  to	  the	  cabinet	  but	  employed	  a	  staff	  of	  over	  three	  hundred.	  It	  consisted	  of	  selected	  cabinet	  members	  and	   the	   governor	   of	   the	   central	   bank.	   Their	   job	   was	   to	   analyze	   the	   current	  economic	   situation,	   to	   evaluate	   large	   projects	   by	   state	   enterprises	   and	   to	  formulate	  macroeconomic	  development	  plans.	   Since	   the	   council	   had	  no	  official	  authority	  it	  acted	  as	  a	  bridge	  between	  different	  ministries	  (Wade	  1990:	  196).	  	  The	  central	  institution	  for	  governing	  the	  market	  was	  the	  Industrial	  Development	  Bureau	  (IDB).	  It	  was	  responsible	  for	  drafting	  detailed	  plans	  with	  consideration	  of	  the	   CEPD’s	   general	   plans.	   Its	   powers	   covered	   issues	   of	   trade	   and	   foreign	  investment	   as	   well	   as	   domestic	   industrial	   policy.	   It	   directed	   the	   above-­‐mentioned	  tools	  and	  concessions	  for	  industrial	  promotion	  and	  had	  less	  to	  say	  on	  monetary	  matters	  of	  course,	  but	  was	  involved	  in	  tax	  policy	  and	  worked	  together	  with	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Finance	  (Wade	  1990:	  201–8).	  	  The	   top	   decision	  makers	   of	   industrial	   policy	   usually	   had	   previously	   served	   in	  public	  enterprises	  or	  different	  government	  agencies	  and	  were	  integrated	  into	  an	  informal	   network	   of	   working	   relations	   across	   relevant	   institutions.	   The	  personnel	   was	   recruited	   from	   the	   top	   tier	   of	   graduates	   and	   consisted	  predominantly	  of	  engineers	  rather	  than	  economists	  (Wade	  1990:	  225).	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  Most	   importantly,	   these	   institutions	   were	   not	   marginalized	   in	   the	   executive	  branch	  but	  right	  at	   the	  center	  of	  power.	  Due	  to	   their	  mission	  as	  planners,	  both	  institutions	  promoted	   the	   long-­‐term	  developmental	   strategies	   in	   their	  dealings	  with	   the	   individual	   ministries	   or	   the	   central	   bank.	   The	   latter	   two	   needed	   to	  devote	  their	  resources	  to	  the	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  business.	  Finally,	  this	  leading	  economic	  bureaucracy	  was	  largely	  insulated	  from	  special	  interests.	  This	  last	  point	  needs	  to	  be	  examined	  more	  closely	  within	  the	  context	  of	  Taiwan’	  political	  system.	  	  Taiwan	   was	   characterized	   by	   Wade	   as	   an	   “authoritarian-­‐corporatist”	   state,	  during	  its	  catching	  up	  phase	  prior	  to	  1987	  (Wade	  1990:	  228).	  In	  terms	  of	  policy	  setting	  capabilities,	  this	  political	  structure	  makes	  the	  rulers	  much	  less	  reliant	  on	  expressions	   of	   popular	   preferences.	   In	   addition	   they	   were	   insulated	   from	  interest	  groups	  that	  would	  have	  voluntarily	  formed	  outside	  the	  political	  elite.	  	  	  Similarly	   to	   Johnson,	  Wade	  points	   to	   the	  situational	  as	  well	  as	  cultural	  aspects,	  which	  benefitted	  the	  formation	  of	  one-­‐party	  states.	  As	  in	  the	  Japanese	  case,	  the	  Kuomintang	  (KMT)	  and	  their	   formation	  of	   the	  new	  State	  was	  shaped	  by	  World	  War	  II	  and	  in	  addition	  by	  the	  civil	  war.	  Moreover,	  the	  newly	  arrived	  KMT	  came	  across	  the	  remnants	  of	  the	  extremely	  authoritarian	  colonial	  structures	  from	  the	  sixty	   years	   of	   Japanese	   rule	   (Wade	   1990:	   229–231).	   According	   to	   Wade,	   the	  “Japanese	   colonial	   administration	   [of	   Taiwan	   and	   Korea]	   had	   carefully	   limited	  the	  growth	  of	  organizations	  in	  native	  hands.	  Distinct	  from	  other	  colonialisms,	  the	  Japanese	   administrators	   did	   not	   build	   dispersed	   strongmen	   as	   their	   agents	   of	  rule;	   and	  no	  Western	   entrepreneurs	  had	   independent	   access	   to	   the	   economies	  through	  which	   to	  make	   reinforcing	  deals	  with	  organizations	  outside	   the	   state.”	  (Wade	  1990:	  338)	  	  But	   there	  were	   two	   pronounced	   differences	   to	   Johnson’s	  model	   of	   Japan:	   One	  was	  the	  role	  of	  politicians	  as	  safety	  valves	  and	  as	  separate	  from	  the	  bureaucratic	  elite.	  In	  a	  one-­‐party	  state	  these	  functions	  are	  rather	  fused	  together.	  The	  second	  deviation	  only	  concerns	   the	   “cooperation	  stage”	  of	   Japan	  after	   the	  war,	  namely	  the	  role	  of	  the	  military.	  In	  Wade’s	  words:	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   “[Contrary	   to	   Japan],	   Taiwan,	   like	   Korea,	   is	   not	   merely	   a	   militarized	   regime,	   but	   a	  militarized	   society.	   The	  military	   has	   veto	   power	   over	   the	   selection	   of	   top-­‐most	   political	  leaders;	   and	   beyond	   this,	   it	   inculcates	   military	   notions	   of	   discipline,	   authority,	   and	  vigilance	  throughout	  society.”	  (Wade	  1990:	  253)	  	  	  	  	  The	  Taiwanese	  state	  built	  on	  an	  authoritarian	  and	  centralized	  tradition.	  Coupled	  with	  the	  geo-­‐political	  and	  historical	  potential	  of	  armed	  conflict	  it	  had	  the	  means	  and	   the	   incentives	   to	   pursue	   a	   long-­‐term	   development	   strategy.	   Maybe	   the	  regime	   also	   required	   rising	   living	   standards	   to	   bolster	   its	   legitimacy.	   Probably	  the	   state’s	   consistent	   involvement	   in	   the	   economy	   can	   be	   explained	   by	   a	  combination	   of	   internal	   and	   external	   factors.	   How	   about	   explaining	   their	  success?	  	  As	  mentioned,	  the	  main	  argument	  of	  the	  governed	  market	  theory	  focuses	  on	  the	  deliberate	   deviation	   of	   short-­‐term	   goals	   in	   order	   to	   reach	   sustained	   growth	   in	  the	   long	   run.	   The	   main	   point	   of	   criticism	   is	   the	   inability	   of	   the	   state	   to	   pick	  winners.	   Here	   Wade	   argued	   that	   by	   coordinating	   different	   tools,	   East	   Asian	  governments	   made	   winners	   (Wade	   1990:334).	   This	   required	   a	   sustained	  government	  commitment,	  which	  could	  be	  undermined	  by	  corruption	  and	  abuse	  of	   power.	   Thus,	   Wade’s	   characterization	   of	   the	   “authoritarian-­‐corporatist”	   or	  more	   generally	   “hard”	   state	   is	   crucial	   (Wade	   1990:	   337).	   The	   insulation	   from	  popular	  preference	  and	  private	  interest	  groups	  limits	  corruption,	  but	  this	  cannot	  explain	  a	   lack	  of	  power	  abuse.	  Unfortunately	   this	   last	   issue	   remains	   somewhat	  open.	  The	  reason	  for	  the	  emergence	  of	  a	  “hard	  state”	  are	  summarized	  by	  Wade	  as	  follows:	  	  	   “Initial	   social	   disruption	   [losing	   the	   civil	   war],	   threats	   from	   other	   states	   [China],	   poor	  natural	   resource	   endowment,	   and	   the	   social	   basis	   for	   an	   independent	   bureaucracy	   all	  strengthened	  the	  governments	  hand	  and	  helped	  maintain	  the	  edge	  of	  their	  commitment	  to	  economic	  development.”	  (Wade	  1990:	  341)	  	  These	  issues	  were	  not	  the	  focus	  of	  Wade’s	  study.	  It	  suffices	  to	  establish	  that	  the	  political	   structures	   were	   adequately	   described,	   without	   providing	   a	   detailed	  analysis	   of	   their	   origins.	   The	   existence	   of	   a	   “hard	   state”	   must	   be	   treated	   as	   a	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general	   precondition	   for	   a	   Developmental	   State,	   but	   the	   degree	   of	   “hardness”	  may	  obviously	  vary,	  considering	  Japan’s	  very	  reduced	  version.	  It	  is	  important	  not	  to	  misinterpret	  that	  feature	  as	  an	  endorsement	  of	  authoritarianism	  for	  the	  sake	  of	   economic	   growth.	   After	   all,	   truly	   totalitarian	   states	   like	   North	   Korea	   are	  seldom	  role	  models	   for	  development.	  The	  essential	   features	  of	  a	  hard	  state	  are	  the	   capacity	   to	  pursue	   a	  development	   strategy	   independently.	   Furthermore,	   as	  Stiglitz	  has	  argued	  as	  well,	  adaptability	  of	  government	  policies	  was	  essential	  for	  continued	   growth:	   “Government	   policies	   adapted	   to	   changing	   economic	  circumstances,	   rather	   than	   remaining	   fixed.	  As	   the	  East	  Asian	   economies	   grew	  more	  complex,	  government	  had	  less	  need	  to	  assume	  an	  active	  role	  and	  found	  it	  more	   difficult	   to	   act	   effectively	   on	   a	   broad	   scale.”	   (1996:	   172)	   Thus,	  independence	  from	  special	  interests	  without	  being	  out	  of	  touch	  with	  society	  are	  the	   most	   important	   features	   for	   a	   Developmental	   State,	   otherwise	   a	   sensible	  development	  strategy	  might	  be	  captured	  or	  misdirected	  over	  time.	  	  	  Based	   on	   Johnson’s	   description	   of	   Japan,	   Wade	   has	   sought	   to	   create	   a	   more	  comprehensive	  theory	  of	  how	  East	  Asian	  states	  have	  successfully	  “governed	  the	  market”.	  The	   focus	   lies	  on	   state	   institutions,	  namely	  a	  bureaucracy	   selected	  by	  merit	   that	   is	   insulated	   from	   special	   interest	   but	   connected	   with	   the	   private	  sector,	   allowing	   the	   formulation,	   coordination	   and	   adjustment	   of	   a	   long-­‐term	  development	  policy.	  The	  other	  successful	  case	  for	  industrial	  catching	  up,	  Korea,	  has	  similar	  attributes	  and	  will	  be	  discussed	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  Alice	  Amsden’s	  theory	  of	  growth	  through	  the	  independent	  asset	  approach.	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Chapter	  4	  –	  Korea:	  Amsden	  and	  the	  most	  successful	  “riser	  of	  the	  rest”	  	  Amsden’s	  work	  on	  the	  “rise	  of	  the	  rest”	  is	  not	  a	  case	  study	  on	  South	  Korea,	  but	  rather	   a	   broad	   comparative	   study	   of	   those	   states,	   which	   have	   successfully	  accomplished	   fairly	   continuous	   growth	   of	   manufacturing	   output	   during	   the	  second	  half	  of	  the	  20th	  century,	  that	  she	  collectively	  calls	  the	  “Rest”	  in	  contrast	  to	  the	   “West”.	   The	   group	   comprises	   China,	   India,	   Indonesia,	   Thailand,	   Malaysia,	  South	   Korea	   and	   Taiwan	   in	   Asia,	   Turkey	   in	   Europe	   and	   finally	   Brazil,	   Mexico,	  Argentina	  and	  Chile	   in	  Latin	  America.	  These	   countries	  had	  already	   to	   a	  degree	  acquired	   manufacturing	   experience	   before	  World	  War	   II	   and	   were	   capable	   of	  moving	   into	   mid-­‐technology	   industrial	   production	   (Amsden	   2001,	   p.	   1).	   This	  analysis	  builds	  on	  her	  earlier	  work,	  focusing	  on	  “Asia’s	  Next	  Giant”	  South	  Korea	  (Amsden	  1989).	  	  At	   the	   outset	   is	   the	   historical	   sequencing	   of	   industrialization	   that	   separates	  pioneers	  and	   innovators	   from	  learners.	  The	  means	   for	  agrarian	  societies	   in	   the	  twentieth	   century	   to	   catch	   up	   meant	   “using	   processes	   conceived	   by	   unallied	  economic	   and	  political	   units.”	   (Amsden	  1989:	   3).	   The	   crucial	   barrier	   remained	  the	   acquisition	   of	   sufficient	   “knowledge-­‐based	   assets”	   in	   the	   sense	   of	  “proprietary	  concepts”.	  They	  include	  managerial	  skills	  as	  well	  as	  technical	  know-­‐how.	  Three	  technological	  requirements	  are	  distinguished:	  	  	   “production	   capabilities	   (the	   skills	   necessary	   to	   transform	   inputs	   into	   outputs);	   project	  
execution	  capabilities	  (the	  skills	  necessary	  to	  expand	  capacity);	  and	  innovation	  capabilities	  (the	  skills	  necessary	  to	  design	  entirely	  new	  products	  and	  processes).”	  (Amsden	  2001:	  3)	  	  Even	  though	  the	  “Rest”	  possessed	  that	  record	  of	   industrial	  production,	  the	  skill	  deficit	  in	  all	  three	  categories	  relative	  to	  the	  first	  and	  second	  wave	  industrializers	  was	   considerable.	   Thus,	   all	   those	   countries,	   except	   for	   Argentina,	   met	   this	  backlog	   demand	   by	   building	   an	   institutional	   control	  mechanism	   through	   state	  institutions.	  Following	   the	   infant	   industry	  argument,	   local	  producers	  who	  were	  not	  competitive	  enough	   for	   the	   free	  world	  market	  needed	  state	  assistance.	  The	  downside	   of	   moral	   hazard	   and	   disincentives	   to	   gain	   productivity	   are	   evident.	  However,	  by	  applying	   the	   “principle	  of	   reciprocity”	  meant	   that	   the	  state	  would	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institute	   performance	   standards	   for	   selected	   industrial	   producers	   in	   exchange	  for	   protective	   measures	   and	   subsidies.	   The	   goal	   was	   to	   get	   firms	   to	   gain	   the	  necessary	   knowledge-­‐based	   assets	   needed	   to	   eventually	   compete	   without	  protection	   or	   subsidies	   (Amsden	   2001:	   8).	   More	   precisely,	   investment	   was	  needed	   in	   large-­‐scale	   production	   units,	   skilled	   labor	   in	   the	   managerial	   and	  technological	  fields	  and	  distribution	  networks	  (Amsden	  2001:	  70–98).10Or	  put	  a	  different	  way,	  the	  three	  sets	  of	  capabilities	  quoted	  above	  needed	  to	  be	  realized	  in	  fixed	  capital	  and	  human	  resources	  in	  addition	  to	  gaining	  market	  share.	  	  All	  countries	   in	  the	  “Rest”	  approached	  this	  strategy	  at	   first	  by	  subsidizing	  their	  import	   substitution	   industries.	   What	   eventually	   divided	   the	   group	   was	   the	  export	   quota	   extracted	   from	   the	   targeted	   sectors	   (Amsden	   2001:	   161).	  Where	  exporting	   was	   made	   part	   of	   performance	   standards,	   export	   shares	   in	   GDP	  skyrocketed.	   The	   causes	   for	   this	   division	   lie	   with	   the	   historically	   prevalent	  nature	   of	   manufacturing	   experience	   and	   also	   with	   the	   degree	   of	   income	  inequality.	  	  	  Three	  distinctive	  but	  not	  exclusive	  kinds	  of	  manufacturing	  experience	  prevailed	  among	   the	   “Rest”:	   Pre-­‐modern	   –	   stemming	   from	   pre-­‐industrial	   artisan	  production	  as	  for	  example	  in	  India,	  China	  or	  the	  Ottoman	  Empire.	  Émigré	  –	  the	  experience	   brought	   in	   by	   immigrant	   traders	   and	   artisans	   such	   as	   the	   Chinese	  communities	   all	   over	   South-­‐East	   Asia,	   foremost	   in	   Singapore.	   Colonial	   –	  depending	  on	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  colonial	  ties,	  knowledge	  was	  transferred	  and	  in	  many	   cases	   fixed	   capital	   in	   industry	   brought	   in.	   The	   colonial	   ties	   were	   either	  European	  or	  Japanese.	  Considering	  the	  success	  of	  Korea	  and	  Taiwan,	  the	  latter	  is	  considered	  by	  Amsden	  to	  have	  been	  the	  most	  valuable	  (Amsden	  2001:	  15;	  161).	  	  	  The	   reason	   for	   this	   is	   not	   the	   extent	   of	   actual	   fixed	   capital	   that	  was	   inherited	  from	   the	   Japanese.	   Indeed,	  measured	   in	  manufacturing	  value	  added	  per	   capita,	  Korea	  ($5)	  and	  Taiwan	  ($6)	  in	  1948	  compare	  poorly	  with	  most	  Latin	  American	  countries	  at	  the	  time,	  which	  exhibit	  values	  between	  $17	  in	  Peru	  up	  to	  $137	  for	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  Amsden	  follows	  the	  classic	  principle	  of	  „three-­‐pronged	  investment“	  as	  presented	  by	  Chandler	  Jr.:	  Scale	  and	  Scope:	  The	  Dynamics	  of	  Industrial	  Capitalism,	  Cambridge	  Mass.	  1990	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Argentina	   (Chang	  2006:	  169).11	  Rather,	  as	  mentioned	  above,	   the	  organizational	  structure	  of	  firms	  and	  industrial	  sectors	  was	  decisive.	  	  	  The	  other	  dividing	  factor	  was	  the	  level	  of	  income	  distribution.	  After	  World	  War	  II,	  countries	   in	   Latin	   America	   had	   higher	   inequalities	   in	   land	   and	   income	  distribution,	   while	   Japan,	   Korea	   and	   Taiwan	   were	   among	   the	   most	   equal	  societies	   in	   this	   regard	   (Amsden	   2001:	   18).	   These	   disparities	   result	   in	   a	  distinction	   of	   two	   developmental	   models.	   On	   the	   one	   hand,	   the	   Integrationist	  group	   includes	   those	   countries	   without	   a	   strong	   colonial	   manufacturing	  experience	   and	  which	   exhibit	   a	   high	   income-­‐inequality.	   On	   the	   other	   hand	   are	  the	   Independent	  group;	   those	   countries	   with	   extensive	   colonial	   manufacturing	  experience	  and	  equal	  societies.	  The	  labels	  do	  not	  refer	  to	  the	  original	  differences	  but	   rather	   to	   the	   diverging	   path	   of	   industrialization	   taken.	   The	   Integrationists	  featured	   a	   smaller	   average	   firm	   size,	   a	   policy	   that	   targeted	   exports	   less	   and	   a	  preference	   for	   the	   “buy”	   decision	   when	   acquiring	   new	   technology.	   The	  Independents	  had	   the	  opposite	   features	  of	   large	  national	   firm	   leaders,	   a	  policy	  targeting	   exports	   and	   preferring	   the	   “make”	   decision	   for	   technological	  innovation	  (Amsden	  2001:	  205–6).	  	  	  Unequal	   income	  distribution	   is	   a	   source	   of	   social	   and	  political	   uncertainty	   and	  thus	  limits	  the	  time	  horizon	  under	  which	  firms	  and	  officials	  operate.	  It	  favors	  the	  “buy”	   decision	   instead	   of	   the	   long-­‐term	   approach	   of	   the	   “make”	   decision.	   In	  addition	  it	  pushes	  states	  towards	  a	  diffusion	  of	  assets	  in	  order	  to	  prevent	  further	  unequal	   distribution.	   This	   aspect	   corresponds	   to	   Wade’s	   emphasis	   on	   the	  capabilities	  of	  hard	  states	  to	  extract	  and	  pool	  social	  resources.	  In	  addition,	  where	  income	  inequality	  is	  based	  on	  rents	  outside	  the	  manufacturing	  sector,	  e.g.	   large	  land	   holdings,	   it	   tends	   to	   draw	   or	   keep	   a	   countries	   elite	   form	   engaging	   in	  industrial	   capacity	   building	   (Amsden	   2001:	   205–6).	   In	   the	   opposite	   case	  according	  to	  Amsden:	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  Values	   are	   given	   in	   1958	   Dollars;	   Original	   source:	   United	   Nations,	   The	   Growth	   oft	   he	  Word	  Industry,	  1938–1961,	  1965	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“[A]n	  existing	  equal	  income	  distribution	  may	  be	  hypothesized	  to	  favor	  long-­‐termism	  and,	  paradoxically,	   a	   greater	   tolerance	   for	   rising	   concentration.	   To	   offset	   the	   social	   costs	   of	  rising	  concentration,	   targeted	   firms	  are	  subject	   to	  performance	  standards.	  Over	   time	  the	  most	  important	  standard	  involves	  heavy	  expenditure	  on	  R&D	  and	  other	  forms	  of	  learning.”	  (Amsden	  2001:	  206)	  	  This	   point	   is	   reinforced	   on	   a	   more	   general	   level	   by	   Stiglitz,	   who	   argues	   that	  government	   policies	   that	   supported	   income	   equality	   are	   an	   integral	   part	   of	  overall	   political	   stability,	   which	   in	   turn	   nurtures	   cooperative	   behavior	   of	   the	  private	  sector	  in	  form	  of	  an	  improved	  business	  climate	  and	  ultimately	  promoted	  economic	  growth	  (1996:	  172).	  	  Taiwan	   and	   Korea	   are	   the	   foremost	   examples	   of	   the	   independent	   path	   to	  development.	  This	  approach	  is	  fundamental	  for	  the	  model	  of	  the	  Developmental	  State,	   since	   it	   corresponds	   to	   the	   preceding	   research	   of	   Johnson	   and	   Wade.	  Because	   the	   Taiwanese	   case	   has	   been	   elaborated	   above,	   I	   will	   solely	   present	  Amsden’s	  findings	  for	  South	  Korea’s	  industrialization,	  but	  it	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  they	  correspond	  strongly	  to	  Wade’s	  study.	  	  
South	  Korea	  	  Under	  the	  treaty	  of	  Shimonoseki,	  which	  ended	  the	  Sino-­‐Japanese	  War	  of	  1894–5,	  the	   Qing	   dynasty	   had	   to	   relinquish	   its	   influence	   over	   the	   Korean	   peninsula.	  Subsequently,	   soon	   after	   proving	   victorious	   in	   the	   Russo-­‐Japanese	   war,	   the	  Japanese	   occupied	   Korea	   in	   1910.	   Since	   that	   time,	   Japan	   began	   to	   invest	   in	  industrial	  production	  there.	  The	  result	  was	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  proletariat,	  used	  to	  wage	   labor.	  By	  1940	   industrial	   output,	   almost	  non-­‐existent	  before,	  was	   almost	  equal	   to	   agricultural	   production	   (Amsden	   2001:	   102).	   The	   inclusion	   of	   native	  Koreans	   in	   salaried	   management	   gradually	   increased,	   even	   if	   most	   firms	  remained	   foreign-­‐owned	   (Amsden	  2001:105).	  The	   Japanese	  Zaibatsu	   served	  as	  the	   role	   model	   for	   the	   Korean	   Chaebols	   and	   thus	   transferred	   knowledge	   of	  production	   techniques	   as	  well	   as	   “project	   execution	   skills	   (in	   both	  private	  and	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public	   sectors)”	   (Amsden	   2001:103–5).	   The	   manufacturing	   experience	   falls	  clearly	  in	  the	  colonial	  category.12	  	  What	  distinguishes	  the	  independent	  industrializers,	  such	  as	  Korea,	  was	  a	  sudden	  disruption	   of	   firm	   ownership	   after	   decolonization.	   Japan’s	   unconditional	  surrender	  in	  August	  1945	  and	  the	  subsequent	  division	  of	  the	  Korean	  peninsula	  created	   the	  most	   abrupt	   decolonization	   and	   transfer	   of	   ownership	   in	   industry,	  paving	   the	   way	   for	   repatriating	   firms	   under	   state	   guidance	   towards	   a	  concentration	  of	  assets	  (Amsden	  2001:	  121).	  	  	  Postwar	   reforms	   in	   Korea	   created	   a	   relatively	   equal	   distribution	   of	   land	  following	   redistributive	   reforms;	   other	  measures	   of	   economic	   equality	   draw	   a	  similar	   picture.	   “Over	   half	   a	   century	   after	   World	   War	   II,	   Korean	   income	  distribution	  supposedly	  did	  not	  become	  substantially	  more	  unequal.	  […]	  	  In	  fact,	  regional	   income	   inequalities	   in	   Korea	   were	   very	   low	   compared	   with	   those	   in	  Argentina,	  Brazil,	  China,	  Mexico	  and	  India.”	  (Amsden	  2001:	  18).13	  Korea,	  having	  not	  only	  a	  highly	  equal	  distribution	  of	  income,	  but	  also	  the	  least	  division	  by	  class,	  race	   or	   ethnicity	   could	   establish	   the	   most	   national	   firm	   leaders	   and	   largest	  business	  groups	  (Amsden	  2001:	  237).	  	  	  By	  1985	  Korea	  had	  twenty-­‐one	  firms	  among	  the	  top	  fifty	  of	  the	  “Rest”	  measured	  by	  sales	  (Amsden	  2001:	  202).	  All	  shared	  the	  fact,	  that	  they	  had	  been	  targeted	  as	  recipients	   of	   intermediate	   assets	   in	   return	   for	   maintaining	   performance	  standards	   by	   the	   government	   (Amsden	   2001:	   193).	   In	   1993	   the	   largest	  enterprises	   were	   Hyundai,	   Samsung,	   LG,	   Daewoo,	   Samsung	   Co.	   Ltd.	   and	  Sunkyung.	   Among	   the	   top	   fifty	  were	   twenty-­‐seven	   from	  Korea	   (Amsden	   2001:	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  „Taiwan’s	   manufacturing	   experience	   before	   the	   1960s	  was	   possibly	   as	   extensive	   as	   Korea’s,	  although	  with	  different	  timing	  and	  weights	  attached	  to	  different	  elements,	  given	  the	  crucial	  fact	  that	  Taiwan	  benefited	  not	  only	  from	  Japanese	  mentoring	  but	  also	  from	  an	  influx	  in	  the	  1950s	  of	  large	   numbers	   of	   experienced	   workers,	   managers,	   and	   entrepreneurs	   from	   the	   Chinese	  mainland.“	  Amsden	  2001:	  105	  13	  According	  to	  a	  UN-­‐study	  in	  2008	  of	  income	  distribution,	  Japan	  ranks	  number	  one,	  Korea	  comes	  in	   fourth	  and	  Taiwan	  ninth.	  Source:	  Davies,	   James	  B.;	   Sandström,	  Susanna;	  Shorrocks,	  Anthony	  and	  Wolff,	  Edward	  N.	  :	  The	  World	  Distribution	  of	  Household	  Wealth	  (WIDER	  Discussion	  Paper/	  Vol.	   2008/03)	   online	   at:	   http://www.wider.unu.edu/publications/working-­‐papers/discussion-­‐papers/2008/en_GB/dp2008-­‐03/;	  For	  more	  detailed	  information	  see	  Chapter	  9.	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198).	  Since	  the	  state	  had	  induced	  these	  firms	  to	  invest	  in	  R&D,	  its	  share	  of	  GNP	  had	  reached	  “western	  levels”	  by	  1990	  (Amsden	  2001:	  241).	  	  What	   is	   more,	   the	   Korean	   state	   had	   followed	   the	   Japanese	   model	   of	   export	  promotion.	  In	  the	  period	  from	  1950–1992	  the	  average	  growth	  rate	  for	  exports	  in	  Korea	  was	  26.3%	  (20.3%	  for	  Taiwan),	  compared	  with	  10.2%	  in	  Brazil	  or	  7.9%	  for	   India.	   (Amsden	   2001:	   162).	   Korea	   thus	   fulfills	   all	   of	   Amsden’s	   criteria	   that	  distinguish	   “the	   Rest”.	   Furthermore	   it	   spearheaded	   the	   more	   successful	  independent	  state-­‐led	  approach	  to	  industrialization.	  	  	  Colonial	  manufacturing	  experience	  and	  a	  relatively	  equal	  distribution	  of	  wealth	  can	   be	   seen	   as	   historically	   adjuvant	   sources	   to	   catch-­‐up	   industrialization.	   The	  goal	  is	  developing	  export-­‐oriented	  large-­‐scale	  companies	  that	  achieve	  “learning”	  in	  production,	  execution	  and	  innovation	  capabilities.	  The	  tools	  for	  achieving	  this	  were	   capable	   state	   institutions:	   “Where	   Korea	   differs	   from	   most	   other	   late	  
industrializing	   countries	   is	   the	   discipline	   its	   state	   exercises	   over	   private	   firms.”	  (Amsden	  1989:	  14;	  e.a.)	  	  Korea’s	   pilot	   agency	   was	   the	   Economic	   Planning	   Board	   (EPB),	   established	   in	  1961.	  It	  was	  responsible	  for	  formulating	  the	  longer-­‐term	  strategy	  and	  guidelines	  by	   analyzing	   both	   the	   international	   economic	   environment	   and	   national	  capacities.	   Individual	  ministries	   then	  dealt	  with	   their	   respective	   sector.	   Similar	  to	   the	   informal	   CEPD	   of	   Taiwan,	   the	   Korea	   Development	   Institute	   (KDI)	   was	  added	   a	   decade	   later	   to	   provide	   technical	   analysis	   and	   assistance	   (Kwack	  1990:70).	   These	   institutions	   exhibit	   the	   two	   key	   features	   of	   operating	   beyond	  the	   influence	   of	   special	   interest	   groups	   while	   being	   connected	   to	   the	   private	  sector.	   Certainly,	   personal	   relations	   and	   favoritism	   cannot	   be	   completely	  excluded	  when	  government	   is	  so	  strongly	   involved	  in	  guiding	  economic	  efforts,	  but	   Korea	   has	   retained	   the	   key	   policy	   of	   rewarding	   good	   and	   penalizing	   bad	  performers.	  Amsden	  concedes	  that:	  	  	   “The	   bail-­‐out	   process	   has	   been	   highly	   politicized	   insofar	   as	   the	   government	   has	  typically	   chosen	   close	   friends	   to	   do	   the	   taking	   over	   of	   troubled	   enterprises	   (the	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production	   facilities	   of	   troubled	   enterprises	   are	   never	   allowed	   to	   rot).	   This	  corruption	   notwithstanding,	  when	   the	   victim	   of	   bankruptcy	   has	   appeared	   to	   be	  poorly	  managed,	  the	  government	  has	  deserted	  it.”	  (Amsden	  1989:	  15)	  	  Aside	  from	  government	  rescue,	  discipline	  requirements	  were	  especially	  strict	  for	  meeting	  export	  targets.	  As	  way	  of	  support	  the	  state	  in	  Korea	  actually	  controlled	  commercial	  banking,	  used	  subsidies	  and	  limited	  entry	  into	  target	  industries,	  yet	  it	  countered	  monopolistic	  behavior	  by	  limiting	  a	  number	  of	  commodity	  prices	  as	  well	  as	  capital	  controls	  –	  much	  like	  in	  Taiwan	  (Amsden	  1989).	  	  At	  the	  heart	  the	  argument	  lays	  the	  fact	  that	  latecomers	  to	  industrialization	  have	  always	   faced	   different	   obstacles	   and	   for	   those	   of	   “the	   Rest”,	   developing	   after	  World	   War	   II,	   the	   major	   hindrance	   was	   a	   lack	   of	   knowledge	   backed	   assets,	  necessary	   to	   compete	   in	   an	   oligopolistic	  world	  market	  with	   established	   firms,	  which	  already	  possessed	  them.	  Catching	  up	  meant	  having	  a	  Developmental	  State	  induce	   investment	   in	  production	  capabilities,	  project	  execution	  capabilities	  and	  innovation	   capabilities	   by	   sheltering	   domestic	   producers	   from	   global	  competition	   while	   pushing	   them	   to	   develop	   these	   skills	   and	   assets.	   Too	   little	  government	  support	  would	  prevent	  national	  firms	  to	  acquire	  the	  necessary	  skills	  to	   be	   more	   competitive,	   while	   the	   same	   would	   be	   true	   if	   the	   state	   offered	  unconditional	   protection,	   generating	   firms	   that	   are	   dependent	   on	   continued	  subsidies	  and	  protection	  from	  international	  competition	  as	  was	  often	  the	  case	  in	  Latin	  America.	  	  	  The	   most	   successful	   states	   achieved	   this	   balance	   thanks	   to	   a	   colonial	  manufacturing	   experience	   and	   a	   transfer	   of	   ownership	   through	   abrupt	  decolonization.	   This	   granted	   the	   economy	   a	   foundation	   to	   build	   on,	   while	  granting	   the	   state	   easy	   access	   to	   productive	   assets.	   	   Additionally	   a	   relatively	  balanced	   income	   distribution	   provided	   the	   social	   and	   political	   stability	   for	  implementing	   a	   long-­‐term	   strategy	   without	   having	   to	   deal	   with	   organized	  opposition	  of	  would-­‐be	  losers	  who	  benefit	  from	  a	  given	  unbalanced	  distribution	  of	  wealth,	  such	  as	  vast	  landholders.	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For	   the	   acquisition	   of	   knowledge-­‐based	   assets	   it	  was	   crucial	   to	   support	   large-­‐scale	   national	   private	   firms	   that	   focused	   on	   exporting	   and	   thus	   international	  competitiveness.	   An	   industry’s	   growth	   was	   assisted	   by	   subsidies,	   while	   its	  development	  of	  knowledge-­‐based	  assets	  was	  induced	  by	  attaching	  performance	  standards	   as	   a	   condition	   to	   receive	   intermediate	   assets	   by	   the	   state.	   Though	   a	  vast	   range	   of	   policies	   were	   available	   and	   different	  mixes	   were	   applied	   by	   the	  three	   countries	   discussed,	   the	   common	   denominator	   was	   a	   state	   with	   the	  institutional	  capacity	  to	  help	  the	  private	  sector	  strive	  internationally.	  In	  the	  next	  part	   the	   theories	   presented	   thus	   far	   are	   integrated	   into	   a	   model	   of	   the	  Developmental	  State,	  against	  which	  the	  Chinese	  experience	  can	  be	  compared.	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Chapter	  5	  –	  The	  Developmental	  State	  Model	  	  As	   has	   become	   clear,	   the	  Developmental	   State	   cannot	   easily	   be	   described	   as	   a	  general	   model	   for	   industrialization	   because	   several	   essential	   factors	   are	   very	  specific	  to	  the	  three	  East	  Asian	  states	  discussed.	  Japan	  even	  has	  to	  be	  set	  apart,	  as	   it	   had	   already	   undergone	   industrialization	   during	   the	   19th	   century;	   only	   its	  developmental	   regime	   after	  World	  War	   II	   had	   all	   the	   essential	   characteristics	  that	  served	  as	  a	  role	  model	  for	  Taiwan	  and	  Korea.	  The	  latter	  two	  countries	  then	  are	  the	  only	  two	  that	  fulfill	  all	  requirements	  of	  a	  Developmental	  State,	  which	  can	  be	   grouped	   into	   three	   themes:	  Historical	  vantage	  points,	   institutional	   structure,	  and	  development	  strategy.	  	  	  The	  historical	  conditions	  offer	  some	  indication	  why	  specific	  institutions	  evolved	  assuming	  a	  degree	  of	  path	  dependency.	  However,	  the	  main	  research	  question	  is	  whether	   China	   has	   followed	   the	  Developmental	   State	  model	   and	   therefore	   the	  focus	  lies	  on	  the	  nature	  and	  effectiveness	  of	  political	  and	  economic	  institutions.	  The	  development	  strategy	  and	  policy	  mix	  that	  are	  actually	   implemented	  can	  be	  seen	   as	   second	   tier	   explanations,	   since	   no	   matter	   what	   they	   encompass,	   only	  sufficiently	  capable	  institutions	  can	  design,	  coordinate	  and	  adjust	  them.	  	  	  The	   Developmental	   State	   model	   derived	   from	   the	   reviewed	   scholarship	   is	  summarized	   in	   Table	   1.	   The	   attributes	   of	   a	   Developmental	   State	   and	   their	  significance	   for	   economic	   growth	   are	   in	   separate	   columns.	   This	   is	   highly	  important	   when	   one	   departs	   from	   the	  well-­‐established	   case	   studies,	   since	   too	  many	   variables	   separate	   each	   polity	   and	   complicate	   any	   effort	   at	   comparison.	  However,	   by	   keeping	   in	   mind	   what	   significance	   a	   certain	   historical	   event	   or	  institution	  has	  for	  economic	  development	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  identify	  the	  existence	  of	  different	  attributes	  that	  may	  render	  the	  same	  outcome.	  On	  the	  other	  hand	  the	  same	  attribute	  may	  lead	  to	  a	  different	  outcome	  due	  to	  an	  interfering	  variable.	  In	  addition,	   a	   fourth	   point	   is	   added,	   to	   take	   account	   for	   the	   actual	   development	  achievements	  that	  define	  a	  functioning	  Developmental	  State.	  As	  indicated	  above,	  this	  includes	  GDP	  growth	  as	  well	  as	  other	  social	  indicators	  of	  well-­‐being.	  	  	  	  
	   34	  
Table	  1	  –	  	  Developmental	  State	  Model	  	  
Attribute	   Significance	  
1.	   Historical	  vantage	  points	  1.a	   Colonial	  manufacturing	  experience	  with	  centralized	  organization	  and	  exclusion	  of	  Western	  influence14	   Existing	  base	  of	  industrial	  structures	  and	  know-­‐how	  from	  an	  already	  industrialized	  nation	  1.b	   Complete	  disruption	  of	  ownership	  structures	  after	  decolonization	   Blank	  slate	  for	  state	  and/or	  indigenous	  ownership	  1.c	   Initial	  equal	  income	  distribution	   Better	  social	  cohesion	  and	  thus	  more	  scope	  for	  state	  action	  1.d	   Other	  nations	  perceived	  as	  rivals	  or	  threats	   Urgency	  on	  developing	  economic	  and	  military	  strength	  	  
2.	   Institutional	  setup	  of	  the	  State	  2.a	   Long	  term	  development	  strategy	   Consistency;	  allows	  for	  investments	  that	  only	  pay	  off	  in	  the	  long	  run	  	  2.b	   Centralized	  “pilot”	  agency	   A	  locus	  of	  competencies	  for	  coordination	  and	  adjustment	  of	  policy;	  conception	  could	  derive	  from	  multiple	  sources	  2.c	   Insulation	  of	  the	  state	  bureaucracy	  	   Reduces	  private	  interests	  and	  public	  pressures	  that	  run	  counter	  to	  the	  long	  term	  development	  strategy	  2.d	   Embedded	  autonomy	  	   Access	  to	  and	  influence	  over	  civil	  society	  in	  order	  to	  pursue	  the	  common	  development	  goal	  and	  to	  receive	  accurate	  feedback	  2.e	   Meritocratic	  bureaucracy	  	   Induces	  a	  nations	  top	  graduates	  to	  develop	  and	  to	  administer	  the	  development	  strategy;	  counters	  corruption	  
3.	   Development	  outcomes	   	  3.a	   GDP	  growth	   Standard	  measure	  of	  economic	  success	  3.b	   Income	  distribution,	  Education,	  Health	   Broader	  measure	  of	  societies	  well-­‐being	  
	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  Atul	   Kohli	   also	   examines	   the	   Japanese	   lineages	   of	   industrialization	   of	   colonial	   times.	   He	  concludes	  that	  „the	  roots	  of	  economic	  dynamism	  in	  the	  critical	  case	  of	  South	  Korea	  are	  located,	  at	  least	   in	   part,	   in	   the	   state-­‐society	   relations	   created	   under	   the	   auspices	   of	   Japanese	   colonialism.	  This	   finding,	   in	   turn,	   directs	   attention	   to	   unique	   aspects	   of	   Japanese	   colonialism:	   as	   a	   late	  developer,	  who	  had	  perfected	  a	  state-­‐led	  model	  for	  catching	  up	  in	  the	  world	  economy,	  Japan	  in	  its	   colonies	   constructed	   a	   political	   economy	   that	   also	   turned	   out	   to	   be	  well	   suited	   at	   catching	  up.“	  (Kohli	  1999:	  136)	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The	  attributes	  and	  their	  significance	   listed	   in	  Table	  1.	  vary	  qualitatively.	  Under	  the	   seemingly	   broad	   heading	   of	   ”historical	   vantage	   points”	   four	   features	  were	  chosen.15	  The	  first	  two	  are	  colonial	  manufacturing	  experience	  and	  a	  disruption	  of	  
ownership,	  transferring	  the	  preexisting	  industrial	  structures	  to	  private	  nationals	  or	   the	   state.	   These	   are	   not	   general	   preconditions	   but	   historical	   facts	   that	  characterized	   important	   starting	   points	   for	   the	   South	   Korean	   and	   Taiwanese	  Developmental	   States.	   If	   their	  model	   is	   to	   be	   emulated	   by	   China	   or	   any	   other	  economy,	   the	   existence	  or	   lack	  of	   these	   circumstances	  needs	   to	  be	   considered.	  Furthermore,	   relative	   income	   equality	   improves	   social	   cohesion	   and	   lowers	  resistance	  by	   social	   groups	   that	  benefit	   from	  an	  unequal	  distribution	  of	   assets.	  Finally,	   a	   perception	   of	   outside	   threat16	  serves	   as	   an	   incentive	   to	   prioritize	  national	   development	   over	   other	   strategies,	   for	   example	   maximizing	   asset	  extraction	   in	   the	   short	   run	   by	   elites	   (Pei	   2006).	   This	   aspect	   is	   not	   merely	  important	   as	   a	   historical	   vantage	   point	   but	   stays	   relevant	   throughout	   the	  development	  process.	  	  	  Chapter	  6,	  starting	  off	  Part	  II,	  will	  examine	  the	  Maoist	  legacy	  and	  the	  dawn	  of	  the	  Reform	   Era	   in	   these	   terms.	   Taken	   together,	   the	   set	   of	   attributes	   provides	   for	  conducive	   conditions	   and	   the	   incentives	   for	   the	   evolution	   of	   a	   Developmental	  State.	  Their	  inclusion	  points	  to	  the	  rejection	  of	  culturally	  motivated	  explanations	  of	   East	   Asian	   economic	   development	   and	   shifts	   the	   focus	   to	   the	   nature	   of	  institutions.17	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  The	  historical	  conditions	  chosen	  here	  were	  derived	  in	  Part	  I	  from	  the	  main	  proponents	  of	  the	  Developmental	   State	   theory.	   There	   are,	   however,	   a	   long	   list	   of	   „initial	   conditions“	   that	  were	   at	  one	  point	  or	  another	  used	  to	  explain	  the	  „East	  Asian	  Miracle“	  such	  as	  initially	  high	  human	  capital	  endowment	  in	  the	  North-­‐East	  Asian	  economies	  (World	  Bank	  2003:	  15).	  It	  is	  worth	  considering	  a	  critical	  analysis	  by	  Chang	  (2006:143f.)	  of	  several	  initial	  conditions	  as	  applied	  to	  Japan,	  Korea	  and	  Taiwan:	  In	  terms	  of	  human	  resource	  endowments,	  including	  literacy	  rates	  and	  school	  enrollment,	  	  East	   Asia	  was	   slightly	   better	   endowed	   than	   Sub	   Saharan	  Africa	   (SSA)	   before	   1950	   and	   clearly	  worse	  off	  than	  Latin	  American	  countries	  (153).	  Concerning	  natural	  resources,	  and	  the	  argument	  that	  an	  abundance	  of	  them	  actually	  acts	  as	  a	  curse,	  Chang	  points	  to	  the	  vast	  differences	  of	  well-­‐endowed	  developed	  regions,	  such	  as	  Australia,	  Canada	  or	  Scandinavia.	  Furthermore,	  the	  variance	  for	  developing	  SSA	  countries	  is	  so	  vast,	  that	  it	  contradicts	  a	  strong	  causality	  of	  a	  resource	  curse	  (157).	  	  16	  The	  impact	  of	  the	  international	  political	  environment	  is	  rather	  scarcely	  considered	  by	  Amsden	  and	  Wade,	  their	  focus	  lies	  on	  imbalances	  of	  world	  trade.	  T.J.	  Pempel	  offers	  a	  compelling	  analysis	  of	  the	  international	  economic	  conditions	  for	  the	  Developmental	  State	  	  (See:	  Pempel	  1999)	  17	  For	  a	  critique	  of	  cultural	  explanations	  of	  differences	  in	  economic	  development	  in	  East	  Asia	  in	  particular	  see:	  Jones	  2002,	  p.	  98–114;	  A	  criticism	  of	  the	  idea	  that	  Confucianism	  had	  fostered	  East	  Asia’s	  high	  savings	  rate	  is	  offered	  in:	  Chang	  2006:	  19;	  Lin	  (2007:	  10–11)	  also	  makes	  the	  excellent	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  Point	  2a	  and	  2b	  of	  Table	  1	  encompass	  the	  institutional	  setup	  of	  a	  Developmental	  State,	  which	  must	  conform	  to	  a	  long-­‐term	  development	  strategy	  coordinated	  and	  adjusted	  by	  centralized	  agencies.	  Chapter	  7	  considers	  this	  point,	  while	  offering	  a	  chronological	   and	   detailed	   discussion	   of	   China’s	   political	   economy	   during	   the	  Reform	  Era.	  As	  points	  2c	  and	  2e	   indicate,	   the	  Developmental	  State	   requires	  an	  
insulated	  bureaucracy	  that	  is	  free	  from	  special	  interests	  to	  design	  and	  pursue	  this	  strategy	   and	   it	   needs	   to	   have	   a	   form	   of	   embedded	   autonomy18	  in	   order	   to	  implement	  and	  coordinate	  with	  actual	  producers	  and	  businesses	  of	   the	  private	  sector.	   To	   this	   end,	   the	   recruitment	   of	   officials	   and	   bureaucrats	   needs	   to	   be	  based	   on	  merit	   in	   order	   to	   optimize	   outcomes.	   Evidently,	   these	   attributes	   are	  highly	  idealized,	  yet	  their	  existence	  only	  needs	  to	  be	  established	  to	  a	  significant	  degree.	   Chapter	   8	   will	   examine	   whether	   the	   Chinese	   state	   has	   evolved	  comparable	   institutions	   and	   thus	   had	   complied	   to	   the	   Developmental	   State	  model.	  	  	  The	  actual	  developmental	  strategy	  and	  policy	  are	   the	  outcome	  that	   functioning	  institutions	   of	   a	   Developmental	   State	   aim	   for.	   As	   mentioned,	   they	   constitute	  second	  tier	  explanations	  for	  the	  present	  research	  agenda.	  The	  case	  studies	  have	  indicated	  some	  commonalities:	  A	  focus	  on	  exports	  -­‐	  by	  itself,	  this	  is	  uncontested	  by	  neo-­‐classical	  authors,	  but	  the	  issue	  is	  whether	  the	  state	  could	  enhance	  export	  performance	   by	   diverging	   from	   a	   free	   market	   strategy.	   At	   any	   rate,	   the	  Developmental	  States	  have	   implemented	  several	  policies	   that	   targeted	  exports:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  point	   that	   culture	   is	   “a	   given	   or	   slowly	   changing	   factor.	   The	   difficulty	   of	   taking	   culture	   as	   the	  fundamental	   detriment	   of	   economic	   development	   is	   that	   it	   cannot	   explain	   why	   a	   country	  suddenly	  takes	  off	  after	  a	  period	  of	  long	  stagnation—such	  as	  the	  NIEs	  in	  East	  Asia	  in	  the	  1960s	  and	   China	   and	   India	   after	   the	   1980s.	   Neither	   can	   it	   explain	   why	   countries	   with	   the	   same	  culture—such	   as	   South	   Korea	   and	   North	   Korea,	   as	   well	   as	   West	   and	   East	   Germany—have	  dramatic	   differences	   in	   economic	   performance.	   Moreover,	   culture	   can	   change	   as	   a	   result	   of	  economic	  development—rather	  than	  being	  a	  cause	  of	  it.”	  	  18	  This	  term	  was	  coined	  by	  Peter	  Evans	  (1995:	  59):	  “It	   is	  an	  autonomy	  embedded	  in	  a	  concrete	  set	   of	   social	   ties	   that	   bind	   the	   state	   to	   society	   and	   provide	   institutionalized	   channels	   for	   the	  continual	   negotiation	   and	   renegotiation	   of	   goals	   and	   policies”	   	   (1995:12)	   I	   use	   it	   here	   to	  encompass	   the	   feature	   discussed	   above	   under	   the	   designation	   of	   „state-­‐civilian	  cooperation“	   (Johnson),	   and	   the	   „authoritarian-­‐corporatist	   state“	   (Wade)	   as	   well	   as	   Amsden’s	  „principle	  of	  reciprocity”.	  I	  have	  separated	  points	  2c	  and	  2d	  to	  underline	  the	  distinction	  of	  being	  independent	   when	   planning	   from	   coordinating	   with	   civil	   society	   and	   adapting	   the	   strategy	   in	  accordance	  with	  feedback	  of	  the	  private	  sector.	  For	  further	  discussion	  of	  State-­‐Autonomy	  and	  its	  role	  for	  development	  see	  Polidano	  2001	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On	   the	  macro	   level,	   currencies	  were	  undervalued	   in	  order	   to	  make	   indigenous	  products	  more	  attractive	  on	  the	  world	  market.19	  This	  serves	  the	  underlying	  goal	  of	  acquiring	  foreign	  exchange	  that	  is	  needed	  for	  importing	  advanced	  technology.	  In	   addition,	   protection	   of	   infant	   industries	   allows	   native	   firms	   to	   enhance	  productivity	   until	   they	   can	   compete	   internationally.20To	   this	   end	   a	   certain	  industry	  and	  firm	  size	  is	  needed	  to	  gain	  from	  economies	  of	  scale	  and	  to	  receive	  a	  profitable	   return	   on	   R&D	   costs.	   Developmental	   States	   have	   targeted	   national	  champions	  by	  inducing	  mergers	  and	  providing	  the	  already	  mentioned	  conducive	  policies	   towards	   specific	   sectors.	   Again,	   the	   goal	   is	   to	   enable	   competition	  with	  the	  established	  MNCs.	  Finally,	  a	  preference	  for	  indigenous	  production	  is	  essential	  where	  increased	  know-­‐how	  is	  involved.	  This	  usually	  pertains	  to	  reaching	  higher	  value-­‐added	   stages	   of	   a	   production	   chain,	   which	   is	   the	   ultimate	   mark	   of	   a	  developed	  economy.	  	  	  The	   actual	  mix	  may	  differ	   and	   apparently	   similar	  policies	   can	   lead	   to	  different	  outcomes.	  For	  example,	  import	  substitution	  was	  soon	  abandoned	  or	  scaled	  back	  in	   East	   Asia,	   while	   it	   led	   to	   overly	   dependent	   firms	   in	   other	   countries.	   Neo-­‐classical	   economic	   modeling	   often	   points	   out	   the	   inefficiencies	   of	   state	  interventionism,	   while	   other	   approaches	   point	   to	   the	   lack	   of	   practical	  applicability	  of	  such	  assumptions.	  It	  is	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  present	  study	  to	  evaluate	  a	   large	  set	  of	  policies	   in	  detail	   from	  different	   theoretical	  perspectives.	  The	   range	   of	   current	   scholarship	   has	   become	   narrower	   though,	   a	   point	   the	  conclusion	  will	  pick	  up	  with	  respect	  to	  China.	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19	  Additional	  export	  promotion	  tools	  were	  discussed	  above	  in	  Chapter	  3	  and	  include	  subsidized	  loans,	   export	   rebates,	   special	   exporting	   zones	   with	   preferential	   tax	   breaks	   etc.	   Lin	   (2007)	  emphasizes	   this	   point	   by	   underlining	   that	   a	   successful	   development	   strategy	   needs	   to	   suit	   a	  country’s	   comparative	   advantage.	   Having	   viable	   exports	   is	   a	   good	   indicator	   of	   a	   comparative	  advantage.	   Chang	   2006	   disagrees	   by	   pointing	   to	   an	   aggressive	   strategy	   of	   pursuing	   more	  technologically	  advanced	  products.	  20	  Chang	  	  (2006:33–34)	  reiterates	  the	  point	  that	  the	  two	  strategies	  reinforce	  each	  other.	  But	  the	  one-­‐sided	   policy	   of	   import-­‐substitution	   to	   protect	   local	   industry	  without	   an	   export	   promotion	  program	   hinders	   the	   advancement	   of	   competitiveness,	   as	   experienced	   by	   Latin	   America.	  Summing	  up	  he	  states:	  “the	  point	  about	  infant-­‐industry	  protection	  is	  not	  to	  ignore	  the	  principle	  of	  comparative	  advantage	  altogether,	  but	  to	  strategically	  violate	  it,	  knowing	  that	  this	  will	  result	  in	  a	   loss	   in	   current	   income	  but	  will	  make	   it	  possible,	   if	   properly	  done,	   to	  develop	  new	   industries	  which	  can	  put	  the	  country	  on	  a	  higher	  growth	  trajectory	  in	  the	  medium	  to	  long	  run”	  (34)
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In	   Chapter	   9	   the	   findings	   for	   the	   People’s	   Republic	   are	   put	   into	   context	   with	  actual	  development	  achievements	  not	  only	  in	  GDP	  growth	  but	  other	  standards	  of	  society’s	  well-­‐being:	  A	  healthier	  population	  that	  is	  better	  educated	  are	  hallmarks	  of	  a	  successful	  development	  strategy	  as	  defined	  above.	  Finally,	   levels	  of	   income	  
distribution	   show	   whether	   the	   state	   has	   spread	   or	   redistributed	   the	   fruits	   of	  development	  across	  society.	  	  The	  logic	  of	  the	  division	  of	  Part	  II	  is	  derived	  from	  the	  central	  research	  question	  whether	   China’s	   economic	   growth	   can	   be	   traced	   back	   to	   the	   workings	   of	   a	  Developmental	   State.	   Therefore,	   before	   asking	   what	   kind	   of	   institutions	   have	  emerged	  in	  China,	  it	  is	  critical	  to	  consider	  what	  kind	  existed	  before.	  This	  allows	  one	  to	  judge	  the	  reform	  period	  and	  its	  impact	  properly.	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PART	  II	  –	  Is	  China	  a	  Developmental	  State?	  	  	  
Introduction	  	  Comparing	  China’s	  economic	  transition	  to	  other	  East	  Asian	  countries	  poses	  some	  obvious	  difficulties.	  First	  of	  all,	  with	  a	  population	  of	  currently	  over	  1.3	  billion,	  it	  is	  more	   than	   ten	   times	   larger	   than	   Japan,	   twenty-­‐seven	   times	  South	  Korea	  and	  fifty-­‐seven	   times	   Taiwan.	   In	   that	   respect	   the	   city	   of	   Shanghai,	  with	   its	   twenty-­‐three	  million	  inhabitants,	  could	  be	  compared	  to	  the	  two	  smaller	  states.	  The	  vast	  size	   also	   makes	   it	   more	   difficult	   to	   coordinate	   and	   manage	   economic	   activity	  according	   to	   a	   centrally	   devised	   strategy,	   without	   preventing	   competition	   and	  free	  market	  forces	  to	  develop.	  	  	  Furthermore,	   at	   the	   beginning	   of	   the	   reform	   period,	   whether	   the	   aim	   was	   a	  transition	   towards	   a	  Developmental	   State	   or	   completely	   free	  market	   economy,	  the	   outset	   was	   an	   entirely	   state-­‐controlled	   planned	   economy,	   dominated	   by	  relatively	  inefficient	  large-­‐scale	  heavy	  industry	  and	  a	  rural	  workforce	  employed	  in	  the	  collectivized	  agricultural	  sector	  (Nolan/Wang	  1998:	  152).	  In	  some	  respect	  this	   offers	   the	   opposite	   task.	   Namely,	   dismantling	   state	   control	   and	   leaving	  enough	  in	  place	  to	  establish	  a	  working	  Developmental	  State	   instead	  of	  creating	  state	   institutions	   to	   increase	   central	   strategy	   coordination.	   This	   can	   be	   an	  additional	  hurdle	  since	  existing	  institutions	  might	  resist	  transformation.	  	  	  Part	   II	   will	   follow	   the	   guiding	   structure	   of	   the	   Developmental	   State	   Model	  composed	   in	   Chapter	   5.	   The	   logic	   of	   inquiry	   is	   thus:	   What	   were	   the	   initial	  historical	   conditions?	  Did	   China	   then	   develop	   the	   institutional	   framework	   of	   a	  Developmental	   State?	   Was	   this	   reflected	   in	   the	   development	   outcome	   when	  measured	  against	  South	  Korea	  and	  Taiwan?	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Chapter	  6	  –	  Historical	  vantage	  points:	  The	  Maoist	  legacy	  	  	  
Industrial	  base,	  ownership	  and	  income	  distribution	  	  Contrary	   to	   South	   Korea	   and	   Taiwan	   the	   link	   to	   colonial	   manufacturing	  experience	   has	   been	   severed	   or	   at	   least	   drastically	   transformed	   after	   Chinese	  Communist	   rule	   began	   in	   1949.	   In	   any	   case,	   Japanese	   industrialization	   efforts	  had	  centered	  only	  on	   the	  North	  East,	  where	   the	   Japanese	  Kwantung	  Army	  had	  acted	  as	  a	  quasi	  government	  of	  the	  puppet	  state	  Manchukuo	  since	  the	  inter-­‐war	  period,	   following	   a	   program	   of	   resource	   extraction	   and	   development	   of	   heavy	  industry,	   necessary	   to	   fuel	   the	   military.	   As	   Duara	   (2006)	   notes:	   “By	   1945,	  Japanese	   investment	   in	   Manchukuo	   exceeded	   the	   combined	   total	   of	   its	  investment	  in	  Korea,	  Taiwan,	  and	  the	  rest	  of	  China.	  Industrial	  production	  tripled	  between	  1933	  and	  1942,	  and	  producer	  goods	  output	  grew	  the	  fastest.”	  Including	  Manchuria	   then,	   Chinese	   industry	   grew	   at	   an	   average	   rate	   of	   9.7%	   per	   year	  between	  1912	  and	  1936	  (Perkins	  2011:	  51).	  	  	  After	  the	  Japanese	  had	  been	  defeated	  in	  1945,	  the	  Chinese	  civil	  war	  for	  control	  over	  the	  newly	  freed	  nation	  raged	  on	  another	  three	  years.	  With	  the	  Communist	  victory	   the	   remainder	   of	   indigenous	   entrepreneurs	   chose	   exile	   or	   faced	  dispossession.	  After	  the	  CCP	  had	  consolidated	  its	  power	  and	  overcame	  the	  crisis	  of	  the	  Korean	  War	  a	  complete	  reorganization	  of	  the	  economy	  began.	  Indeed,	  the	  first	  Five-­‐Year	  Plan,	  initiated	  in	  1953,	  had	  the	  official	  aim	  to	  fulfill	  “Transition	  to	  Socialism”.	   Agriculture	   was	   collectivized,	   industry	   nationalized	   and	   private	  enterprise	  almost	  completely	  suppressed	  (Guo	  2006:	  13;	  Perkins	  2011).	  	  	  The	  development	  of	  heavy	  industry	  became	  paramount	  even	  though	  the	  lack	  of	  a	  genuine	   “proletariat”,	   sufficient	   fixed	   and	   investment	   capital,	   and	   know-­‐how	  gave	  China	  a	  comparative	  disadvantage.	  In	  order	  to	  artificially	  reduce	  costs,	  the	  market-­‐mechanism	  was	  replaced	  with	  a	  fixed	  price	  regime,	  exploiting	  mostly	  the	  abundance	   of	   cheap	   labor	   (Zhang	   2009:	   13).	   By	   setting	   very	   low	   prices	   for	  agricultural	  raw	  materials,	  industrial	  manufactures	  benefited	  from	  cheap	  inputs	  and	   could	   garner	   swollen	   profits.	   These,	   in	   turn,	   fueled	   the	   government’s	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revenue	   either	   through	   direct	   remittances	   of	   profits	   or	   through	   indirect	   taxes,	  which	   the	   central	   government	   in	   turn	   used	   to	   develop	   heavy	   industry	   (Young	  200:	  5).	  	  	  As	  in	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	  central	  planners	  reinvested	  a	  high	  proportion	  of	  output,	  averaging	   roughly	   30%	   since	   the	   1950s.	   More	   than	   a	   third	   of	   industrial	  investment	   was	   allocated	   towards	   iron,	   steel	   and	   manufacturing	   of	   heavy	  machinery.	   Consequently	   the	   value	   of	   heavy	   industrial	   output	   multiplied	   over	  ninety	   times	   during	   the	   entire	   pre-­‐Reform	  Era,	   compared	  with	   a	   twenty	   times	  increase	  for	   light	   industry	  and	  merely	  a	  two-­‐fold	  growth	  of	  agricultural	  output.	  However,	  total	  factor	  productivity	  decreased	  steadily,	  forcing	  ever-­‐larger	  shares	  of	   industrial	  output	   to	  be	  reinvested	   in	  order	   to	  keep	  up	  growth	   figures	   (Shirk	  1993:	  25–26).	  	  	  By	   1980,	   China’s	   industrial	   sector	   was	   larger	   than	   those	   of	   most	   other	  developing	   nations	   and	   even	   greater	   or	   on	   par	  with	  middle-­‐	   and	   high-­‐income	  countries	   (Heston/Sicular	   2008:	   39).	   Yet,	   this	   inefficient	   and	   one-­‐sided	  investment	  strategy	  prevented	  sufficient	  production	  of	  consumer	  goods,	  while	  a	  negligence	   of	   infrastructure	   inhibited	   their	   distribution	   (Xiaolin	   2011;	   Shirk	  1993:	   27).	   This	   explains	   the	   tragedy	   of	   double-­‐digit	   industrial	   growth,	   while	  general	  welfare	  decreased	  —	  although	  not	  in	  all	  aspects	  of	  life	  (see:	  Chapter	  9).	  Before	   one	   can	   get	   a	   sense	   on	   what	   basis	   a	   potential	   Chinese	   Developmental	  State	  could	  operate,	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  consider	  the	  other	  historical	  vantage	  points	  identified	  above:	  prevalent	  income	  distribution	  and	  ownership	  structures.	  	  From	  1957	  to	  1960	  the	  notorious	  industrialization	  effort	  termed	  ‘The	  Great	  Leap	  Forward’	   fundamentally	   rearranged	   society.	   It	   was	   during	   that	   period	   that	  collectivization	   was	   extended	   to	   the	   entire	   rural	   population.	   Organized	   in	  Communes	   under	   local	   government	   supervision,	   all	   land	   and	   other	   productive	  resources	  were	  placed	  under	  collective,	   in	  essence	  state,	  ownership.	  Organized	  as	   brigades	   and	   subdivided	   as	   teams	   the	   peasantry	  worked	   and	  was	   bound	   to	  their	  commune,	  which	  also	  encompassed	  their	  own	  schooling,	  security	  and	  even	  small-­‐scale	  industry	  (Guo	  2006:15).	  Approximately	  750.000	  back-­‐yard	  furnaces	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were	  set	  up	  to	  smelt	  ore	  or	  existing	  iron	  goods,	  but	  largely	  produced	  worthless	  pig	   iron	   from	  formerly	  useful	  utensils	   (Fenby	  2009:	  400).	  Nearly	  80	  percent	  of	  China’s	   population	   lived	   and	   worked	   under	   this	   rural	   organization	   scheme.	  Income	   from	  collective	   farming	  was	  divided	  at	   the	   level	  of	   teams,	   consisting	  of	  25-­‐30	  families	  and	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  perceived	  need	  and	  to	  a	  lesser	  degree	  on	  work	  points.	  In	  effect	  this	  created	  a	  relatively	  equal	  distribution	  of	  income.	  Differences	  were	  due	  to	  a	  rural/urban	  divide	  and	  natural	  resource	  endowments	  of	  specific	  regions	  (Benjamin	  et	  al.	  2008:	  735).	  	  	  Urban	  population	  worked	   in	  SOEs,	  was	  allocated	  housing	  and	  only	  had	   limited	  access	   to	   consumer	  goods	  due	   to	   rationing.	  The	   fixed	  price	   regime	  and	  strictly	  enforced	  prohibitions	  to	  migrate	  from	  rural	  to	  urban	  areas	  resulted	  in	  an	  income	  gap	  of	  5:1.	  But	   this	  was	   somewhat	  mitigated	  by	   the	   rationed	   commodities	   and	  rather	  boosted	  savings	  instead	  of	  being	  manifested	  in	  a	  living	  standard	  that	  was	  five-­‐fold	   higher	   in	   cities	   (Benjamin	   et	   al.	   2008:	   736).	   By	   1980	   China’s	   GINI	  coefficient	   was	   0.28,	   even	   slightly	   below	   that	   of	   Japan	   (0.31	   in	   1956),	   South	  Korea	  (0.34	   in	  1965)	  and	  Taiwan	  (0.32	   in	  1964)	  during	   the	  respective	  starting	  phases	  of	  growth	  (Bramall	  2000:	  451).21	  	  	  None	  are	  as	  able	   to	   identify	  positive	  aspects	  of	   the	  notoriously	  dismal	  Mao-­‐era	  economy	   as	   Chris	   Bramall:	   “The	   absence	   of	   significant	   concentrations	   of	  economic	  and	  financial	  power	  in	   late	  Maoist	  China	  thus	  made	  it	  much	  easier	  to	  introduce	   growth-­‐promoting	   institutional	   structures.”	   (Bramall	   2000:	   451)	  Relative	   equality	   was	   an	   important	   boon	   as	   reformers	   faced	   two	   potential	  pitfalls:	  For	  one,	  dismantling	  the	  system	  of	  government	  purchase	  and	  reselling	  of	  agricultural	  output	  at	  fixed	  prices	  would	  deprive	  the	  state	  of	  its	  arbitrage	  income.	  Two,	   reducing	   the	   implicit	   subsidies	   for	   urban	   food	   consumption	   would	   raise	  demands	   for	  wage	   increases	   or	   result	   in	   unrest	   and	   deprivation	   as	   urban	   real	  incomes	   fall.	   The	   eventual	   outcome	   saw	   a	   compromise	   between	   the	   two,	   but	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  21	  The	  GINI	   coefficient	   is	   used	   to	  measure	   statistical	   divergence	  of	   values	   on	   a	  percentile	   scale	  with	  1.0	  meaning	  complete	  inequality	  and	  0.0	  indicating	  that	  all	  measured	  values	  are	  the	  same.	  Current	  values	  applying	  the	  GINI	  coefficient	  to	  income	  by	  the	  Word	  Bank	  rank	  Namibia	  (0.74)	  as	  the	  country	  with	   the	  most	  unequal	  distribution	  and	   Japan	   (0.25),	   among	  others,	  with	   the	  most	  equality;	   See:	   http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.GINI/	   	   More	   details	   and	   data	   are	  presented	  in	  Chapter	  9	  and	  in	  the	  Appendix.	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even	   so	   the	   reforms	   had	   an	   inescapable	   redistributive	   outcome	   that	   was	  mitigated	  by	  the	  initial	  conditions	  (Comp.	  Rodrik	  2007:	  91).	  	  	  While	  the	  manufacturing	  experience	  of	  Maoist	  industrial	  policy	  suggested	  a	  less	  than	   ideal	   precondition	   for	   a	   Developmental	   State	   to	   profit	   from,	   the	   two	  advantages	  of	   indigenous	  ownership	  of	  productive	  assets	  and	  an	  equal	   income	  distribution	  are	  clear	  legacies	  of	  the	  Mao	  era.	  These	  three	  attributes	  make	  up	  a	  more	  or	  less	  fertile	  ground	  for	  the	  Developmental	  State	  but	  they	  do	  not	  explain	  what	  motivation	   lies	  behind	  adopting	  such	  a	  model.	  As	  noted	  above,	   the	   fourth	  historical	  vantage	  point	  zooms	  out	  to	  international	  factors	  and	  their	  influence.	  	  
External	  and	  internal	  reform	  pressures	  	  Maoist	  thought	  applied	  Marxism	  and	  Leninism	  to	  specific	  Chinese	  circumstances.	  According	   to	   that,	   imperialism,	   both	   Western	   and	   Japanese,	   had	   controlled	  China’s	   economy	   via	   dominion	   over	   trading	   ports	   and	   had	   infringed	   upon	   the	  financial	  system,	  both	  fiscal	  and	  monetary.	  By	  supporting	  select	  warlords	  and	  by	  proselytizing	   via	   media	   control,	   schools	   and	   other	   social	   institutions,	   the	  Western	   powers	   at	   least	   were	   seen	   to	   have	   “conducted	   a	   policy	   of	   cultural	  aggression”	  (Zheng	  2004:	  45).	  Domestically,	  the	  institution	  of	  feudalism	  kept	  the	  peasants	  oppressed.	  Since	  the	  overwhelming	  majority	  of	  the	  population	  lived	  in	  rural	   areas,	   a	   revolution	   needed	   to	   be	   built	   on	   the	   peasantry	   instead	   of	   a	  proletariat.	  Massive	  industrialization	  within	  an	  autarkic	  economy	  would	  restore	  Chinas	   greatness	   and	   offer	   protection	   from	   outside	   forces.	   The	   Ministry	   of	  Foreign	  Trade	  (MFT)	  controlled	  specialized	  corporations	  in	  charge	  of	  importing	  and	   exporting	  what	   little	   resources	   and	   goods	  were	   required	   from	   the	  outside	  (Guo	  2006:	  29).	  	  	  Nevertheless,	  in	  the	  beginning	  the	  ideological	  partnership	  with	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  induced	   an	   inflow	   of	   advisers,	   technology	   and	   fixed	   capital	   (Brandt/Rawski	  2008:	  4;	  Guo	  2006:	  13).	  The	  first	  five-­‐year-­‐plan	  included	  156	  major	  plants	  to	  be	  provided	  by	  the	  USSR	  while	  28.000	  Chinese	  went	  to	  their	  northern	  neighbor	  for	  training.	   Following	   the	   second	  Taiwan	   Strait	   crisis,	   the	   Soviet	  Union	   agreed	   to	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assist	   the	   People’s	   Republic	   with	   its	   own	   nuclear	   weapons	   program,	   which	  would	   culminate	   in	   a	   first	   test	   in	   1964	   (Fenby	   2009:	   377).	   Mounting	  disagreements	  between	  the	  two	  socialist	  countries	  eventually	  led	  to	  a	  break	  off	  and	   consequent	   withdrawal	   of	   all	   Soviet	   assistance	   in	   1961,	   leaving	   China	  completely	   isolated.	  At	   that	   time,	   the	   “Third	  Front”	   initiative	  aimed	  at	   creating	  secure	  industrial	  bases	  across	  China	  and	  in	  far	  flung	  provinces	  in	  case	  of	  foreign	  attack.	   This	   had	   the	   unfortunate	   effect	   of	   duplicating	   industries	   and	   losing	   the	  advantages	   of	   economies	   of	   scale	   and	   shared	   infrastructure	   at	   specialized	  clusters	   (Young	   2000:	   7).	   	   Factories	   were	   moved	   from	   the	   coastal	   to	   inland	  regions.	  Brandt	  and	  Rawski	  note	  that:	  “Although	  China’s	  leaders	  valued	  material	  progress,	   considerations	   of	   national	   defense	   and	   ideology	   frequently	   trumped	  economics	  during	  the	  plan	  era,	  with	  predictably	  negative	  effects	  on	  output	  and	  productivity.”	  (2008:7)	  	  Perceived	  outside	  threats	  did	  little	  to	  convince	  the	  Chinese	  leadership	  to	  change	  course	   and	   try	   and	   imitate	   institutions	   of	   successful	   Developmental	   States.	  China’s	  economic	  isolation,	  its	  vast	  territory,	  the	  world’s	  largest	  population	  and	  standing	  army,	  and	  a	  nuclear	  arsenal	  presented	  its	  leadership	  with	  very	  different	  options	   when	   faced	   with	   an	   external	   threat	   compared	   to	   South	   Korea	   and	  Taiwan.	   Rather,	   the	   decision	   for	   economic	   reforms	   resulted	   from	   the	   internal	  crisis	   of	   the	   Cultural	   Revolution,	   the	   death	   of	   chairman	   Mao	   and	   the	   ensuing	  struggle	  for	  succession.	  	  The	  planned	  economy	  was	  administered	  by	  the	  highly	  centralized	  Party	  state.	  All	  productive	   assets	   were	   under	   at	   least	   indirect	   control	   of	   Party	   cadres.	   Top	  officials	   garnered	   support	   by	   the	   distribution	   of	   assets	   and	   positions	   to	   their	  clients.	  Limited	  accountability	  was	  only	  given	  through	  acts	  of	  individual	  leaders	  to	   keep	   a	   power	   balance	   within	   Party	   and	   state	   organs,	   reinforcing	   a	   strict	  hierarchical	  structure	  and	  chain	  of	  command	  (Naughton	  2008:	  93).	  This	  system	  was	   undermined	   during	   the	   final	   decade	   of	   Mao’s	   life	   and	   the	   launch	   of	   the	  Cultural	  Revolution	   from	  1966–76.	   In	   essence,	   the	  movement	  was	   a	  pretext	   to	  radicalize	  supporters	  and	  stage	  violent	  clashes	  and	  weigh	  in	  on	  power	  struggles	  between	   various	   Party	   factions,	   which	   depended	   on	   the	   tacit	   guidance	   by	   the	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Chairman.	   Old	   leaders,	   who	   had	   fought	   alongside	   Mao	   for	   over	   forty	   years,	  suddenly	   faced	   persecution.	   Most	   notably	   the	   former	   military	   leader	   Peng	  Dehuai	   and	   the	   vice	   chairman	   and	   head	   of	   state	   Liu	   Shaoqi.	   Both	   died	   under	  incarceration.	   Deng	   Xiaoping	   was	   even	   purged	   twice	   but	   placed	   under	   house	  arrest	  instead	  of	  prison.	  Mao’s	  presumed	  successor	  and	  leader	  of	  the	  PLA	  faction,	  Lin	   Biao,	   rose	   to	   power	   by	   allying	   himself	   with	   the	   group	   that	   instigated	   the	  Cultural	  Revolution.	  This	  in	  turn	  made	  him	  too	  powerful	   in	  Mao’s	  view,	  leading	  to	  Lin’s	  untimely	  death.22	  	  	  These	   top	   tier	   power	   struggles	   were	   carried	   out	   through	   mass	   mobilization	  campaigns,	  edging	  on	  youths	  to	  become	  “Red	  Guards”	  and	  to	  go	  on	  witch-­‐hunts	  for	   supposed	   counterrevolutionaries.	   Three	   quarters	   of	   top	   economic	   officials	  and	   almost	   a	   third	   of	   all	   Party	   officials	  were	   purged	   (Guo	  2006:	   43).	   Thus	   the	  virtues	  of	  being	  “red”	  trumped	  the	  qualifications	  of	  being	  an	  “expert”	  —	  an	  anti-­‐intellectualism	   that	   crippled	   economic	   governance.	   The	   state	   failed	   to	   provide	  political	   order	   and	   economically	   it	   failed	   to	   provide	   goods.	   According	   to	   Xu	  (2011:	  1079)	  that	  amounted	  to	  a	  “change	  of	   the	   legitimacy	  base	  of	   the	  Chinese	  Communist	   Party[.]”	   After	   Mao’s	   death	   in	   1976	   the	   question	   became,	   how	   to	  restore	   that	   legitimacy?	   Different	   answers	   delineated	   the	   frontlines	   of	   the	  ensuing	  struggle	  for	  succession	  (Zheng	  2004:	  52).	  	  The	  need	  to	  enhance	  the	  economic	  situation	  in	  1976	  was	  even	  more	  evident,	  as	  previous	  ignorance	  was	  stripped	  away.	  Shirk	  notes:	  	  	   “The	  Chinese	   leaders	  also	  may	  have	  believed	  the	  Chinese	  economy	  to	  be	   in	  even	  worse	   shape	   than	   it	   actually	   was.	   A	   greatly	   improved	   system	   for	   compiling	  economic	   statistics	   revealed	   declining	   factor	   productivity	   and	   made	   other	  deficiencies	  of	  the	  system	  more	  obvious	  than	  they	  had	  been	  in	  the	  past.	  When	  in	  the	   mid-­‐1970s	   Chinese	   officials	   began	   to	   venture	   outside	   China	   to	   visit	   foreign	  countries,	  many	  of	  them	  for	  the	  first	  time,	  they	  were	  shocked	  and	  demoralized	  by	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  22	  After	   Lin	   and	   his	   family	   had	   realized	   that	   the	   political	  winds	   had	   shifted	   against	   them,	   they	  actually	  considered	  a	  coup	  d’état	  but	   instead	  opted	  to	  flee	  the	  country.	  Their	  plane	  presumably	  ran	   out	   of	   fuel	   over	   Mongolia	   on	   the	   way	   to	   Soviet	   Territory	   (Fenby	   2009).	   This	   and	   similar	  episodes	  highlight	   the	  arbitrariness	  and	   interplay	  of	  political	   fortune	   that	  by	   itself	  prevented	  a	  well-­‐functioning	  government.	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what	  they	  saw.	  They	  had	  anticipated	  the	  technological	  and	  economic	  gap	  between	  China	   and	   the	  West,	   but	   they	   were	   surprised	   and	   humiliated	   to	   see	   that	   China	  lagged	  far	  behind	  even	  Japan	  and	  the	  newly	  industrialized	  countries	  of	  East	  Asia.”	  (1993:	  35)	  	  Hua	  Guofeng,	  Mao’s	  official	  successor,	  brought	  the	  Cultural	  Revolution	  to	  an	  end	  and	  purged	  its	  main	  instigators,	  the	  so	  called	  Gang	  of	  Four	  led	  by	  Mao’s	  widow	  Jiang	  Qing.	  Nevertheless,	  Hua	   remained	   a	   staunch	   supporter	   of	  Maoist	   policies	  with	  certain	  updates:	  Announcing	  to	  uphold	  whatever	  policies	  the	  Chairman	  had	  designed	  and	  to	  follow	  whatever	  instructions	  he	  had	  given,	  he	  initiated	  another	  massive	  heavy	  industrialization	  program,	  but	  this	  time	  with	  inclusion	  of	  outside	  markets.23In	  what	  was	  later	  derisively	  termed	  the	  “foreign	  leap	  forward”,	  about	  120	   new	   projects	   were	   launched,	   all	   of	   which	   relied	   heavily	   on	   technology	  imports.	  Increased	  investment	  spending	  created	  a	  record	  budget	  deficit	  of	  15.5%	  of	   revenue	   (Fenby	   2009:	   537).	   Subsequently,	   after	   1977	   the	   value	   of	   imports	  rose	   from	  $72m	  to	  $200m	  (Bramall	  2000:	  231).	  The	   intention	   to	  pay	   for	   these	  imports	  by	  developing	  and	  exporting	  oil	   reserves	  was	  proven	  unfeasible,	  when	  estimates	  of	  reserves	  had	  to	  be	  scaled	  back	  and	  the	  collapse	  of	  an	  oil	  rig	   in	  the	  Bohai	  Gulf,	  killing	  seventy-­‐two,	  demonstrated	  the	  industry’s	  inadequacy	  (Fenby	  2009:	   537).	   After	   the	   already	   critical	   situation,	   created	   by	   the	   Cultural	  Revolution,	  had	  been	  exasperated,	  Deng	  could	  use	  his	  policy	  of	  economic	  reform	  as	   an	   attractive	   alternative	   to	   wrest	   leadership	   away	   from	   Hua	   at	   the	   third	  Plenum	  of	  the	  Eleventh	  Communist	  Party	  Central	  Committee	  in	  December	  1978	  	  (Shirk	  1993:	  35-­‐6).	  	  	  	  
Conclusion	  	  The	  Mao	   era	   had	   drastically	   expanded	   the	   industrial	   base	   but	   not	   by	   virtue	   of	  integrating	   the	  entrepreneurial	  elite	   that	  had	  gained	  manufacturing	  experience	  during	   and	   before	   the	   Japanese	   occupation.	   Any	   link	   to	   traditional	   forms	   of	  entrepreneurship	  had	  been	  severed	  as	  well.	  Thus	  any	  advantage	  in	  knowledge-­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  23	  This	   „Two	  Whatevers“	  policy	  was	   later	   criticised	  by	   the	  Dengist	   faction	  who	   instead	   favored	  the	  approach	  of	  „seeking	  the	  truth	  from	  practice/facts;	  Fenby	  2009:	  536,	  Huang	  2008:	  88	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backed	  assets	  had	  been	   largely	   lost.	   The	   continued	   isolation	   from	   the	  Western	  world	  and	  subsequently	  even	  from	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  prevented	  an	  effective	  build	  up	  of	  an	  efficient	  and	  modern	  industrial	  base.	  But	  in	  terms	  of	  output	  at	  least,	  an	  overcapacity	  in	  heavy	  industry	  was	  attained.	  	  	  The	   complete	   disruption	   of	   ownership	   and	   control	   over	   productive	   assets	   by	  foreigners	  had	  been	  achieved	   to	  a	  much	  higher	  degree	   than	  was	   the	   case	  after	  Decolonization	   in	   South	   Korea	   and	   Taiwan.	   In	   addition,	   ownership	   was	   also	  monopolized.	  As	  a	  beneficial	  historical	  vantage	  point	  for	  a	  Developmental	  State,	  ownership	  disruption	  serves	  a	  specific	  purpose:	  to	  allow	  the	  state	  to	  coordinate	  these	  industries,	  rather	  than	  to	  nationalize	  them	  entirely.	  	  	  Income	  distribution	  was	   relatively	  equal	  under	   the	  planned	  economy,	  with	   the	  biggest	  divide	  between	  rural	  and	  urban	  areas.	  A	  low	  income-­‐inequality	  suggests	  limited	  resistance	  to	  a	  change	  in	  the	  status	  quo	  as	  well	  as	  better	  social	  cohesion	  to	  bear	  any	  redistributive	  outcomes	  of	  reforms.	  In	  that	  respect,	  late	  Maoist	  China	  resembles	  the	  East	  Asian	  Developmental	  States	  rather	  well.	  	  	  Finally,	  a	  driving	  force	  to	  maintain	  a	  Developmental	  State	  has	  been	  a	  perceived	  external	   threat.	   To	   recap	   the	   argument:	   The	   South	   Korean	   and	   Taiwanese	  leadership	   perceived	   the	   need	   for	   continued	   modernization	   and	   wealth	  accumulation	  as	  a	  foundation	  for	  economic	  and	  political	  clout.	  China	  by	  virtue	  of	  its	  size	  and	  nuclear	  arsenal	  could	  reinforce	  its	  national	  security	  despite	  a	  lack	  of	  per	  capita	  development.	  For	  a	  long	  time,	  even	  internal	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  Party	  did	  not	  suffer	  from	  the	  negative	  outcomes	  of	  its	  development	  policies.	  Only	  when	  the	  Cultural	   Revolution	   eroded	   not	   just	   what	   limited	   popular	   security	   had	   been	  maintained,	   but	   also	   the	   functioning	   of	   the	   power	   allocation	  within	   the	   Party-­‐state,	   pressures	   for	   reform	   won	   out.	   However,	   this	   does	   not	   mean	   that	   a	  transformation	   into	   a	   Developmental	   State	   was	   on	   the	   horizon.	   The	   following	  chapters	  will	  explore	  what	  political	  and	  economic	  institutions	  emerged	  in	  China	  post-­‐1978	  and	  to	  what	  extent	  they	  resemble	  the	  Developmental	  State	  model.	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Chapter	  7	  –	  The	  Institutional	  Setup	  of	  China’s	  Political	  Economy	  	  
Introduction	  	  The	   Developmental	   State	   model	   presented	   above	   has	   emphasized	   the	  formulation	  and	  implementation	  of	  a	  long-­‐term	  development	  strategy	  that	  goes	  beyond	   a	   basic	   state-­‐led	   drive	   towards	   economic	   growth.	   Rather,	   it	   should	  encompass	   concrete	   steps	   towards	   building	   a	   homegrown	   internationally	  competitive	   industry	   that	   is	   capable	   of	   reaching	   ever-­‐higher	   steps	   along	   the	  value-­‐added	   chain	   of	   production.	   The	   success	   of	   such	   a	   strategy	   depends	   on	  central	   state	   institutions	   that	   are	   powerful	   enough	   to	   coordinate	   and	   adjust	  economic	   policy.	   These	   ought	   to	   be	   staffed	   on	   a	   meritocratic	   basis.	   Those	   in	  charge	  of	  directing	  policy	  need	  to	  be	  insulated	  from	  special	  interests	  or	  political	  factions	   while	   being	   simultaneously	   embedded	   in	   civil	   society.	   This	   section	  introduces	  the	  Chinese	  political	  institutions	  and	  their	  transformation	  throughout	  the	   Reform	   Era	   in	   order	   to	   understand	   how	   economic	   policy	   decisions	   were	  made	   and	   to	   what	   extent	   they	   resemble	   the	   institutional	   setup	   of	   a	  Developmental	  State.	  	  Deng	   Xiaoping	   had	   consolidated	   power	   by	   embodying	   a	   departure	   from	   the	  Cultural	   Revolution	   and	   the	   attempted	   continuation	   of	  Maoist	   policies	   by	   Hua	  Guofeng.	  A	  Party	  Resolution	  condemned	  Mao’s	  policies	  of	  the	  last	  decade	  of	  his	  life,	   with	   the	   official	   position	   remaining	   that	   70	   percent	   of	   his	   decisions	  were	  correct	  and	  only	  30	  percent	  were	  wrong	  (Fenby	  2009:	  560).	  The	  new	  leadership	  was	  thus	  identified	  in	  the	  negative,	  or	  by	  virtue	  of	  what	  it	  wasn’t	  rather	  than	  for	  what	   concrete	   path	   it	   represented.	   This	   accounted	   for	   the	   backing	   of	   diverse	  factions	  but	  also	  meant	  that	  there	  was	  no	  clear	  path	  of	  reform.	  What	  became	  so	  distinctively	   associated	   with	   a	   new	   era	   under	   Deng	   was	   the	   result	   of	  experimentation	  and	  gradual	  policy	  innovation,	  best	  summarized	  by	  the	  leader’s	  own	  description	  of	  “crossing	  the	  river	  by	  feeling	  the	  stones.”24	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  24	  Fenby	  2008:	  533	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The	  evolution	  of	  political	  institutions	  in	  general	  and	  specifically	  those	  in	  charge	  of	  economic	  policy	  between	  1978	  and	  2001	  is	  usually	  divided	  into	  two	  periods,	  before	   and	   after	   the	   Tiananmen	   revolt	   of	   1989	   (e.g.	   Naughton	   2008;	   Hunag	  2008).	  This	  approach	  is	  sensible,	  as	  the	  years	  around	  1990	  mark	  not	  only	  social	  turmoil	  but	  also	  an	  economic	  crisis	  and	  a	  leadership	  transition	  accompanied	  by	  a	  policy	  shift.	  Both	  periods	  can	  be	  further	  subdivided	  by	  major	  reform	  initiatives	  that	   focus	   on	   specific	   sectors	   of	   the	   economy	   and	   on	   internal	   power	  redistribution:	  First,	  between	  1978–1983,	  the	  new	  leadership	  had	  to	  consolidate	  power	  and	   implement	  ad	  hoc	  measures	   to	  deal	  with	   the	   legacy	  of	  Mao	  and	  his	  designated	  successor	  Hua,	  while	  already	  experimenting	  with	  first	  reforms.	  	  	  Initial	   success	   allowed	   for	   a	   second,	   deeper	   reform	   drive	   from	   1984–1989	  ending	  in	  political	  and	  economic	  crisis.	  A	  three-­‐year	  period	  of	  consolidation	  and	  retrenchment	  set	  in	  until	  in	  1992	  the	  reform	  drive	  was	  re-­‐launched,	  albeit	  with	  a	  slight	  shift	  of	  focus	  from	  rural	  to	  urban	  sectors.	  The	  attention	  throughout	  these	  chronologically	  discussed	  sections	  lies	  with	  the	  major	  reforms	  that	  transformed	  the	  state	  as	  an	  economic	  player,	  foremost	  through	  reforms	  of	  state	  industry	  and	  the	   fiscal	   system.	   	  Subsequently	   the	  main	  attributes	  of	  a	  Developmental	  State’s	  institution	   are	   examined	   in	   light	   of	   China’s	   experience	   over	   more	   than	   two	  decades.	   However,	   first	   a	   basic	   account	   of	   the	   Party-­‐State’s	  main	   political	   and	  economic	  institutions	  during	  the	  Reform	  Era	  is	  required	  in	  order	  to	  explain	  how	  economic	  policy	  was	  made.	  	  	  
Policy	  formulation	  and	  institutions	  of	  the	  Chinese	  Party-­‐State	  	  	  Deng’s	  reformist	  agenda	  was	  foremost	  a	  means	  to	  reinstate	  the	  CCPs	  mechanism	  of	   power	   allocation	   and	   internal	   checks	   by	   allowing	   the	   different	   factions	   to	  operate	   again.	   While	   the	   once	   purged,	   old	   revolutionary	   leaders	   thankfully	  supported	   him,	   the	   economic	   experiments	   of	   reform	   created	   lucrative	  opportunities	   to	   be	   doled	   out	   to	   a	   network	   of	   clients	   (Shirk	   1993:	   37).	  While	  these	   actions	   served	   to	   further	   consolidate	  power,	  Hua	  Guofeng	   and	  his	   group	  were	  not	  radically	  purged.	  In	  fact,	  Hua	  officially	  remained	  Premier	  –	  the	  head	  of	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government	   –	   until	   1980	   and	   Party	   Chairman	   as	   well	   as	   heading	   the	   Central	  Military	  Commission	  until	  1981.25	  	  	  This	  constellation	  conveyed	  stability	  and	   thus	   legitimacy	   for	   the	  Party,	  while	   it	  also	  serves	  as	  a	  reminder,	  how	  much	  politics	  was	  based	  on	  personality	  of	  leaders	  even	   if	   they	  did	  not	  hold	   the	  highest	  offices.	  The	  allocation	  of	  power	   is	   spread	  through	   networks	   that	   run	   parallel	   in	   both	   Party	   and	   state	   institutions.	  Understanding	  their	   function	  is	  paramount	  for	  considering	  how	  they	  can	  foster	  or	  inhibit	  attributes	  of	  a	  Developmental	  State.	  	  	  Figures	   1	   and	   2	   respectively	   chart	   the	   organization	   of	   both	   the	   CCP	   and	   the	  Chinese	   government.	  The	  Party,	   rather	   than	   the	   state	   as	   such,	   is	   considered	   to	  represent	   the	   combined	   will	   of	   society	   and	   it	   is	   the	   locus	   of	   political	   power.	  While	   the	   government	   and	   its	   bureaucracy	   are	   closely	   linked	   through	  membership	  with	   the	  CCP,	   their	  organization	   is	  distinct.	  Both	  Government	  and	  Party	   are	   structured	   hierarchically,	   with	   the	   top	   two	   offices	   usually	   held	   by	  different	  leaders.	  The	  Party	  General	  Secretary	  usually	  reinforces	  his	  position	  by	  heading	   the	   third	   pillar	   of	   power	   within	   China,	   the	   People’s	   Liberation	   Army.	  Power	   struggles	   for	   top	   leadership	   play	   out	   over	   the	   composition	   of	   three	  connected	  institutions:	  The	  Central	  Committee,	  the	  Politburo	  and	  the	  Secretariat.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  25	  These	  are	  the	  top	  three	  offices	  in	  the	  People’s	  Republic.	  Even	  Mao	  had	  not	  held	  all	  of	  them	  at	  once,	  having	  made	  Zhu	  Enlai	  the	  premier.	  Currently	  Hu	  Jintao	  holds	  the	  office	  of	  President	  of	  the	  People's	  Republic	  of	  China,	  but	  that	   is	  a	   largely	  ceremonial	  office	   for	  the	  head	  of	  state.	  His	  true	  power	  stemmed	  from	  his	  positions	  as	  Party	  Chairman	  (now	  held	  by	  Xi	  Jinping)	  and	  Chairman	  of	  the	  Central	  Military	  Commission.	  Wen	  Jiabao,	  the	  Premier,	  is	  head	  of	  government.	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Figure	  1	  –	  Organization	  of	  the	  Chinese	  Communist	  Party	  	  
Source:	  Author	  	  
Figure	  2	  –	  Organization	  of	  the	  Chinese	  government	  
	  Source:	  Author	  
	   52	  
The	   Central	   Committee	   formally	   elects	   the	   Secretary	   and	   the	   Politburo.	   In	  practice,	  informal	  channels	  decisively	  influence	  these	  appointments.	  Party	  elders,	  such	  as	  the	  famous	  eight	  immortals,	  the	  PLA	  command	  and	  above	  all	  the	  retiring	  leadership	   decides	   the	   succession	   at	   the	   top.26	  Dittmer	   and	   Wu	   (2006:	   52f.)	  transfer	   the	   Weberian	   concepts	   of	   value-­‐rational	   and	   purpose-­‐rational	   to	  political	  relationships	   in	  modern	  China.	  Value-­‐rational	  relationships	  are	  an	  end	  in	   itself	   and	   apply	   to	   the	   informal	   networking	   (guanxi).	   Purpose-­‐rational	  relationships	   usually	   are	   an	   instrument	   towards	   a	   specific	   shared	   goal	   and	  encompass	   formal	  and	  officially	   conferred	  power	  relationships.	  Empirically	   the	  two	  are	  not	  always	  clearly	  distinct.	  Chinese	  politics	   is	  very	  much	  characterized	  by	   informal	   relationships,	   which	   are	   embodied	   by	   factions.	   Their	   three	   main	  purposes	  in	  descending	  order	  of	  importance	  are:	  security,	  material	  interest,	  and	  a	   certain	   policy	   interest	   by	   its	   members.	   The	   composition	   of	   the	   Central	  Committee	  often	  gives	  a	  clue	  to	  faction	  rivalries	  with	  a	  useful	  division	  of	  blocks	  into	  central	  Party	  officials,	  the	  military	  and	  local	  and	  provincial	  officials.	  	  The	  Party	  organization	  mirrors	  that	  of	  the	  state	  by	  relying	  on	  departments	  and	  groups	  with	  specific	  functions,	  corresponding	  to	  the	  ministries,	  as	  well	  as	  federal	  offices	   on	   all	   levels	   of	   local	   administration.	   The	   two	   exhibit	   a	   “delegation	  relationship”	  with	  the	  Party	  as	  the	  “principal”	  and	  the	  government	  as	  the	  “agent”	  (Shirk	  1993:	  55).	  While	  bureaucrats	  are	  in	  charge	  of	  the	  daily	  administration,	  the	  ministries	   or	   commissions	   they	  work	   for	   receive	   directives	   from	  Party	   organs.	  	  The	   chief	   instrument	   of	   power	   is	   the	   Party’s	   ability	   to	   fill	   any	   position	   in	  government.	  Aside	  from	  the	  most	  senor	  positions,	  which	  are	  determined	  by	  the	  politburo,	   all	   personnel	   decisions	   within	   the	   state,	   the	   Party	   and	   even	   many	  seemingly	   private	   institutions	   are	   made	   by	   the	   CCP’s	   Central	   Organization	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  26	  The	  eight	  immortals	  is	  a	  reference	  to	  a	  mythical	  group	  in	  Taoism	  used	  to	  describe	  CCP	  Elders	  in	  the	  1980s	  and	  1990s	  who	  had	  revolutionary	  experience;	  many	  participants	  of	  the	  famous	  Long	  March.	  These	  veterans	  often	  relinquished	  formal	  power	  positions	  but	  still	  played	  a	  decisive	  role	  in	  policy-­‐making.	  Foremost	  among	  them	  were	  Deng	  himself	  and	  the	  economic	  planner	  Chen	  Yun.	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Department	   (McGregor	   2010:	   73).27	  Formally,	   the	   National	   People’s	   Congress,	  the	   legislative	   branch	   of	   government,	   elects	   top	   positions.	   But	   this	   body’s	  decisions	  are	  frequently	  characterized	  as	  mere	  rubber-­‐stamping.28	  	  	  Within	   the	   administration,	   those	   civil	   servants	   who	   are	   CCP	   members	   form	  “Party	  groups”.	  Each	  of	  these	  controls	  the	  corresponding	  agency	  from	  within	  but	  the	  group’s	  members	  are	   simultaneously	  answerable	   to	   the	  Central	  Committee	  or	  its	  subunits.	  While	  in	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	  the	  Committee	  had	  served	  to	  supervise	  Party	   members,	   the	   Chinese	   communists	   switched	   from	   controlling	   to	  substituting	  government	  (Shirk	  1993:	  61).	  	  	  At	  the	  top	  level,	  Party	  leading	  groups	  are	  formed	  by	  a	  handful	  of	  key	  officials	  and	  organized	   according	   to	   policy	   area.	   The	   Finance	   and	   Economy	   Leading	   Group	  was	   established	   after	   the	   fifth	   CCP	   plenum	   in	   1980	   and	   is	   still	   in	   existence.	   It	  formed	  the	  top	  body	  for	  economic	  decision-­‐making	  through	  which	  the	  Politburo	  directed	   both	   State	   and	   Party	   in	   economic	   matters.	   In	   general,	   these	   leading	  groups	  are	  very	   informal	  and	   tend	   to	  shift	  between	   the	  Party	  and	  government,	  depending	  to	  who	  is	  in	  charge	  of	  them.	  Their	  membership	  is	  not	  made	  public	  and	  needs	   to	   be	   painstakingly	   inferred	   from	   various	   sources	   and	   reports	   (Miller	  2008).	  	  The	  general	  policy	  decisions	  are	  made	  in	  the	  politburo	  and	  in	  the	  leading	  groups.	  Their	   members	   are	   leaders	   of	   political	   factions,	   which	   spread	   throughout	   the	  government	  bodies,	   including	   those	   in	  charge	  of	  applying	  economic	  policy.	  The	  three	  most	   important	   formal	   institutions	   for	  economic	  policy	  during	   the	  1980s	  were:	  The	  State	  Planning	  Commission	  (SPC),	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Finance	  (MoF)	  and	  the	  State	  Economic	  Commission	  (SEC).	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  27	  McGregor	   (2010)	   emphasizes	   the	   Department’s	   power	   by	  making	   a	   striking	   comparison:	   “A	  similar	   department	   in	   the	   US	   would	   oversee	   the	   appointment	   of	   the	   entire	   US	   cabinet,	   state	  governors	   and	   their	   deputies,	   the	   mayors	   of	   major	   cities,	   the	   heads	   of	   all	   federal	   regulatory	  agencies,	   the	   chief	   executives	   of	   GE,	   ExxonMobil,	   Wal-­‐Mart	   and	   about	   fifty	   of	   the	   remaining	  largest	  US	  companies,	  the	  justices	  of	  the	  Supreme	  Court,	  the	  editors	  of	  the	  New	  York	  Times,	  The	  Wall	  Street	  Journal	  and	  the	  Washington	  Post,	  the	  bosses	  of	  the	  TV	  networks	  and	  cable	  stations,	  the	  presidents	  of	  Yale	  and	  Harvard	  and	  other	  big	  universities,	  and	  the	  heads	  of	  think-­‐tanks	  like	  Brookings	  Institution	  and	  the	  Heritage	  Foundation.”	  (72)	  28	  See:	  The	  Economist:	  The	  National	  People's	  Congress.	  What	  makes	  a	  rubber	  stamp?	  (Mar.	  5th,	  2012)	  
	   54	  
	  The	  Planning	  Commission	   is	   in	   charge	  of	  drafting	   the	   five-­‐year	  plans,	   formerly	  covering	   almost	   all	   economic	   activities.	   Thereby,	   it	   allocates	   funds	   and	   sets	  targets	  for	  the	  ministries	  and	  provinces,	  which	  in	  turn	  direct	  the	  state	  controlled	  sectors	   to	   fulfill	   these.	   The	   reform	   process	   has	   often	  worked	   by	   laying	   out	   an	  additional	  track	  to	  the	  existing	  plan,	  rather	  than	  transforming	  the	  methods	  used	  by	   the	   Planning	   Commission.	   Its	   power	   waxed	   and	   waned,	   depending	   on	  whether	   radical	   reformers	   or	   conservative	   planners	   dominated	   politics	   (Shirk	  1993).	  The	  Ministry	  of	  Finance	  is	  in	  charge	  of	  state	  revenue	  and	  thus	  focuses	  on	  saving	  rather	  than	  spending	  measures.	  During	  the	  Reform	  Era	  it	  represented	  the	  interest	  of	  the	  central	  state	  vis-­‐a-­‐vis	  the	  provinces	  especially	  concerning	  reforms	  of	  the	  tax	  system	  (Zheng	  2004).	  The	  State	  Economic	  Commission	  was	  established	  in	   1982	   and	   represented	   the	   chief	   rival	   of	   the	  Planning	  Commission.	   In	   fact,	   it	  took	   over	   administering	   the	   plan	   by	  monitoring	   its	   implementation	   in	   shorter	  time	   intervals.	   In	   addition	   it	   was	   in	   charge	   of	   many	   of	   the	   new	   policy	  experiments,	  making	  it	  the	  power	  base	  of	  the	  radical	  reformers	  (Zheng	  2004).	  	  	  To	   understand	   how	   institutions	   of	   a	   Developmental	   State	   could	   emerge	   it	   is	  essential	  to	  focus	  on	  the	  CCPs	  role	  and	  see	  China	  as	  a	  Party-­‐State.	  The	  crisis	  that	  had	  led	  to	  the	  reform	  process	  foremost	  concerned	  the	  Party.	  Of	  course	  the	  chaos	  and	   misdirected	   mass-­‐mobilizations	   of	   the	   Cultural	   Revolution	   had	   had	   a	  negative	  economic	   impact	  but	  to	  a	  totalitarian	  one-­‐Party	  regime,	  the	  welfare	  of	  the	  masses	   is	  not	   the	  primary	   factor	   for	  maintaining	  power.	  As	  Perkins	   (2011:	  61)	  notes:	  	   “The	  biggest	  political	  legacy	  of	  the	  1960s	  and	  early	  1970s	  from	  the	  point	  of	  view	  of	   the	   economy,	   however,	   was	   derived	   directly	   from	   the	   politics	   of	   that	   period.	  The	   Great	   Proletarian	   Cultural	   Revolution	   was	   so	   extreme	   along	   so	   many	  dimensions	  that	  it	  led	  to	  reaction	  equally	  strong.	  The	  Great	  Leap	  Forward	  [1958–1961]	  did	  more	  direct	  damage	  to	  the	  economy,	  but	  it	  was	  the	  Cultural	  Revolution	  that	   fundamentally	   undermined	   political	   support	   for	   the	   kinds	   of	   utopian	   social	  change	  goals	  and	  political	  mobilization	  policies	  pursued	  during	  the	  last	  half	  of	  the	  1960s	  and	  into	  the	  early	  1970s”	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The	  poor	   condition	  of	   the	  nation	  was	  a	   recurring	  phenomenon,	  but	   the	   loss	  of	  political	   support	   from	  all	   but	   few	   radical	   left-­‐wing	   cadres,	   opened	   the	  way	   for	  change.	  Thus	  the	  process	  of	  economic	  reform	  was	  a	  means	  to	  find	  new	  legitimacy	  for	   the	   Party-­‐State	   foremost	   internally	   and	   to	   a	   lesser	   degree	   externally.	   The	  direction	  of	  economic	  policy	   therefore,	  was	  neither	  provided	  by	  circumstances,	  nor	   by	   international	   financial	   institutions,	   nor	   by	   a	   clear	   theoretical	   model	   or	  ideology	   to	   be	   applied.	   Rather,	   the	   policies	   coalesced	   from	   the	   interaction	   of	  different	  factions	  within	  the	  CCP,	  with	  Deng	  Xiaoping	  acting	  to	  balance	  them	  out	  (Garnaut	   2011:84).	   The	   general	   agreement	   among	   elites	   was	   that	   economic	  reform	  should	  bring	  development	  and	  raise	   living	  standards,	   thereby	  replacing	  the	  Party’s	   role	   of	   ideological	   standard-­‐bearer	  with	  provider	   of	   actual	   tangible	  wealth	  (Guo	  2006:	  45).	  	  	  
Commencing	  the	  reforms	  1978–1983	  	  Deng	  reintroduced	  the	  grand	  scheme	  of	  the	  ‘Four	  Modernizations’	  in	  agriculture,	  industry,	  defense	  and	  science	  and	  technology	  at	   the	  3rd	  Plenum	  of	   the	  eleventh	  Congress	  of	  the	  CCP	  in	  December	  1978.	  Zhu	  Enlai	  had	  already	  proclaimed	  such	  an	  initiative	  over	  a	  decade	  earlier.	  Back	  then,	  Deng	  had	  been	  briefly	  in	  charge	  of	  it	  between	  his	  first	  and	  second	  purge	  by	  Mao	  (Fenby	  2008:	  514).	  The	  sequence	  of	   reforms	   was	   determined	   by	   how	   much	   political	   resistance	   needed	   to	   be	  overcome	  instead	  of	  following	  any	  coherent	  strategy.	  Deng	  used	  the	  momentary	  reform	  oriented	  consensus	  to	  ensure	  that	  the	  next	  generation	  of	   leaders	  would	  continue	   in	   this	   vein.	   The	   two	   younger	   cadres	   that	   would	   take	   on	   the	   top	  positions	  during	  the	  1980s	  were	  Zhao	  Ziyang	  and	  Hu	  Yaobang.	  	  	  Zhao	   has	   copied	   the	   pioneer	   Wan	   Li’s	   agricultural	   reform	   success	   in	   Anhui	  province	  to	  Sichuan,	  where	  he	  had	  been	  made	  Party	  Secretary	  in	  1975.	  By	  letting	  farmers	  sell	  produce	  that	  exceeded	  their	  quota	  requirements	  on	  the	  free	  market,	  he	   substantially	   increased	   the	   provinces	   output.	   In	   1980	   he	   replaced	   Hua	  Guofeng	   as	   head	   of	   government,	   becoming	   the	   new	   Premier.	   Hu	   was	   also	   a	  staunch	  supporter	  of	   reforms	  but	  his	  political	  career	  shadowed	  Deng’s	  with	   its	  ups	   and	   downs	   and	   concentrated	   on	   the	   central	   Party	   leadership.	   After	  Mao’s	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death	   he	   lead	   the	   powerful	  Organization	  Department.	   In	   1980	  he	   too	   replaced	  Hua,	  but	  as	  General	  Secretary.	  The	  remaining	  position	  as	  Chairman	  of	  the	  Central	  Military	  Commission	  held	  by	  Hua	  was	   taken	  by	  Deng	   for	  himself	   the	   following	  year	  (Fenby	  2008).	  While	  not	  always	  on	  the	  same	  page,	   this	  new	  generation	  of	  leaders	   would	   head	   the	   “radical	   reform	   faction”,	   often	   clashing	   with	   the	  	  “conservative	  faction”	  leaders	  of	  the	  old	  guard	  such	  as	  Chen	  Yun	  and	  Peng	  Zhen,	  who	   favored	   a	   slower	   pace	   of	   transition	   and	   preferred	   giving	   the	   planning	  system	   a	   central	   role,	   since	   they	   feared	   political	   destabilization	   if	   economic	  reform	  got	   out	   of	   control	   (Guo	  2006:	  43).	  The	   struggle	  between	   these	   factions	  would	  determine	  the	  pace,	  scope	  and	  sequence	  of	  reforms.	  	  Agricultural	   reform	   posed	   an	   ideal	   starting	   point	   since	   it	   lay	   outside	   the	  entrenched	   interests	   of	   economic	   planners	   who	   had	   focused	   on	   industry.	   The	  central	  institutions	  concerned,	  such	  as	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Agriculture,	  The	  Ministry	  of	   Grain	   or	   the	   All	   China	   Federation	   of	   Supply	   and	  Marketing	   Cooperatives	   all	  had	  little	  political	  clout	  (Shirk	  1993:	  133).	  Before	  real	  structural	  reform	  could	  be	  tackled	  however,	  the	  dire	  situation	  of	  state	  finances	  inherited	  by	  Hua	  Guofeng’s	  ill	  conceived	  Great	  Leap	  Outwards	  had	  to	  be	  rectified.	  	  	  The	   first	  actual	  new	  policies	  had	  also	  been	   initiated	   in	  1978	  by	  rising	   the	  state	  purchasing	  prices	  of	  agricultural	  output	  by	  22.1%	  and	  subsequently	  by	  another	  7.1%	   and	   5.9%.	   Meanwhile,	   the	   urban	   consumer	   prices	   were	   kept	   stable	   (Pei	  2011:	   61).	   The	   goal	   was	   to	   relieve	   the	   burden	   of	   the	   rural	   population	   and	   to	  complement	  decollectivization	  in	  order	  to	  raise	  productivity.	  The	  decreased	  gap	  between	   rural	   sellers	   and	   urban	   consumers,	   formerly	   a	   lucrative	   arbitrage	   for	  the	   state,	   had	   to	   come	   out	   of	   the	   central	   budget.	   The	   legacy	   of	   the	  Great	   Leap	  Outwards	  however	  also	  piled	  on	  investment	  commitments	  and	  put	  a	  huge	  strain	  on	  state	  finances	  and	  foreign	  exchange	  reserves	  through	  a	  mounting	  trade	  deficit.	  Inflation	   rose	   from	   2%	   to	   6%	   in	   1980	   and	   the	   budget	   deficit	   increased	  dramatically.	  This	  prompted	  further	  efforts	  to	  cool	  down	  the	  economy	  by	  cutting	  state	  enterprise	  capital	   investment	  and	  by	  actually	  renouncing	  approximately	  a	  thousand	  joint	  venture	  contracts.	  Consequently,	  GDP	  growth	  declined	  from	  7.8	  to	  5.2%	  in	  1981	  (Dittmer/Wu	  2006:	  57).	  But	  in	  consolidating	  state	  finances,	  even	  at	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the	  price	  of	  more	  sluggish	  growth,	  Deng	  and	  Chen	  saw	  eye	   to	  eye.	  While	   there	  was	   no	   agreement	   on	   urban-­‐industrial	   reforms,	   Zhao	  was	   allowed	   to	   continue	  with	   extending	   agricultural	   reforms	   after	   the	   precedent	   had	   been	   set	   in	  Anhui	  and	  Sichuan	  (Huang	  et	  al.	  2008:	  488).	  	  	  The	   Household	   Responsibility	   System	   (HRS)	   replaced	   communes	   but	   without	  privatizing	   any	   land.	   The	   collectively	   owned	   plots	   were	   contracted	   out	   to	  farming	  households	  based	  on	  family	  units.	  Farmers	  still	  had	  to	  fulfill	  a	  set	  quota	  and	  sell	  it	  at	  the	  plan-­‐price	  but	  what	  was	  produced	  beyond	  that	  could	  be	  sold	  at	  the	  higher	  market	  price.	  29	  Between	  1979	  and	  1984	  agricultural	  output	  grew	  by	  an	   annual	   average	   of	   7.5%	   (Liu	   et	   al.	   1998:	   135)30.	   As	   Yasheng	   Huang	   notes,	  contrary	   to	   the	   institutional	   economist’s	   insistence	   on	   absolutely	   secure	  property	  rights,	  the	  credibility	  offered	  by	  Deng	  and	  an	  initially	  united	  leadership,	  was	   a	  marginal	   shift	   towards	   a	   belief	   in	  more	   autonomous	   land	   use	   and	   thus	  sufficient	  to	  boost	  productive	  incentives	  even	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  legally	  protected	  ownership	  rights	  (Huang	  2008).	  	  How	   is	   the	   early	   success	   of	   agricultural	   reform	   related	   to	   assessing	   central	  economic	   institutions	  and	  bureaucratic	  restructuring?	  The	  main	  argument	  here	  is	  that	  the	  new	  orientation	  of	  the	  Party	  towards	  economic	  development	  provided	  the	   respective	   leader	   with	   legitimacy	   to	   rearrange	   central	   institutions	   and	  redistribute	  power	   toward	  his	   faction.	  Since	   rural	   reform	  driven	  by	  Zhao	  went	  ahead	   relatively	   unopposed	   and	   had	   proven	   successful	   early	   on,	   the	   premier	  could	   do	   just	   that.	   His	   aim	   was	   complementing	   the	   central	   institutions	   of	   a	  planned	   economy	  with	   those	   of	   a	  market	   economy	   under	   his	   aegis.	   The	   State	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  29	  After	  decollectivization	  from	  1979	  onwards,	  the	  unified	  grain	  collection	  system	  was	  switched	  to	  a	  "contract	  procurement	  system"	  following	  the	  dual-­‐track	  pricing	  system.	  Peasants	  sold	  a	  fixed	  quota	  at	  a	  predetermined	  price	  and	  negotiated	  the	  price	  for	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  grain	  on	  the	  market,	  even	   though	  most	   of	   it	  was	   purchased	   by	   the	   state	   as	  well.	   Between	  1985	   and	   1991	   the	   state	  procured	  around	  80%	  of	  marketed	  grain	  which	  in	  turn	  accounted	  for	  a	  third	  up	  to	  one	  half	  of	  the	  total	  amount	  (Pei	  2006:	  98).	  30	  According	   to	  Huang	  et.	   al.	  Agricultural	  GDP	  between	  1978–84	  even	   increased	  on	  average	  by	  8.8%	  compared	  with	  4.9%	  between	  1970–1978.	  What	  is	  most	  striking	  is	  the	  boom	  in	  cash-­‐crops.	  Cotton	  production	  for	  example	  slightly	  declined	  during	  the	  late	  Mao	  era,	  while	  it	  grew	  by	  almost	  20%	  annually	  during	  the	  first	  half	  decade	  of	  the	  Reform	  Period,	  suggesting	  the	  market	  oriented	  shift	  of	  production	  choices.	  Data	  from:	  Huang/	  Otsuka/	  Rozelle	  2011:	  479;	  A	  good	  analysis	  of	  the	  change	  of	   the	   incentive	   structure	   that	   compares	   the	  HRS	  with	   the	  previous	  working	  method	   is	  provided	  by:	  Lin	  1988	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Economic	  Commission	   (SEC)	  was	   restructured	   in	  1982,	   integrating	   five	   former	  commissions	   among	   them	   the	   ones	   in	   charge	   of	   agriculture	   and	   energy,	   the	  Finance	  and	  Trade	  Group	  of	   the	  State	  Council,	   and	  several	  State	  Bureaus.	  Zhao	  also	   recreated	   and	   personally	   headed	   the	   Commission	   for	   Economic	   System	  Restructuring	  (CESR),	  using	  it	  as	  his	  “think	  tank	  and	  power	  base”.	  Overall,	  State	  Council	  staff	  was	  reduced	  by	  17.000	  officials	  (Zheng	  2004:	  89).	  	  	  The	   composition	  of	   the	  administration	  always	   reveals	   the	  CCP’s	  preference	   for	  which	  groups	  should	   take	  part	   in	  policy	   formulation.	  The	  reformist	   faction	  had	  thus	  managed	  to	  open	  up	  the	  least	  contested	  sector	  for	  reform	  and	  reshuffled	  the	  responsibilities	   of	   the	   top	   bureaucracy	   towards	   market	   economics.	   The	   first	  years	  of	   the	  Reform	  Period	  did	  not	  exhibit	  a	  concentration	  of	  economic	  policy-­‐making	   but	  merely	   a	   shift	   from	   one	   faction	   to	   another.	   Several	   agencies	   claim	  responsibility	   for	   essential	   sectors	   of	   the	   economy,	   resulting	   in	   competition	  between	   ‘savers’	   (MOF),	   ‘spenders’	   (Ministries,	   Provinces)	   as	   well	   as	   between	  Planners	  (SPC)	  and	  market	  reformers	  (SEC).	  Reforms	  lack	  a	  clear	  blueprint	  and	  instead	  are	  carried	  out	  where	  there	  is	  least	  resistance.	  	  	  Similarly	  to	  agricultural	  reform,	  which	  had	  spread	  from	  local	  implementation	  to	  include	  more	  and	  more	  of	  the	  country,	  other	  reform	  measures	  were	  “tested”	  first.	  This	   form	   of	   particularistic	   policies	   allowed	   the	   reformers	   to	   garner	   support,	  since	   the	   prize	   of	   becoming	   an	   “experiment”	   was	   lavish	   central	   funding.	   Most	  famously,	   four	   Special	   Economic	   Zones	   were	   established	   in	   Shenzhen,	   Zhuhai	  and	  Shantou	   in	  Guangdong	  province,	   located	   strategically	  near	  Hong	  Kong	  and	  Xiamen	   in	   Fujian	   province	   on	   the	   Taiwan	   Strait.	   They	   enjoyed	   lower	   tax	   rates	  and	   more	   autonomy	   over	   investment	   decisions,	   most	   importantly	   involving	  foreign	   funds.	   Opening	   the	   economy	   meant	   opening	   these	   zones,	   which	   soon	  became	  responsible	  for	  most	  of	  exports	  and	  FDI	  (Xu	  2011:	  1113).	  	  On	  the	  enterprise	  level,	  profit-­‐retention	  schemes	  were	  granted	  to	  specific	  SOEs.	  As	  with	  the	  HRS	  the	  idea	  to	  create	  such	  incentives	  was	  first	  implemented	  in	  the	  provinces,	  this	  time	  by	  Zhao	  Ziyang	  during	  his	  time	  in	  Sichuan.	  Each	  enterprise	  was	  entitled	  to	  negotiate	  a	  proportion	  of	  the	  profits	  that	  would	  not	  be	  remitted	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to	  the	  state,	  but	  could	  instead	  be	  used	  for	  worker’s	  welfare,	  bonus	  payments	  or	  investment	  (Qian	  2006:	  235).	  The	  SEC	  and	  local	  politicians	  also	  favored	  the	  first	  experimental	  firms	  to	  adopt	  the	  system	  in	  order	  to	  ensure	  their	  success	  and	  thus	  legitimize	   expanding	   the	   reforms.	   As	   Susan	   Shirk	   reveals	   from	   interviews	   she	  had	  conducted:	   “Even	  SEC	  officials	  admitted	   that	   reform	  experiments	  were	  not	  true	  tests	  of	  changes	  in	  the	  rules	  of	  the	  game	  but	  served	  primarily	  political	  and	  propaganda	   functions.”	   She	   concludes	   that:	   “the	   experiments	  were	   an	   effective	  way	  to	  tie	  the	  interests	  of	  local	  officials	  to	  the	  fate	  of	  the	  industrial	  reform	  drive.”	  (Shirk	  1993:	   201)	  The	  most	  dramatic	   change	  of	   China’s	   political	   economy	  was	  the	  similarly	  motivated	  decentralization,	  especially	  in	  fiscal	  matters.	  	  Under	   the	  old	   fiscal	   system	  dating	  back	   to	   the	  1950s,	   all	   revenues	  went	   to	   the	  center	   and	   were	   distributed	   among	   provincial	   governments	   as	   seen	   fit	   to	  accomplish	  set	   targets.	  The	  main	  source	  of	  revenue	  was	  the	  remitted	  profits	  of	  SOEs	  operating	  in	  heavy	  industry	  (Wong/Bird	  2008:	  430).	  This	  was	  a	  function	  of	  a	   national	   economy	   that	   extracted	   rural	   surplus	   and	   reinvested	   it	   in	   heavy	  industry.	   Since	   the	   reformers	   had	   allied	   with	   provincial	   governments,	   the	  revenue	  mechanism	  changed.	  The	  increase	  in	  rural	  income	  through	  price	  reform	  in	   addition	   to	   the	   growing	   non-­‐state	   industrial	   sector,	   budget	   revenues	  declined.31	  In	   1978	  direct	   taxes	  made	  up	  60%	  of	   state	   revenue	   and	  93%	  came	  from	  SOEs.	  In	  1989	  direct	  taxes	  accounted	  for	  only	  19%	  with	  a	  mere	  8%	  coming	  from	  SOEs	  profit	   remittances	  (Zheng	  2004:	  111).	  Relative	  government	  revenue	  declined	  from	  31.2%	  of	  GDP	  in	  1978	  to	  23%	  in	  1983.	  The	  MoF,	  usually	  a	  staunch	  supporter	   of	   central	   power	   and	   fiscal	   conservatism,	   now	   welcomed	   further	  decentralization	   as	   it	   wanted	   to	   transfer	   the	   budget	   draining	   responsibilities	  along	  with	  the	  resources	  that	  the	  provinces	  had	  gained.	  	  	  In	  1980	  a	  fiscal	  reform	  started	  under	  the	  heading	  of	  “eating	  in	  separate	  kitchens”	  or	   fiscal	   contracting.	   As	   with	   other	   measures,	   the	   new	   system	   introduced	   a	  particularistic	  element.	  Each	  province	  could	  negotiate	  a	  proportion	  of	  revenue	  to	  be	   retained	   locally.	   The	   deals	   varied:	   for	   example	   Guangdong	   had	   to	   deliver	   a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  31	  The	  non-­‐state	  industrial	  sector	  includes	  private	  business,	  foreign-­‐invested	  business	  but	  mainly	  township	  and	  village	  enterprises	  (TVEs)	  that	  focused	  on	  light	  industry.	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fixed	   amount	   to	   Beijing,	   while	   Fujian	   would	   receive	   predetermined	   subsidies	  (Qian	   2006:	   233).	   The	   central	   government	   still	   decided	   on	   all	   tax	   rates	   and	  between	   1980	   and	   1984	   about	   80%	  of	   revenue	   that	  was	   collected	   locally	  was	  remitted	   to	   the	   central	   state	   (Shen/Jin/Zou	  2012:	   6).	   But	   compared	   to	   the	   old	  system,	  the	  provinces	  had	  gained	  significant	  autonomy	  and	  were	  able	  to	  develop	  their	   local	   economy	  by	   allocating	   new	   funds	   for	   investment.	   Furthermore,	   this	  system	   was	   implemented	   down	   the	   line,	   with	   contracts	   being	   negotiated	  between	   the	   provinces	   and	   the	   prefectures,	  which	   continue	   the	   deals	  with	   the	  counties,	   which	   eventually	   sign	   contracts	   with	   the	   townships	   and	   villages	   (Oi	  1992:	  103).	  	  Spanning	   industrial	  enterprise	  reform	  and	   fiscal	  reform	  was	  the	  matter	  of	  how	  homogeneously	  to	  extract	  profits	  from	  SOEs,	  since	  curiously	  they	  were	  required	  to	   pay	   income	   taxes	   and	   remit	   a	   share	   of	   after-­‐tax	   profits	   (Young	   2000:	   9).	   A	  conflict	   arose	   that	   split	   up	   the	   reformer’s	   camp	   between	   Hu,	   who	   favored	  maintaining	  particularistic	  profit-­‐contracting	  and	  Zhao,	  who	  now	  accommodated	  Chen	  Yun’s	  conservative	  centrists	  by	  supporting	  the	  implementation	  of	  a	  tax-­‐for-­‐profit	  scheme,	  that	  would	  rely	  more	  on	  a	  synchronized	  income	  tax.	  This	  division	  reflects	   the	  competition	  over	  who	  would	  eventually	  succeed	  Deng	  (Shirk	  1993:	  222).	  The	  struggle	  was	  only	  resolved	  during	  the	  next	  period	  of	  reforms.32	  	  To	   conclude,	   the	   early	   reform	   measures	   did	   not	   conform	   to	   any	   long-­‐term	  strategy.	   Deng’s	   faction	   enlisted	   the	   support	   of	   the	   provinces	   with	   attractive	  possibilities	  to	  pioneer	  reform	  experiments	  and	  by	  expanding	  local	  autonomy	  in	  agricultural,	   industrial	   and	   fiscal	   matters.	   This	   went	   against	   the	   established	  economic	  power	  bases	  of	   the	  MoF	  and	   the	  SPC.	  Throughout	   the	   first	   years	   the	  conservative	  faction	  pointed	  to	  the	  precarious	  state	  of	  the	  budget,	  trade	  deficits	  and	   the	   slump	   in	   GDP	   growth	   in	   order	   to	   maintain	   the	   central	   control	   of	   a	  planned	  economy	  as	  much	  as	  possible.	  But	  the	  marketization	  measures	  showed	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  32	  When	  Zhao	  went	  on	  several	  state	  visits	  in	  Africa,	  Hu	  campaigned	  for	  profit-­‐contracting	  in	  China,	  venturing	   into	   the	   economic	   policy	   domain	   that	   had	   been	   under	   Zhao’s	   purview.	   Apparently	  Deng	  privately	   reprimanded	  Hu	   and	   in	   effect	   also	   accommodated	   the	   conservatives.	   In	  1983	   a	  tax-­‐for-­‐profit	  system	  was	   introduced	  that	  augmented	  the	  MoF’s	  central	  control.	  Since	   it	  did	  not	  endure,	   this	   small	   victory	   is	   confined	   to	   a	   footnote.	   See	   Shirk	   (1993:245–279)	   for	   a	   detailed	  account.	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enough	  positive	  result,	  albeit	  with	  some	  time	  lag,	   to	  empower	  the	  reformers	  to	  continue.	  	  
From	  extended	  reforms	  to	  crisis	  1984–1989	  	  The	   HRS	   had	   quickly	   spread	   throughout	   the	   countryside,	   with	   80%	   of	  households	   in	   1982	   and	   two	   years	   later	   almost	   all	   of	   them	   taking	   part	   (Qian	  2006:	  232).	  GDP	  growth	  accelerated	  after	   the	   fiscal	  and	  macro	   imbalances	  had	  been	  overcome.	  A	  new	  wave	  of	  reforms	  was	  decided	  at	  the	  3rd	  Plenary	  Session	  of	  the	   12th	   Central	   Committee	   in	   October	   1984.	   This	   time	   the	   industrial	   urban	  sector	  was	  the	  main	  target.	  The	  market	  economy	  was	  formally	  placed	  on	  equal	  footing	  alongside	  the	  planned	  economy.	  Fourteen	  coastal	  cities	  were	  opened	  to	  foreign	   investment	   with	   other	   regions	   following	   suit	   the	   following	   year.	   The	  dual-­‐track	  marketization	  was	  extended	  to	  industrial	  goods,	  allowing	  enterprises	  to	   sell	   their	  above-­‐quota	  output.	  The	  market	  price	  was	  usually	  higher	   than	   the	  plan	   price,	   reflecting	   the	   long	   legacy	   of	   scarcity	   in	   China.	   This	   generated	  opportunities	   for	  patronage	  by	   the	  planners	  setting	   the	   initial	  quota,	  since	   that	  determined	   the	   profits	   that	   could	   be	  made	   from	   the	   surplus	   (Naughton	   2008:	  112).	  By	  the	  mid	  1980s,	  the	  industrial	  ministries	  had	  switched	  from	  opposition	  to	   conditional	   support,	   seeking	   a	   higher	   share	   of	   benefits.	   For	   example,	   these	  could	   take	   the	   form	  of	   special	   “departmental	   contracts”	   that	   can	   essentially	  be	  reduced	   to	   handouts	   by	   the	   SPC	   (Shirk	   1993:	   139).	   In	   return	   they	   would	  increasingly	  relinquish	  control	  over	  SOEs.	  	  The	   gradual	   retreat	   of	   the	   planned	   economy	   needs	   to	   be	   seen	   in	   perspective:	  While	  in	  1978	  no	  producer	  goods	  were	  sold	  on	  the	  open	  market,	  the	  share	  rose	  to	   13%	   in	   1985	  but	   by	   1991	   it	  was	   still	   less	   than	  half	   (Brandt/Rawski/Sutton	  2008:	   572).	   The	  major	   structural	   shift	  was	   related	   to	   the	   emergence	  of	   a	   non-­‐state	   sector	   with	   the	   rise	   of	   Township	   and	   Village	   Enterprises	   (TVEs).	   Mostly	  owned	  by	  the	  respective	  local	  governments,	  it	  would	  be	  misleading	  to	  label	  them	  either	   public	   or	   private	   enterprise.	   The	   important	   feature	   is,	   that	   they	   are	   not	  centrally	   directed	   SOEs,	   but	   the	   main	   beneficiaries	   of	   the	   expanding	   market	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economy.33Their	   predecessors,	   Commune	   and	   Brigade	   Enterprises,	   were	   only	  allowed	   to	  produce	  goods	  necessary	   for	   agriculture,	   to	  use	   local	   inputs,	   and	   to	  only	   sell	   locally.	   All	   three	   restrictions	   were	   lifted	   for	   TVEs,	   allowing	   them	   to	  compete	  with	  established	  SOEs.	  	  	  In	   1984	   the	   tax	   for	   profit	   system	   for	   SOEs	  was	   implemented.	   The	   enterprises	  were	  divided	  into	  two	  groups:	  large	  and	  small.	  Large	  firms	  had	  to	  pay	  a	  55%	  tax	  on	   profits,	   while	   the	   rate	   was	   reduced	   progressively	   for	   those	   in	   the	   small	  category	  (Zheng	  2004:	  110).	  In	  principle,	  a	  fixed	  tax	  rate	  on	  profits	  without	  any	  further	  remittances	  would	  function	  as	  an	  incentive	  to	  be	  profitable	  and	  provide	  managers	  with	   a	   better	   ability	   to	   project	   future	   expenses.	   However,	   the	   fierce	  resistance	  had	  resulted	   in	  a	  number	  of	  exemptions.	  Since	   the	  enterprises	  were	  owned	  by	  the	  state,	  unprofitable	  ones	  would	  not	  only	  fail	  to	  contribute	  to	  the	  tax	  revenue	  but	  needed	  to	  be	  subsidized.	  In	  a	  move	  that	  ran	  counter	  to	  the	  logic	  of	  market	  competition	  an	  additional	  “adjustment	  tax”	  was	  introduced	  to	  be	  paid	  by	  specifically	   profitable	   enterprises,	   mostly	   located	   in	   the	   coastal	   provinces.	  Opposition	   from	   industry	   and	   the	   most	   affected	   provinces	   remained	   strong	  throughout	  the	  years	  until	  finally	  in	  1987	  the	  measure	  was	  scrapped.	  	  	  Earlier	   in	   the	   year,	   Hu	   had	   called	   for	   political	   reform,	   encouraging	   modest	  democratic	   positions.	   His	   lenient	   stance	   towards	   ensuing	   student	   protests,	  initially	   backed	   by	   Deng,	   united	   the	   old	   guard	   in	   opposition.	   Exhibiting	   their	  political	   clout	   despite	   the	   mass	   retirements	   from	   state	   offices,	   seventeen	  members	   of	   the	   Central	   Advisory	   Commission	   successfully	   pressured	   Deng	   to	  remove	   Hu	   as	   General	   Secretary	   (Dittmer/	   Wu	   2006:58).	   But	   instead	   of	   vice	  premier	  Li	  Peng,	  their	  favored	  candidate	  to	  take	  up	  the	  post,	  Deng	  gave	  the	  office	  to	  Zhao.	  	  	  With	   the	   internal	   rivalry	   between	   the	   reformers	   resolved,	   the	   new	   General	  Secretary	  proceeded	   to	   back	   a	   return	   to	   the	  particularistic	   policy	   of	   extracting	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  33	  The	  literature	  on	  the	  nature	  and	  importance	  of	  TVEs	  during	  the	  Reform	  Era	  is	  vast.	   It	  rightly	  points	  to	  their	  essential	  role	  for	  China’s	  modernization,	  but	  since	  they	  fall	  outside	  the	  main	  focus	  of	  the	  political	  economy	  of	  an	  Developmental	  State,	  they	  cannot	  be	  considered	  in	  more	  detail	  at	  this	  point.	  For	  a	  good	  overview	  see:	  Xu/	  Zhang	  2011	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SOE	   profits	   now	   termed	   “Contract	   Responsibility	   System”.	  Managers	   increased	  their	   autonomy	   and	   each	   enterprise	   negotiated	   three-­‐year	   contracts	   over	   the	  amount	   of	   profit	   they	   had	   to	   remit.	   By	   the	   end	   of	   the	   year,	   80%	   of	   large	   and	  middle	   SOEs	   adopted	   the	   new	   system	   and	   the	   rest	   soon	   followed	   (Qian	   2006:	  235).	  Already	  an	  agency	  problem	  emerged	   that	  provided	  managers	  with	  a	   soft	  budget	   constraint,	   since	   any	   attempts	   to	   introduce	   negative	   consequences	   for	  loss	  making	  had	  been	  in	  vain.	  As	  the	  share	  of	  profits	  retained	  increased,	  central	  government	  revenue	  declined,	  leading	  to	  further	  fiscal	  decentralization.	  	  The	  1980	   “eating	   in	   separate	  kitchens”	  program	  of	  negotiated	   revenue	  sharing	  between	   the	   provinces	   and	   the	   center	   had	   led	   to	   considerable	   divergence.	  Guangdong	   and	   Fujian,	   where	   the	   initial	   SEZs	   were	   located,	   received	   the	   best	  deal	   by	   having	   fixed	   obligations	   for	   five	   years	   and	   could	   direct	   any	   surplus	  however	  they	  saw	  fit.	  While	  the	  poorest	  provinces,	  mostly	  further	  inland	  and	  the	  autonomous	   regions,	   remained	   reliant	   on	   central	   subsidies,	   the	   rich	  metropolitan	  areas	  like	  Beijing,	  Shanghai	  or	  Tianjin	  were	  forced	  to	  relinquish	  the	  lion’s	  share	  of	  taxes	  (Shen/Jin/Zou	  2012:	  6).	  The	  negotiated	  sharing	  of	  funds	  did	  not	  help	  offset	  the	  loss	  to	  the	  budget	  from	  decreased	  enterprise	  remittances.	  As	  in	  the	  early	  1980s,	  the	  MoF	  reacted	  with	  further	  devolution	  of	  responsibilities.	  	  In	  1988	  the	  Contract	  Responsibility	  System	  was	  introduced	  for	  the	  provinces	  as	  well.	   Revenue	   sharing	   was	   effectively	   decoupled	   from	   expenditure	   needs,	  charging	   local	   governments	   with	   partly	   financing	   themselves.	   Overall,	   central	  government	   revenue	   still	   declined,	   reaching	   a	   trough	   of	   20%	   of	   total	   revenue	  collected,	  amounting	  to	  only	  3%	  of	  GDP	  in	  1993	  (Wong/Bird	  2008:	  432).34	  Zheng	  (2004:	   115)	   sums	   up	   Beijing’s	   dilemma:	   “Fiscal	   reform	   provided	   a	   strong	  incentive	   to	   act	   like	   entrepreneurs,	   using	   various	   ways	   to	   increase	   provincial	  revenues,	   and	   the	   resulting	   behavior	   was	   not	   always	   in	   line	   with	   central	  government’s	   expectation.	   Instead	   it	   became	   an	   effective	   tool	   for	   local	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  34	  As	   the	   numbers	   provided	   by	   Zheng	   (2004:	   116)	   demonstrate,	   when	   the	   proportions	   are	  measured	   in	   collections,	   then	   the	   central	   government	   share	   actually	   increased	   from	   20.6%	   in	  1981	   to	   41.3%	   in	   1990,	   but	   once	   grants	   and	   other	   forms	   of	   revenue	   are	   included	   the	   bleaker	  picture	   for	   the	   central	   budget	   emerges.	   Wong	   and	   Bird	   (2008:	   432)	   explain	   this	   with	   the	  unanticipated	  effects	  of	  high	  inflation,	  which	  outpaced	  the	  negotiated	  growth	  of	  remittances.	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governments	   to	   seek	   greater	   power	   in	   relation	   to	   the	   central	   government.”	  Indeed,	   this	   is	   reflected	   in	   the	   composition	   of	   the	   Central	   Committee,	   where	  provincial	   leaders	   formed	   the	   largest	   bloc,	   holding	   43%	   in	   1987.35Like	   SOE	  managers,	  provincial	  governments	  had	  a	  soft	  budget	  constraint	  and	  the	  power	  to	  negotiate	   favorable	   deals,	   increasing	   their	   tax	   base	   and	   demanding	   huge	  investment	   sums	   for	   various	   projects	   even	   if	   on	   aggregate	   their	   action	   put	  pressure	  on	  the	  national	  economy.	  	  	  	  	  Leading	  up	  to	  1986	  the	  macro	  indicators	  made	  the	  conservative	  faction	  nervous	  about	   an	   overheating	   economy	   and	   they	   demanded	   restrictive	   monetary	   and	  fiscal	   measures.	   Further	   price	   reforms	   were	   delayed.	   Inflation	   dropped	   from	  8.8%	  to	  6%,	  industrial	  growth	  went	  down	  to	  8.8%	  from	  18%	  and	  import	  growth	  almost	  halted	  at	  1.6%	  compared	  to	  the	  54%	  increase	  the	  year	  before	  (Dittmer/	  Wu	  2006:	  58).	  	  	  Zhao,	   seemingly	   backed	   by	   Deng,	   tentatively	   announced	   another	   attempt	   to	  liberalize	   prices	   in	   1988.	   He	   faced	   stiff	   opposition,	   now	   embodied	   by	   the	  conservative’s	  hopeful	  Li	  Peng.	  After	  Deng	  suddenly	  withdrew	  his	  initial	  support,	  Zhao’s	   faction	   was	   forced	   onto	   the	   defensive.	   In	   1988	   price	   reform	   was	  abandoned	   and	   Li	   Peng	   advanced	   to	   the	   Premiership	   (Shirk	   1993:326).	   He	  proceeded	   to	   have	   the	   Planning	   Commission	   take	   over	   the	   Economic	  Commission,	   cementing	   his	   factions	   grasp	   on	   central	   economic	   policy	   making	  (Zheng	   2004:	   90).	   The	   infamous	   protest	   at	   Tiananmen	   Square	   was	   the	   final	  turning	  point	   for	   the	  Party.	   Zhao	  was	  deemed	   to	  have	   reacted	   to	   leniently	   and	  was	  removed,	  even	  put	  under	  house	  arrest,	  but	  Deng	  protected	  him	  from	  further	  prosecution	  at	  Li’s	  hands	  (Fenby	  2009:	  633).	  Political	  turmoil	  was	  accompanied	  by	  economic	  crisis	  and	  it	  took	  three	  years	  until	  any	  new	  reform	  efforts	  could	  be	  re-­‐launched.	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  35	  Including	  seats	  of	  local	  military	  leaders	  puts	  the	  share	  above	  50%,	  See:	  Shirk	  1993:	  150.	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From	  crisis	  to	  recommitting	  to	  the	  market	  1989–1993	  	  Along	  with	  Zhao,	  other	  leaders	  of	  the	  reform	  faction	  lost	  their	  top	  positions.	  The	  political	   unrest	   and	   its	   danger	   to	   the	   Party	   was	   seen	   as	   resulting	   form	   the	  economic	  imbalance,	  which	  in	  turn	  were	  attributed	  to	  the	  reforms.	  	  Jiang	  Zemin,	  who	  had	  shown	  strength	   in	  dealing	  with	  protests	  as	  mayor	  and	  Party	   leader	  of	  Shanghai,	  was	  chosen	  as	  Zhao’s	  successor.	  Deng	  even	  stepped	  down	  and	  allowed	  Jiang	  to	  head	  the	  Central	  Military	  Commission.	  Nevertheless,	  Jiang	  moved	  closer	  to	  Chen	  Yun’s	  conservative	  camp	  (Fenby	  2008:	  646).	  	  In	  mid	  1989	   a	  period	  of	   “retrenchment	   and	   austerity”	   set	   in.	   Inflation	   reached	  17.8%	   and	   foreign	   debt	   stood	   at	   over	   $40	   billion	   at	   the	   end	   of	   the	   year	  (Dittmer/Wu	  2006:60).	  GDP	  growth	  collapsed	  from	  11.3%	  the	  previous	  year,	  to	  4.1%	   and	   further	   to	   3.8%	   in	   1990.	   Reestablishment	   of	   central	   control	   over	  investment	  and	  imports	  countered	  inflation	  and	  in	  1990,	  for	  the	  first	  time	  since	  1983,	  China	  registered	  a	  trade	  surplus.	  At	  the	  same	  time	  growth	  and	  the	  reform	  momentum	  were	   arrested	   (Garnaut	   2011:	   87).	   But	   ever	   declining	   SOE	   profits	  and	   budgetary	   revenue	   since	   1978	   limited	   the	   capacity	   of	   central	   Party-­‐State	  cadres	   to	   fuel	   their	   patronage	   support	  network	   through	  doling	  out	   investment	  projects	  or	  generating	  and	  allocating	  jobs	  (Naughton	  2008:	  114).	  	  Dissatisfied	  with	  sluggish	  growth	  and	  a	  halt	  to	  the	  reforms,	  Deng	  allied	  with	  Zhu	  Rongji,	  Jiang’s	  successor	  as	  Mayor	  of	  Shanghai.	  Early	  in	  1992,	  Deng	  embarked	  on	  his	  famous	  “southern	  tour”,	  visiting	  the	  SEZs	  of	  Shenzen	  and	  Zhuhai	  and	  as	  well	  as	   Shanghai.	   It	  was	   a	  massive	  mobilization	   campaign	   of	   the	  wealthy	  provinces	  and	  cities	  to	  continue	  economic	  modernization.	  He	  proclaimed	  that:	  “we	  should	  be	   bolder	   in	   carrying	   out	   reforms	   and	   opening	   up	   to	   the	   outside	  word	   and	   in	  making	  experimentation.”36The	  power	  of	  the	  elder	  faction	  was	  naturally	  waning	  with	   their	   physical	   demise.	   Chen	   Yun	   conceded	   the	   inappropriateness	   of	  formerly	   reliable	   policies	   for	   the	   new	   situation.	   By	   the	   end	   of	   the	   year,	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  36	  Cited	  in	  Fenby	  2008:	  647.	  Deng	  compared	  the	  current	  approach	  to	  women	  with	  bound	  feet,	  a	  phrase	  that	  Mao	  had	  often	  used	  to	  mock	  adversaries.	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Central	  Advisory	  Commission	  was	  abolished,	  marking	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Old	  Guard’s	  power	  (Naughton	  2008:	  114).	  	  	  Zhu	   Rongji	   was	   given	   a	   newly	   created	   agency,	   the	   Economic	   and	   Trade	   Office	  (ETO).	   After	   he	   became	  Vice-­‐Premier	   in	   1993	   his	   agency	  was	   upgraded	   to	   the	  State	  Economic	  and	  Trade	  Commission	   (SETC),	  which	  would	   serve	  as	  his	  main	  power	  base	  and	  policy	  formulation	  tool,	  taking	  on	  the	  tradition	  of	  the	  reformist	  faction	  under	  Zhao.	  Jiang	  Zemin,	  head	  of	  the	  Party,	  acted	  as	  balancer	  between	  the	  factions,	  with	  the	  conservatives	  still	  led	  by	  Li	  Peng.	  	  At	  the	  Third	  Plenum	  of	  the	  fourteenth	  Party	  Congress	  the	  aim	  was	  proclaimed	  to	  establish	   a	   “socialist	   market	   economy”,	   finally	   substituting	   any	   mention	   of	   a	  planned	   economy.	   A	   document	   was	   drafted	   listing	   major	   reform	   goals	   for	   all	  sectors.	  The	  major	  shift	  is	  described	  by	  Huang:	  	  	   “In	  the	  1990s,	  Chinese	  policy	  makers	  favored	  the	  cities	  in	  terms	  of	  investment	  and	  credit	  allocations	  and	  taxed	  the	  rural	  sector	  heavily	  in	  order	  to	  finance	  the	  state-­‐led	  urban	  boom.	  The	  policy	  changes	   in	   the	  1990s	  were	  not	  experimental;	   rather	  they	  were	  rooted	  in	  a	  technocratic	   industrial	  policy	  blueprint	  and	  a	  heavy	  urban	  bias.”	  (Huang	  2008:	  xv)	  	  The	   provinces	   led	   the	   way	   in	   pushing	   forward	   with	   reform,	   increasing	   the	  number	   of	   open	   cities	   and	   special	   development	   zones	   without	   formal	   central	  authorization.37FDI	   barriers	  were	   lifted	   in	   several	   sectors,	   while	  more	   regions	  became	  accessible.	  Most	  importantly,	  approval	  authority	  for	  FDI	  was	  transferred	  to	   the	   local	   governments	   (Huang	   2003:247).	   SOE	   autonomy	   was	   increased	   in	  many	   areas	   including	   investment,	  wage,	   and	   labor	  decisions	   (Qian	  2006:	   238).	  Economic	  modernization	   entered	   into	   a	   new	  phase	  under	   a	   new	  generation	   of	  leaders,	  but	  was	   still	  determined	  by	   the	  power	  allocation	  between	   the	   factions	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  37	  One	  rather	  extreme	  example	  was	  the	  village	  of	  Daqiu	  near	  Tianjin.	  With	  almost	  300	  enterprises,	  many	  foreign-­‐invested,	  it	  was	  lauded	  in	  the	  media	  as	  an	  example	  for	  the	  new	  market	  approach.	  The	  local	  Party	  Chief	  took	  on	  the	  air	  of	  a	  western	  CEO,	  wearing	  expensive	  suits	  and	  driving	  a	  fine	  German	  car.	  However,	   it	   turned	  out	  that	  he	  had	  suppressed	  the	  entire	  village	  to	  enrich	  himself.	  Finally,	  a	  paramilitary	  unit	  had	  to	  remove	  and	  arrest	  him.	  See:	  Fenby	  2008:	  655	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within	   the	   Party-­‐State	   elite	   and	   the	   tension	   between	   center	   and	   provincial	  governments.	  	  	  
The	  new	  reform	  drive	  1994–2001	  	  During	   the	   1990s	   a	   consensus	   emerged	   to	   commit	   to	   economic	   reform	   and	  stability.	  Curbing	   inflation	  accounted	   for	   “soft	   landings”	  after	   the	  boom	  phases.	  Figures	  3	  and	  4	  illustrate	  a	  gradual	  cooling	  down	  of	  growth	  without	  any	  radical	  collapses,	   even	   throughout	   the	   Asian	   Financial	   Crisis	   1997–8,	   and	   inflation	  following	  the	  trend	  with	  a	  slight	   lag.	  The	  new	  leadership	  thus	  remained	  secure	  from	   being	   made	   responsible	   for	   either	   sluggish	   development	   or	   precarious	  instability	  that	  could	  foster	  social	  unrest,	  especially	  since	  all	  forays	  into	  political	  liberalization	  had	  been	  shelved.	  	  	  The	  factional	  competition	  focused	  on	  internal	  political	  power,	  the	  separating	  line	  between	   them	   often	   derived	   from	   local	   backgrounds	   such	   as	   Jiang’s	   Shanghai	  gang	   that	   triumphed	   over	   his	   Beijing	   centered	   rival	   Chen	   Xitong	   (Dittmer/Wu	  2006:	   68).	   The	   other	   cleavage,	   between	   center	   and	   provinces,	   saw	   a	   decisive	  change	   through	   two	   important	   reform	   initiatives	   concerning	   SOEs	   and	   fiscal	  matters.	  	  	  Industrial	   reform	   centered	   on	  making	   SOEs	  more	   profitable	   and	   divesting	   the	  state	  from	  loss-­‐making	  enterprises.	  The	  share	  of	  total	  industrial	  output	  of	  small	  scale	   SOEs	   fell	   from	  36%	   in	   1980	   to	   10%	   in	   the	   early	   1990s	  while	   large	   scale	  SOEs	  raised	  their	  share	  from	  25%	  to	  over	  28%	  (Nolan/Wang	  1998:	  156).	  Overall	  though,	   the	  share	  of	  SOE’s	  output	  declined	  sharply,	   reaching	  44%	   in	  2001	  (Pei	  2004:	   124).	   SOE	   profits	   declined	   more	   drastically	   from	   14%	   to	   0.6%	   of	   GDP	  between	  1978	  and	  1996	  but	  slowly	  gained	  ground	  again	  since	  (Naughton	  2008:	  108).	   The	   particularistic	   policymaking	   and	   building	   of	   patronage	   has	   allowed	  urban	  workers	   and	   their	   bosses	   to	   increase	  wages.	   Since	   the	   beginning	   of	   the	  Reform	  Era	  until	  1996	  the	  SOE	  wage	  fund	  grew	  on	  average	  by	  16%	  annually	  (Lin	  1998:	  425).	  By	  1993	  one	  third	  of	  SOEs	  reported	   losses	  (Zhang	  2004:	  131).	  The	  same	   year,	   small	   and	   medium	   sized	   enterprises	   employed	   the	   majority	   of	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workers	  but	  accounted	  for	  less	  than	  half	  of	  output	  (Qian	  2006:	  246).	  In	  the	  early	  1990s	  the	  central	  state	  had	  to	  use	  17%	  of	  the	  budget	  to	  cover	  SOE	  losses,	  which	  were	  concentrated	  in	  these	  small	  firms	  (Nolan/Wang	  1998:	  156).	  	  To	  counter	  the	  dire	  situation	  of	  state	  industry	  and	  to	  alleviate	  the	  fiscal	  burden	  a	  reform	   was	   started	   to	   implement	   a	   “modern	   enterprise	   system”,	   including	   an	  increase	   in	   corporatization	   and	   even	   shared	   stock	   options,	   where	   a	   minority	  stake	  was	  traded	  publicly.	  By	  1997	  most	  of	  the	  companies	  listed	  on	  the	  Shanghai	  and	  Shenzen	  stock	  exchanges	  (both	  opened	  in	  1990)	  were	  majority	  state-­‐owned	  (Guo	   2006:	   106).	   The	   remaining	   stake	   was	   controlled	   by	   individual	  organizations	  such	  as	  relevant	  Ministries,	  TVE	  partners,	  in	  some	  cases	  even	  the	  PLA	  or	  foreign	  investors	  (Nolan/Wang	  1998:	  165).	  	  	  The	  most	  important	  part	  of	  reform	  was	  termed	  “grasping	  the	  large	  and	  letting	  go	  of	  the	  small”	  (Ngo	  2011:	  xxxviii).	  Within	  two	  years	  over	  20	  million	  workers	  were	  laid	  off	  and	  more	  than	  half	  of	  small	  and	  medium	  sized	  SOEs	  were	  privatized	  or	  merged	   with	   larger	   ones	   (Qian	   2006:	   243).	   For	   the	   first	   time	   since	   1978,	  industrial	   SOE	   profits	   began	   to	   rise,	   albeit	   slowly	   (Naughton	   2008:108).	   One-­‐thousand	  SOEs	  were	  targeted	  to	  form	  large	  conglomerates	  in	  key	  industries	  and	  under	   continued	   state	   control.	   A	  Vice-­‐Premier	   announced	   in	  1998	   that	   China’s	  standing	   in	   the	   economic	   order	   “will	   be	   to	   a	   large	   extent	   determined	   by	   the	  position	  of	  our	  nation’s	  large	  industrial	  groups.”38	  After	  joining	  the	  WTO	  in	  2001	  policymakers	   intended	  to	  create	   fifty	  even	   larger	  conglomerates,	  modeled	  after	  the	   Japanese	   and	   Korean	   example	   complete	   with	   favorable	   financial	   support	  (Brandt/Rawski/Sutton	  2008:	  614).	  But	  contrary	   to	   Japan	  and	  Korea	   (and	   to	  a	  lesser	   degree	   Taiwan),	   the	   focus	   was	   not	   on	   private	   national	   champions.	   The	  main	  point	  to	  be	  made	  here	  is	  the	  success	  that	  was	  achieved	  in	  halting	  the	  drain	  on	  the	  state	  budget	  by	  consolidation	  of	  SOEs	  and	  the	  concentration	  of	  efforts	  on	  fewer	   firms.	   This	   meant	   extensive	   investment	   projects	   in	   urban	   industry,	  financed	  by	  the	  state.	  But	  private	  sector	  share	  in	  fixed-­‐assed	  investment	  actually	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  38	  Vice	   Premier	  Wu	   Bangguo	   quoted	   in	   Brand/Rawski/Sutton	   2008:	   614;	   originally	   in	   Nolan/	  Zhang	  2004	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declined	  from	  21.4%	  between	  1981	  and	  1989	  to	  13.3%	  between	  1993	  and	  2001	  (Huang	  2008:	  113).	  	  	  The	  second	  major	  step	  in	  1994	  was	  a	  new	  tax	  reform	  with	  the	  aim	  to	  recentralize	  financial	  administration.	  The	  former	  complex	  system	  of	  turnover	  taxes,	  including	  multiple	  tiers,	  was	  simplified	  by	  introducing	  a	  value	  added	  tax	  at	  the	  single	  rate	  of	  17%.	  Excise	   taxes	  were	   levied	   for	   specific	  products	   such	  as	   tobacco,	   alcohol	  and	  luxury	  items	  such	  as	  jewelry.	  A	  modest	  5%	  tax	  for	  business,	  trade	  and	  other	  services	  and	  transactions	  was	  introduced	  as	  well.	  The	  corporate	  income	  tax	  was	  unitized	  to	  33%.	  Overall,	  the	  simplification	  and	  harmonization	  was	  an	  easy	  way	  to	  eliminate	  distortions	  through	  loopholes	  or	  inconsistencies	  that	  had	  provided	  incentives	  to	  duplicate	  certain	  industries,	  where	  local	  government	  would	  extract	  more	  revenue	  (Wong/	  Bird	  2008:	  434).	  	  At	   the	   heart	   of	   the	   reform	   was	   a	   new	   way	   of	   tax	   sharing,	   that	   distinguished	  between	   three	   groups:	   A	   central	   fixed	   revenue	   base,	   including	   continued	  remittances	  by	  centrally	  owned	  SOEs,	  tariffs	  and	  others.	  A	  second	  group	  made	  up	  a	  purely	  local	  revenue	  base,	  consisting	  of,	  among	  others,	  business	  taxes	  of	  local	  enterprises,	   state	   and	   land	   sales	   revenues	   and	   personal	   income	   tax.	   Most	  importantly,	   a	   third	   revue	  base	  was	   shared	  at	   fixed	   ratios	  between	   the	   central	  and	   local	   governments,	   including	   the	   new	   value-­‐added-­‐tax	   of	   which	   three	  quarters	  of	  revenue	  flowed	  to	  the	  center	  (Zheng	  2004:	  119).	  	  	  New	   agencies	   were	   created	   for	   actual	   collecting	   both	   the	   central	   and	   shared	  taxes,	   with	   a	   separate	   entity	   having	   autonomy	   to	   collect	   the	   local	   taxes.	  Previously,	   local	  tax	  offices	  had	  been	  in	  charge	  of	  assessing,	  collecting	  and	  then	  delivering	  almost	  all	  taxes,	  which	  had	  provided	  opportunities	  to	  withhold	  some	  revenue.	   In	  fact,	  Wong	  and	  Bird	  (2008:	  437)	  go	  as	  far	   in	  making	  this	   fact	  alone	  responsible	  for	  a	  significant	  recovery	  of	  the	  central	  budget,	  improving	  from	  22%	  in	  1993	  to	  56%	  of	  total	  revenue	  in	  one	  year.	  The	  value-­‐added-­‐tax	  made	  up	  42%	  of	  total	  revenue	  (Shen/Jin/Zou	  2012:	  12).	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The	  new	  system	  had	  two	  important	  effects:	  First,	  while	  the	  central	  government	  has	  regained	  a	  higher	  ratio	  of	  revenues	  it	  did	  not	  reassume	  more	  responsibilities	  for	   spending	   the	   funds.	   In	   descending	   order	   of	   magnitude	   the	   central	  governments	   three	   main	   expenditures	   were:	   military,	   servicing	   interest	   on	  national	  debt	  and	  capital	  construction.	  Since	  three	  quarters	  of	  spending	  still	  fall	  under	  local	  obligation,	  the	  provinces	  and	  in	  turn	  the	  counties,	  villages	  and	  towns	  rely	   heavily	   on	   transfers	   along	   the	   chain	   from	   the	   central	   government.39These	  transfers	  consists	  mostly	  of	  tax	  rebates,	  except	  for	  the	  poorest,	  mostly	  inland	  and	  minority	  regions.	  The	  reason	   for	   this	   lies	   in	   the	  nature	  of	   the	   tax	  rebate	   that	   is	  based	  on	  the	  previous	  year’s	  tax	  income	  and	  delivers	  30	  percent	  of	  any	  increase	  back	   to	   the	   province.	   Thus,	   rich	   regions	   like	   Shanghai,	   Beijing	   or	   Tianjin	   are	  vastly	   favored.	   This	   comes	   on	   top	   of	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   previous	   particularistic	  contracts,	   which	   served	   to	   redistribute	   funds	   between	   provinces,	   have	   been	  abandoned	  in	  favor	  of	  equal	  tax	  rates	  (Wong/Bird	  2008:	  438).	  	  	  The	  second	  effect	  was	  a	  shift	  to	  extra-­‐budgetary	  and	  off-­‐budgetary	  resources	  of	  revenue.	   The	   former	   denote	   “all	   resources	   managed	   directly	   or	   indirectly	   by	  administrative	   branches	   of	   the	   government	   outside	   the	   normal	   budgetary	  process.”	   (Wong/Bird	   2008:	   443)	   The	   latter	   are	   simply	   collected	   without	   any	  formal	  authorization	  from	  the	  central	  or	  even	  the	  provincial	  government	  by	  the	  subunits	   (Shen/Jin/Zou	   2012:	   37).	   Due	   to	   several	   reclassifications	   and	   the	  opaque	  nature	  of	  these	  funds	  it	  is	  very	  difficult	  to	  provide	  an	  exact	  estimate,	  but	  they	  rival	   the	  actual	  budget	   in	  size.	  They	  are	  almost	  entirely	  spent	  by	   the	   local	  government.	  The	  function	  of	  these	  extra	  and	  off-­‐budgetary	  revenues	  is	  to	  fill	  the	  gap	   left	   by	   the	   responsibility	   to	   finance	   infrastructure,	   social	   services	   or	  education	  but	  their	  opaque	  nature	  makes	  them	  extremely	  prone	  to	  misallocation	  	  (Pei	  2008:	  124).	  The	  new	   tax	   system	  did	  manage	   to	  dampen	   the	   long	   trend	  of	  fiscal	  decentralization	  but	  could	  not	  reverse	  the	  absolute	  positions.	  Measured	  in	  spending,	   central	   government	   allocated	  47.4%	  of	   total	   revenue	   in	  1978,	  which	  declined	  to	  34.7%	  in	  2000	  (Pei	  2004:	  142).	  Considering	  the	  vast	  amount	  of	  funds	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  39	  The	  order	  of	  spending	  volume	  was	  calculated	  for	  2005	  but	  they	  still	  fall	  under	  the	  same	  fiscal	  sharing	  system	  of	  1996,	  See:	  Shen/Jin/Zou	  2012:	  16	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outside	  the	  official	  budget	  concentrated	  in	  the	  local	  units	  the	  imbalance	  becomes	  all	  the	  more	  severe.	  	  	  
	  
Conclusion	  –	  The	  Political	  Economy	  of	  the	  Reform	  Era	  	  	  Over	  twenty-­‐three	  years	  of	  reforms	  a	  continuous	  shift	  from	  plan	  to	  market	  had	  occurred	   in	   China.	   Modernization	   was	   the	   new	   legitimacy	   for	   the	   Party-­‐State,	  both	   internal	  and	  external	   since	   the	   last	  years	  under	  Mao	  had	  undermined	   the	  entire	  social	  structure,	  including	  the	  implicit	  rules	  how	  elite	  power	  was	  allocated.	  Deng	   Xiaoping	   offered	   a	   return	   to	   the	   factional	   competition	   of	   patronage	  networks	   and	   a	   promise	   of	  wealth	   generation	   that	   promised	   lucrative	   returns	  while	  increasing	  overall	  prosperity.	  	  	  For	  the	  first	  decade	  the	  reformist	  faction	  initiated	  a	  successful	  transition	  towards	  more	   marketization	   through	   increased	   autonomy	   for	   agriculture	   and	   rural	  industry	  at	  the	  same	  time	  accumulating	  political	  power	  towards	  a	  younger	  and	  more	   change	   oriented	   faction.	   Subsequent	   opposition	   by	   conservatives,	  preferring	   to	   preserve	   the	   planned	   economy	   and	   seeing	   their	   political	   power	  bases	   diminished,	   succeeded	  whenever	   the	   rapid	   reforms	   could	   be	   blamed	   for	  instability,	  both	  economic	  and	  social.	  Eventually	  the	  crisis	  of	  1989	  halted	  further	  reform	  and	   tightened	   the	  Party’s	   resolve	   to	  hold	  on	   to	  political	  power	   through	  authoritarian	  means.	  	  	  As	   the	   reform	   drive	   was	   achieved	   through	   a	   play	   to	   the	   provinces,	   their	  increased	   influence	  on	   the	   center	   re-­‐launched	   the	   reforms,	  now	   focusing	  more	  on	  the	  urban	  bastions	  of	  state	  industry	  and	  a	  consolidation	  of	  state	  finances	  that	  favored	   the	   already	   richer	   coastal	   parts	   of	   the	   nation.	   Throughout	   the	   second	  decade	  of	  the	  Reform	  Era	  a	  consensus	  of	  growth	  with	  stability	  was	  achieved	  and	  reflected	  in	  more	  macroeconomic	  stability.	  The	  primary	  division	  no	  longer	  drove	  the	  factional	  disputes	  between	  reformers	  and	  conservatives,	  as	  a	  new	  generation	  of	   like-­‐minded	   technocrats	   could	   agree	   on	   the	   general	   direction	   of	   economic	  reforms.	   The	   central	   state	   has	   countered	   the	   gradual	   loss	   of	   power	   and	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Figure	  3	  –	  Annual	  GDP	  Growth	  in	  %	  
	  Source:	  World	  Bank	  data	  
	  
Figure	  4	  –	  China	  Inflation	  (GDP	  deflator	  annual	  %)	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Chapter	  8	  –	  China’s	  Bureaucracy:	  Meritocratic,	  Embedded	  and	  Insulated?	  	  The	   discussion	   of	   China’s	   political	   economy	   has	   demonstrated	   how	   the	   state	  managed	  a	  gradual	  transition	  from	  plan	  to	  market	  that	  was	  far	  from	  complete	  at	  the	   turn	   of	   the	  millennium	  and	  more	   than	   a	   decade	   later	   is	   going	   on	   still.	   The	  outcome	   of	   economic	   policy	   was	   the	   result	   of	   negotiations	   between	   different	  power	  factions	  and	  saw	  the	  rise	  of	  provincial	  influence	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  the	  central	  state.	  Considering	  the	  almost	  complete	  control	  over	  productive	  assets	  during	  the	  plan-­‐era,	   theoretically	   this	   leaves	  plenty	  of	   room	  for	  a	  capable	  Developmental	  State.	  What	   was	   already	   demonstrated	   however,	   is	   the	   lack	   of	   a	   long-­‐term	  development	   strategy,	   especially	   for	   the	   first	   fifteen	   years,	   besides	   the	   general	  direction	  of	  market	  liberalization.	  This	  chapter	  then,	  will	  consider	  the	  evolution	  of	  organizational	  features	  of	  the	  state	  apparatus	  and	  how	  they	  compare	  to	  those	  of	  the	  Developmental	  State	  Model.	  The	  discussion	  above	  already	  provides	  a	  basis	  for	  judging	  the	  extent	  of	  insulation	  and	  embedded	  autonomy	  of	  the	  bureaucracy.	  Therefore,	  to	  complement	  the	  picture,	  the	  reform	  of	  China’s	  civil	  service	  towards	  increased	  meritocracy	  and	  efficiency	  is	  reviewed	  first.	  	  
Meritocracy	  and	  efficiency	  	  	  Although	   meritocracy	   has	   increased	   relative	   to	   the	   Mao	   Era	   it	   remains	  contentious	  what	   forces	   lay	  behind	   it	   (Cao	  2004:	  436).	  The	  politics	   of	   the	   first	  Reform	  Era	  years	  have	  demonstrated	  how	  informal	  power	  was	  preserved	  at	  the	  highest	   level	   and	   therefore	   even	   a	   recruitment	   initiative	   could	   not	   escape	   the	  client-­‐patronage	   forces	   that	  were	   still	   attached	   to	   the	   topmost	   power	   brokers.	  But	   several	   attempts	   at	   reforming	   the	   system	   have	   produced	   some	   qualified	  results.	  	  Early	   on,	   in	   the	   1980s	  Deng	   pushed	   for	   rejuvenation	   of	   the	   CCP	   and	   the	   state	  hierarchy.	  He	  declared	  his	  goal	  to	  "abolish	  the	  de	  facto	  lifetime	  tenure	  system	  of	  government	   officials"	   and	   to	   "modernize	   the	   contingent	   of	   government	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officials”.40	  Fast-­‐tracking	  younger	  and	  better-­‐educated	  cadres	  into	  top	  leadership	  positions	  was	  one	  such	  effort.	  Another	  one	  was	  setting	  an	   implicit	  age	   limit	   for	  politburo	   members.	   As	   compensation	   the	   Central	   Advisory	   Commission	   was	  created	  where	  powerful	   elders	   took	   seats	   after	   they	  had	   resigned	   from	   formal	  state	  and	  Party	  offices	  (Naughton	  2008:	  102).	  Their	  continued	  power	  during	  the	  1980s	   and	   early	   1990s	   meant	   the	   preservation	   of	   the	   respective	   patronage	  networks,	   now	  promoting	   younger	   clients	   to	   fill	   vacancies.	  Overall,	  within	   less	  than	  a	  decade	  ninety	  percent	  of	  officials,	  not	  counting	  those	  on	  county	  level	  and	  below,	  had	  been	  replaced	  (Li	  1998:	  394).	  	  	  The	  1980s	  and	   the	  1990s	  both	   saw	  a	   rise	   in	  meritocratic	  principles	   applied	   to	  staffing	  official	  government	  post,	  albeit	  with	  reduced	  applicability	  for	  provincial	  and	   local	   subunits.	   Rationalizing	   state	   structures	   had	   the	   adverse	   effect	   of	  preoccupying	   Party	   officials	   with	  maintaining	   their	   department	   or	   jurisdiction	  rather	   than	   pursuing	   a	   coordinated	   goal	   (Howell	   2006:	   287).	   Besides	   evoking	  resistance	   the	   reforms	   bore	   another	   liability.	   Civil	   servants	   charged	   with	  implementing	   a	   shift	   toward	   a	   market	   economy	   could	   find	   opportunity	   for	  corruption.	  Having	  the	  adverse	  experience	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  in	  mind,	  Naughton	  argues	  that:	  	  	   “As	   the	   option	   of	   personal	   enrichment	   becomes	   more	   feasible	   along	   with	   the	  growth	  of	  the	  market	  economy,	  there	  must	  be	  some	  increase	  in	  the	  overall	  level	  of	  incentives	  inside	  the	  hierarchy	  in	  order	  to	  sustain	  the	  same	  level	  of	  commitment	  as	  before.	  	  Those	  incentives	  can	  either	  be	  career	  incentives	  or	  rewards	  for	  specific	  performance.”	  (Naughton	  2004:	  3)	  	  	  Both	  positive	  and	  negative	   incentives	  and	  specific	  rewards	  were	  part	  of	  reforms	  attempting	   to	   introduce	   meritocratic	   principles,	   but	   they	   achieved	   different	  outcomes	   between	   groups	   working	   within	   the	   state	   apparatus:	   professionals,	  administrators	   and	   the	   top	   level	   leadership.	   The	   two	   main	   efforts	   at	  restructuring	  the	  bureaucracy	  were	  Deng	  and	  Zhao’s	   initiative	  starting	   in	  1980	  and	  then	  again	  the	  limited	  attempt	  by	  Li	  Peng	  in	  1993	  and	  by	  Zhu	  Rongji	  in	  1998.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  40	  Cited	  by	  Li	  1(998:	  393);	  originally	  in:	  Deng,	  Xiaoping:	  Deng	  Xiaoping	  Wenxuan.	  Selected	  Works	  of	  Deng	  Xiaoping,	  Beijing	  1983.	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  The	  rejuvenation	  effort	  of	   the	  early	  1980s	  had	  provided	   the	  Party-­‐State	  with	  a	  boost	  of	  fresh	  talent.	  The	  intent	  was	  to	  refit	  the	  entire	  administration	  to	  be	  able	  to	   carry	   out	   the	   envisioned	   modernization	   process.	   As	   Burns	   (1983)	   has	  discussed,	  the	  civil	  service	  reforms	  under	  Zhao	  encompassed	  several	  measures,	  including:	   education,	   cracking	   down	   on	   corruption,	   departmental	   streamlining	  and	  most	  importantly,	  efforts	  to	  introduce	  meritocratic	  elements	  in	  recruitment	  and	  advancement	  of	  state	  employees.	  	  	  Educating	  officials	   to	  pursue	   the	   “Mass	  Line”	  was	  based	  on	   standard	  efficiency	  criteria,	  including	  such	  general	  virtues	  as	  trust,	  openness	  and	  honesty.	  The	  basic	  principles	  have	  not	  been	  significantly	  altered	  since	  Mao’s	  time	  and	  are	  aimed	  at	  both	   Party	   cadres	   and	   civil	   servants	   (Burns	   1983:	   701).	   The	   organizational	  reform’s	  relevant	  aspects	  lie	  in	  actual	  institutional	  changes	  and	  a	  new	  incentive	  structure,	  both	  positive	  and	  negative.	  	  	  At	   the	   macro	   level	   institutional	   reform	   started	   with	   the	   State	   Council	   by	  trimming	   the	   number	   of	   commissions,	   ministries	   and	   bureaus.	   As	   discussed	  above,	   a	   reduction	   was	   initially	   accomplished	   but	   bore	   the	   mark	   of	   Zhao’s	  concentration	   of	   competencies	   for	   the	   SEC.	   The	   overall	   trend	   of	   departmental	  streamlining	  had	  been	  slightly	  reversed	  and	  reshuffled	  under	  the	  premiership	  of	  Li	  Peng	  after	  1988	  until	  the	  cuts	  made	  by	  Zhu	  Rongji	  in	  1998	  (Zheng	  2004).	  The	  cutting	   of	   departments	   masks	   an	   actual	   extension	   of	   personnel.	   The	   goal	   had	  been	  set	  to	  reduce	  government	  staff	  by	  25%	  until	  1993	  and	  50%	  by	  1998	  (Chou	  2004:	  231).	  Official	  data,	  referenced	  by	  Pei	  (2006:	  136),	  indicate	  that	  during	  the	  first	   decade	   of	   the	  Reform	  Era,	   the	   number	   of	   government	   employees	   actually	  grew	  at	  a	  rate	  of	  6.7%	  annually,	  compared	  with	  1.8%	  from	  1953–1978.41	  In	  2002	  the	   total	   count	  had	  more	   than	  doubled	   to	  10.75	  million	  cadres.42	  However	   it	   is	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  41	  This	  far	  surpasses	  China’s	  slow	  annual	  population	  growth,	  which	  approximately	  reached	  1.5%	  between	   1980	   and	   1990	   and	   declined	   to	   0.7%	   until	   2001.	   See:	   World	   Bank	   data	   online	   at:	  http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.GROW?page=2	  42	  According	   to	  Pei,	   this	   figure	   includes	   all	   employees	  of	   government	   agencies	   and	  other	   state-­‐affiliated	  social	  organizations	  but	  excludes	   teachers	  and	  medical	  professionals	   (Pei	  2006:	  138).	  According	   to	   Burns	   (2007:	   3)	   the	   total	   number	   of	   public	   sector	   employees	   in	   2002	   was	  approximately	  70	  million,	  half	  of	  whom	  worked	  in	  SOEs.	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likely	   that	   the	   true	   number	   of	   officials	   is	   even	   higher,	   as	   overstaffing	   is	   being	  concealed	   especially	   at	   the	   lower	   levels	   of	   government.	   The	   cost	   of	  administration	   rose	   by	   11%	   more	   than	   budget	   revenues	   increased	   between	  1978	  and	  2002,	  consequently	  crowding	  out	  other	  investments	  (Pei	  2006:	  138).	  	  	  The	   prominence	   given	   to	   a	   somewhat	   powerful	   bureaucracy	   in	   the	  Developmental	  State	  model	  does	  not	   lead	  to	  the	  conclusion	  that	  a	  growth	  in	  its	  size	  is	  in	  any	  way	  a	  positive	  sign.	  While	  recruitment	  of	  new	  and	  better-­‐educated	  talent	  is	  essential,	  it	  should	  be	  accompanied	  by	  an	  overall	  streamlining	  especially	  through	  concentration	  of	   long	   term	  economic	  planning	  within	  central	  agencies.	  Instead,	   China’s	   expansion	   points	   to	   a	   fragmentation	   and	   replication	   of	  administrative	  units	  on	  the	  provincial	   level	  and	  below.	  Some	  changes	  did	  occur	  in	  the	  composition	  of	  the	  civil	  service	  but	  the	  increase	  of	  meritocratic	  principles	  hit	  several	  walls.	  	  The	   introduction	   of	   a	   performance	   based	   evaluation	   system	   within	   the	   state	  bureaucracy	   clashed	   with	   the	   Central	   Organization	   Department’s	   power	   to	  control	  official	  posts.	  As	  Burns	  wrote	  commenting	  on	  the	  first	  reform	  drive:	  	  	   “China	   has	   adopted	   parts	   of	   [an	   appraisal	   process	   based	   on	   objective	   criteria],	  relying	   at	   least	   in	   theory	   on	   ‘democratic	   assessment’	   of	   cadre	   performance	   by	  peers.	   Authorities	   have	   not,	   however,	   given	   high	   priority	   to	   standardizing	  performance	  appraisal	  criteria	  nor	  to	  developing	  objective	  measurable	  goals.	  The	  Party	   assumes	   the	   prerogative	   of	   determining	   these	   criteria,	  which	  may	   explain	  why	  so	  little	  has	  been	  done	  in	  this	  area.”	  (Burns	  1983:	  717)	  	  	  Zhao	   had	   intended	   to	   curb	   the	   Party’s	   influence	   by	   two	   measures:	   First,	   by	  empowering	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Personnel	  allowing	  it	  to	  manage	  all	  positions	  up	  to	  vice-­‐ministers.	   Two,	   by	   dismantling	   the	   Party	   groups	   within	   state	   agencies	  where	   all	   decisions	   where	   aligned	   with	   Party	   directives,	   including	   individual	  promotions	   (Wang	   2012:	   4;	   Chou	   2004:	   216).	   After	   some	   initial	   success	   the	  attempt	   to	   reduce	   Party	   influence	   failed.	   As	   discussed	   above,	   the	   crisis	   and	  political	  demise	  of	  Zhao	  and	  the	  pro-­‐democratic	  reformers	  in	  1989	  reestablished	  
	   78	  
the	  CCP’s	  hold	  on	  the	  state	  and	  especially	  empowered	  the	  Central	  Organization	  Department	   in	   questions	   of	   personnel.	   The	   new	   civil	   service	   reform	   effort	  initiated	  under	  Li	  Peng	  and	  Zhu	  Rongji	  in	  1993	  focused	  more	  on	  continuing	  with	  technical	  aspects.	  	  For	   one,	   the	   number	   of	   institutions	   under	   the	   State	   Council	  was	   again	   slightly	  reduced,	  from	  45	  ministries	  and	  commissions	  to	  41	  but	  this	  reflected	  mostly	  the	  reshuffling	  of	  power	  bases	  instead	  of	  an	  effort	  to	  streamline	  government	  (Zheng	  2004:	  93).	  Nonetheless,	   the	  new	   civil	   service	   system	  was	   intended	   to	   separate	  those	  agencies	  with	  regulatory	  function	  from	  the	  general	  administration,	  which	  could	  then	  focus	  on	  performance	  evaluation	  and	  staffing,	  albeit	  under	  the	  Party’s	  oversight.	   The	   former,	   ‘political	   civil	   servants’	  would	   be	   appointed	   by	   the	   CCP	  while	  the	  latter,	  ‘professional	  civil	  servants’	  would	  undergo	  an	  open	  examination	  process.	   Such	   a	   transparent	   distinction	   remained	   unimplemented,	   as	   the	  conservatives	  led	  by	  Li	  Peng	  continued	  to	  prevent	  any	  attempt	  at	  political	  reform	  detrimental	  to	  Party	  authority	  (Wang	  2012:	  4).	  	  	  The	   CCP	   Committees	   thus	   reassumed	   their	   control	   over	   the	   nomenklatura,	  selecting	  candidates	  that	  had	  been	  shortlisted	  but	  also	  determining	  whether	  an	  open	   recruitment	  was	   necessary	   at	   all	   to	   fill	   a	   post	   (Chou	   2004:	   217).	   Still	   an	  overall	   tendency	   emerged	   that	   saw	   more	   rigorous	   selection	   criteria	   for	   civil	  servants	   in	   addition	   to	   political	   requirements.	   Especially	   at	   the	   central	  government	   meritocratic	   principles	   for	   recruiting	   have	   taken	   hold	   by	   the	   late	  1990s;	   farther	   down	   the	   level	   of	   government	   the	   selection	   process	   becomes	  nontransparent	  and	  more	  corrupt	  (Burns	  2007:	  10).43	  By	  1998	  open	  recruitment	  occurred	  in	  30	  provincial	  governments,	  but	  only	  18	  of	  them	  made	  use	  of	  it	  at	  the	  township	   level,	   where	   less	   than	   half	   of	   new	   employees	   were	   chosen	   this	   way	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  43	  Burns	  gives	  the	  example	  of	  how	  bureau	  chiefs	  at	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Personnel	  were	  selected	  in	  one	  instance.	   In	   2004,	   four	   vacancies	   were	   publicly	   advertised	   for	   which	   one	   hundred	   candidates	  applied.	  Sixty	  of	  whom	  were	  given	  examinations.	  The	  results	  were	  added	  to	  the	  usual	  appraisal,	  leaving	   31.	   These	   had	   to	   answer	   two	   essay-­‐based	   questions,	   followed	   by	   an	   interview	  with	   a	  board	  that	  included	  the	  Minister.	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(Chou	  2004:	  221).44	  For	  judging	  the	  potential	  of	  an	  efficient	  bureaucracy	  on	  the	  national	   level,	   this	  tendency	  undermines	  a	  Developmental	  State	   in	  combination	  with	  the	  decentralization	  of	  economic	  policy	  making.	  Still,	  since	  these	  recruiting	  data	   include	   a	   vast	   apparatus	   it	   is	   necessary	   to	   consider	   whether	   different	  groups	  of	  government	  employees	  face	  distinct	  recruiting	  preconditions.	  	  Setting	  aside	  the	  career	  requirements	  of	  the	  top	  leadership	  for	  the	  moment,	  one	  must	   ask	   how	   important	   professional	   ability	   was	   compared	   to	   political	  conformity	   for	   the	   elite	   staff.	   Following	   the	   research	   by	  Walder	   et.	   al.	   (2000),	  there	   is	   little	   ground	   to	   suggest	   that	   the	   state	   had	   forsaken	   the	   principles	   of	  loyalty	  to	  the	  Party	  as	  a	  prerequisite	  to	  career	  advancement.	  What	  emerged	  is	  a	  double	   career	   path,	   distinguishing	   "high	   professionals"	   such	   as	   engineers,	  academic	   faculty	   or	   economic	   planners	   from	   “elite	   cadres”,	   which	   include	  “managerial	   positions	   in	   public	   agencies	   or	   enterprises	   and	   their	   subunits”.	  Based	  on	  empirical	  data	  on	  urban	  adults	  across	  China,	  the	  studies	  show	  that	  CCP	  membership	  —	  not	  surprisingly	  —	  is	  immensely	  important	  for	  becoming	  an	  elite	  cadre,	  but	  it	  bears	  little	  influence	  on	  becoming	  an	  elite	  professional.	  In	  contrast,	  attainment	  of	  higher	  education	  does	  little	  for	  advancement	  to	  elite	  cadres,	  while	  it	  is	  necessary	  almost	  per	  definition	  for	  becoming	  an	  elite	  professional.45	  	  	  The	   distinction	   of	   career	   paths	   suggests	   that	   the	   shortage	   of	   college	   educated	  candidates,	  exacerbated	  by	  Mao’s	  anti-­‐intellectual	  campaigns,	  has	  led	  the	  state	  to	  channel	   them	   towards	   professional	   positions	   rather	   than	   including	   higher	  education	  requirements	  for	  the	  administrative	  cadres	  (Walder	  et.	  al.	  2000:	  205).	  Irrespective	   of	   one’s	   career,	   a	   higher	   education	   has	   dramatically	   increased	   the	  odds	  of	  becoming	  a	  Party	  member.	  Since	  1988	  a	  college	  degree	  became	  the	  best	  predictor	   for	  CCP	  membership,	  displacing	   factors	  such	  as	  parent’s	  membership	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  44	  Chou	  quotes	  township	  data	  for	  2003,	  when	  only	  43.3%	  of	  positions	  were	  filled	  through	  open	  recruitment.	   He	   compares	   this	   with	   the	   62.7%	   national	   average	   for	   2001–2002.	   There	   is	   no	  reason	  to	  believe	  that	  the	  shares	  had	  been	  better	  the	  years	  before.	  45	  The	   exact	   scale	   of	   the	   respective	   impacts,	   according	   to	  Walder	   et	   al.	   (2000:	   199)	  were:	   „[...]	  Party	  members	  are	  5.3	   times	  more	   likely	   to	  become	  cadres	   than	  are	  non-­‐members,	  while	   they	  are	   not	  more	   likely	   to	   become	   elite	   professionals	   […]	   Those	  who	   attended	   college	   are	   6	   times	  more	   likely	  to	  become	  professionals	  than	  are	  high	  school	  graduates,	  who	  in	  turn	  enjoy	  a	  9-­‐fold	  advantage	   over	   those	   without	   a	   high	   school	   diploma.	   However,	   college	   education	   does	   not	  significantly	  improve	  the	  odds	  of	  becoming	  an	  elite	  cadre	  above	  the	  2.4-­‐fold	  advantage	  conferred	  by	  a	  high	  school	  education.”	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(Walder	   2004:	   199).	   Thus,	  while	   the	   overall	   Party-­‐State	   apparatus	   includes	   an	  increasing	  number	  of	  higher	  educated	  members,	  entry	  to	  administrative	  careers	  can	  be	  based	  on	  political	  merits	  alone.	  This	  is	  neither	  surprising	  nor	  completely	  undesirable.	   The	   question	   remains	   whether	   the	   promotion	   system	   works	   to	  motivate	  and	  select	  ideal	  candidates.	  	  In	   the	   early	   1980s	   appraisal	   of	   state	   employees	  was	   introduced	   that	   ought	   to	  include	  the	  evaluation	  of	  performance	  by	  peers.	  The	  Party	  decides	  on	  the	  criteria	  for	   such	   assessment,	  making	   the	   entire	   process	   rather	   arbitrary	   (Burns	   1989:	  717).	   Only	   in	   1989	  were	   these	   appraisals	  made	  mandatory,	   but	   in	   effect	   only	  leading	   officials	   were	   vetted.	   The	   aim	   was	   not	   so	   much	   to	   identify	   merit	   and	  qualification	  but	  rather	  the	  absence	  of	  political	  loyalty	  and	  to	  uncover	  corruption.	  A	  seemingly	  standard	  procedure	  was	  introduced	  only	  in	  1994,	  directing	  heads	  of	  departments	  to	  set	  up	  commissions	  to	  score	  their	  subordinates	  annually.	  Based	  on	  its	  member’s	  judgment	  and	  a	  candidate’s	  self-­‐report	  one	  of	  three	  grades	  was	  issued:	   “excellent”,	   “satisfactory”	   or	   “unsatisfactory”.	   Those	   not	   rated	  “unsatisfactory”	   were	   entitled	   to	   a	   year-­‐end	   bonus.	   The	   entire	   system	   then	  exhibited	   more	   structure,	   but	   was	   still	   undermined	   by	   the	   high	   discretionary	  influence	  by	   the	  Party	   and	   the	  weight	  of	  personal	   opinion.	   In	   effect	  more	   than	  99%	  of	  civil	  servants	  were	  deemed	  satisfactory	  or	  excellent	  and	  thus	  entitled	  to	  a	  minor	  bonus	  (Chou	  2004).	  	  	  While	   performance	   based	   incentives	   failed	   within	   the	   bureaucracy,	   the	  continuing	   economic	   liberalization	   had	   exposed	   some	   organizations	   staffed	   by	  the	  state	  to	  market	  forces	  and	  even	  allowed	  the	  emergence	  of	  a	  modest	  private	  sector.	   Cao	   (2003)	   finds	   a	   correlation	   between	   effective	   performance-­‐based	  standards	  and	  the	  extent	  of	  exposure	  to	  competitive	  market	  forces.	  Conversely,	  higher	  levels	  of	  state	  control	  have	  a	  relatively	  negative	  impact	  on	  the	  emergence	  of	  meritocracy.	  	  Finally,	  concerning	  the	  top	  leaders	  the	  process	  has	  already	  been	  discussed	  above.	  The	   Party	   selectorate	   negotiates	   internally	   along	   factional	   lines	   over	   top	  promotions.	  The	  main	  qualification	  is	  political	  capability	  in	  building	  a	  patronage	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system.	  In	  addition	  a	  successful	  track-­‐record	  in	  one’s	  political	  career	  is	  required,	  especially	   since	   the	   modern	   Party	   line	   focuses	   on	   economic	   success.	   Huang	  (2001)	  uses	  an	  argument	  of	  institutional	  economics	  to	  account	  for	  the	  outcome	  of	  top	  leadership	  succession.	  Over	  the	  Reform	  Era	  the	  majority	  of	  leaders	  had	  a	  strong	   background	   in	   provincial	   or	   urban	   management	   where	   they	   have	  presided	   over	   successful	   economic	   expansion.	   Provincial	   leaders	   are,	   what	   he	  terms	   “multi-­‐task-­‐bureaucrats”,	   while	   their	   ministerial	   peers	   are	   “single-­‐task-­‐bureaucrats”.	  The	  former	  are	  favored	  for	  two	  reasons:	  	  	   “First,	  governing	  a	  country	  is	  more	  akin	  to	  governing	  a	  province	  than	  to	  governing	  a	  ministry	  because	  both	  involve	  multidimensional	  tasks.	  Thus	  the	  performance	  of	  a	  bureaucrat	  in	  a	  provincial	  post	  provides	  more	  information	  about	  his	  suitability	  as	   national	   leader	   than	   the	   similar	   performance	   of	   a	   ministerial	   bureaucrat.	  Second,	   to	   include	   a	   similar	   level	   of	   effort,	   promotion	   is	   a	   more	   important	  incentive	  mechanism	   for	  provincial	  bureaucrats	   than	   for	  ministerial	  bureaucrats	  because	  the	  output	  of	  the	  latter	  is	  more	  easily	  measured.”	  (Huang	  2001:	  74)	  	  This	   analysis	   fits	  neatly	  with	   the	  ongoing	  provincial	   bias	  discussed	   throughout	  the	  previous	  chapter.	  It	  was	  reflected	  in	  the	  State	  Council’s	  composition	  and	  the	  fact	   that	   the	   post-­‐Tiananmen	   factions	   have	   shifted	   from	  proponents	   of	   certain	  policies	  to	  regionally	  delineated	  ones.	  	  	  In	  conclusion,	  the	  Chinese	  civil	  service	  had	  limited	  success	  in	  developing	  a	  truly	  meritocratic	   system	   of	   recruitment	   and	   promotion	   if	  measured	   by	   the	   level	   of	  transparent	   selection	   criteria	   based	   on	   skill	   rather	   than	   political	   adherence.	  Proclamations	   to	   streamline	   the	   state	   apparatus	   have	   also	   proven	   unfulfilled.	  However,	  for	  top	  professionals	  including	  economic	  planners,	  a	  quality	  education	  is	  a	  necessary	  criterion,	  if	  not	  a	  sufficient	  one.	  While	  these	  professionals	  do	  staff	  the	   administration	   of	   top	   policy	   bodies,	   their	   leaders	   undergo	   the	   more	  politically	   determined	   career	   path	   of	   rotating	   governing	   positions.	   Since	   they	  operate	   under	   the	   pressure	   of	   factional	   competition	   and	   the	   requirement	   to	  build	   their	   own	   patronage	   network,	   any	   long-­‐term	   national	   economic	   policy	  planning	  is	  prone	  to	  take	  a	  back	  seat.	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Embedded	  Autonomy	  and	  Insulation	  of	  China’s	  bureaucracy	  	  To	  successfully	  support	  the	  economy,	  state	  officials	  need	  a	  counterparty	  that	   is	  not	   only	   the	   passive	   beneficiary	   of	   policy	   but	   also	   actively	   engaged	   in	  formulating	  goals	  and	  providing	  feedback.	  The	  main	  theories	  discussed	  in	  Part	  I	  take	  the	  existence	  of	  such	  a	  counterparty	  for	  granted,	  but	   in	  this	  respect	  above	  all,	  China	  was	  different,	  for	  it	   lacked	  a	  strong	  private	  sector.	  Thus	  it	   is	  useful	  to	  reconsider	  the	  concept	  briefly,	  before	  applying	  it	  to	  the	  People’s	  Republic.	  	  Embeddedness,	   as	   coined	   by	   Peter	   Evans,	   relates	   to	   the	   extent	   of	   networks	  crossing	   the	   public-­‐private	   divide	   and	   producing	   a	   synergy	   beneficial	   for	  development	   (Evans	   1995).	   The	   concept	   may	   apply	   to	   such	   networks	   on	  different	   levels.	   Evans	   notes:	   “Embeddedness	   is	   not	   just	   a	   feature	   of	  developmentally	  effective	  relations	  between	  public	  agencies	  and	  the	  powerless.	  It	   is	   even	   more	   pervasive	   in	   successful	   projects	   that	   join	   the	   state	   with	   elite	  actors.”	  (Evans	  1996:	  1122).	  The	  evident	  drawback	  of	  close	  ties	  between	  officials	  and	   civilian	  actors	   is	   the	  potential	   for	   rent-­‐seeking.	   “Unless	   such	  opportunities	  are	  constrained	  by	  powerful	  internal	  norms	  and	  a	  dependably	  rewarding	  system	  of	   longterm	   career	   benefits,	   corruption	   is	   indeed	   likely	   to	   become	   the	   prime	  consequence	   of	   embeddedness”	   (Evans	   1996:	   1126).46	  Therefore,	   “autonomy”	  from	  “social	  entanglements”	  is	  required	  as	  well	  (Kohli	  1999:	  132).	  The	  notion	  of	  
insulation	  of	   state	  bureaucracy	  applies	   to	  both	  private	  attempts	  of	   interference	  as	  well	  as	  political	  ones.47	  	  	  Despite	   the	   positive	   trend,	   the	   relative	   absence	   of	  meritocratic	   recruitment	   of	  China’s	  state	  employees	  demonstrated	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  this	  chapter	  suggests	  a	  lack	   of	   insulation.	   Indeed,	   levels	   of	   rent-­‐seeking	   increased	   significantly	   during	  the	   Reform	  Era.	   Gong	   (1997)	   documents	   how	  market	   reforms	   opened	   up	   vast	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  46	  Evans	   refers	   to	   East	   Asia’s	   success,	   confirming	   the	  Developmental	   State	  model	   arrived	   at	   in	  Part	   I:	   „attention	   has	   been	   paid	   to	   the	   traditional	   Weberian	   requisites	   of	   bureaucratic	  organization.	   Public	   institutions	   are	   characterized	   by	   traditional	   Weberian	   features	   such	   as	  meritocratic	   recruitment,	   good	   salaries,	   sharp	   sanctions	   against	   violations	   of	   organizational	  norms	  and	  solid	  rewards	  for	  career-­‐long	  performance.	  Corruption	  is	  still	  common,	  but	  it	  has	  not	  been	  allowed	  to	  overwhelm	  the	  joint	  public-­‐private	  project	  of	  industrialization.”	  (Ibid.)	  	  47	  Again	   Evans	   bears	   the	   Devleopmental	   State	  model	   out:	   „The	   technocrats	   in	   Japan’s	  MITI	   or	  Taiwan’s	   Industrial	  Development	  Bureau	   [...]	   share	   a	   relative	   disinterest	   in	   contributing	   to	   the	  political	  advantage	  of	  particular	  political	  factions.	  (Ibid.:	  1127)	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new	  opportunities	  for	  officials	  to	  generate	  corruption	  income.	  For	  example,	  since	  land	   is	   state	   owned,	   property	   development	   contracted	   out,	   and	   the	   completed	  properties	   are	   sold	   on	   the	  market,	   bribery	   of	   those	   officials	   who	   allocate	   real	  estate	  became	  very	   lucrative.	  An	  observed	  expansion	  of	   enterprise	   tax-­‐evasion	  often	   falls	   under	   the	   same	   category,	   as	  many	   businesses	   concerned	   are	   state-­‐administered	   or	   enjoy	   the	   protection	   of	   local	   officials	   through	   personal	   ties	  (Gong	  1997:	  281).48While	  the	  rise	  of	  the	  market	  economy	  has	  primarily	  shifted	  rent-­‐seeking	   behavior,	   the	   concurrent	   decentralization	   of	   economic	   policy	  making	   has	   locked	   it	   in,	   because	   local	   officials,	   who	   have	   benefitted	   from	   the	  reform	   process	   initially,	   are	   wary	   of	   letting	   privatization	   continue	   (Liu	   et	   al.	  1998:	   147).	   This	   popular	   line	   of	   argument	   sees	   China	   as	   an	   entity	   of	  	  “economically	   separate	   fiefdoms”	   (Williams	   2005:	   143)	   or	   as	   a	   “decentralized	  predation	  state”	  (Pei	  2008:	  36).	  At	  the	  core	  of	  this	  phenomenon,	  that	  undermines	  embeddedness	  and	  insulation	  of	  the	  state,	  is	  the	  underdeveloped	  private	  sector.	  	  The	  many	  hybrid	  forms	  of	  enterprise	  have	  made	  it	  difficult	  to	  determine	  the	  size	  of	   the	  private	  sector.	   In	  1997	  the	  non-­‐state	  sector,	  determined	  by	  excluding	  all	  SOEs,	   produced	   roughly	   70%	   of	   industrial	   output.	   However,	   that	   includes	  collectively	   owned	   enterprises,	   shareholding	   enterprises	   or	   foreign-­‐invested	  enterprises,	  all	  of	  which	  are	  to	  some	  degree	  controlled	  by	  government	  agencies	  or	  the	  localities.	  By	  counting	  only	  registered	  private	  businesses	  and	  those	  firms	  with	  only	  a	  minority	  stake	  held	  by	  the	  central	  government,	  the	  share	  decreases	  to	   only	   21.2%	   (Haggard/Huang	   2008:	   340–341).	   A	   conservative	   approach	   to	  measuring	   the	   “de	   jure	   private	   sector”	   is	   useful	   as	   it	   encompasses	   the	  counterparty	   from	   which	   a	   Developmental	   State	   ought	   to	   be	   insulated,	   while	  enjoying	  the	  embedded	  autonomy	  of	  a	  shared	  network	  and	  feedback	  mechanism.	  All	  other	  enterprise	  forms	  have	  institutionally	  built-­‐in	  agency	  problems	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  public-­‐private	  interaction.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  48	  Gong	  provides	  telling	  figures:	  „In	  1992	  alone,	  more	  than	  150	  big	  and	  mid-­‐sized	  enterprises	  were	  caught	  for	  tax	  fraud;	  among	  them,	  three	  big	  cases	  implicated	  71	  government	  officials.	  Based	  on	  a	  sampling	  investigation	  of	  different	  types	  of	  enterprises,	  the	  national	  statistical	  bureau	  estimated	  that	  about	  80%	  of	  private	  businesses,	  50%	  of	  collective	  enterprises,	  and	  40%	  of	  state-­‐owned	  ones	  evaded	  taxes.”	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Over	  the	  first	  two	  decades	  of	  the	  Reform	  Era,	  China’s	  private	  sector	  has	  grown	  by	  any	  definition,	   since	   it	  was	   virtually	   non-­‐existent	   before	   1978.	  Opening	  up	   the	  rural	  economy	  has	  freed	  a	  vast	  labor	  pool	  that	  fueled	  the	  industrial	  drive	  in	  the	  countryside.	   By	   1985	   over	   12	   million	   TVEs	   were	   registered,	   most	   of	   them	  beneficiaries	   of	   credits	   channeled	   through	   the	   government	   controlled	   banking	  system	  (Huang	  2008:	  xiv).	  	  	  The	  positive	  flip-­‐side	  of	  decentralizing	  economic	  capabilities,	  especially	  the	  fiscal	  contracting	   reforms,	   is	   the	   incentive	   generated	   for	   lower	   levels	   of	   government	  that	   retain	   revenue	   beyond	   the	   negotiated	   amounts	   and	   thus	   seek	   to	   run	   or	  support	   profitable	   TVEs	   (Oi	   1992:	   104).	   However	   those	   TVEs	   that	   were	  collectively	   owned	   (meaning	   directly	   by	   local	   government)	   enjoyed	   a	  comparative	  advantage	  since	  they	  face	  a	  harder	  budget	  constraint	  than	  SOEs	  and	  are	   more	   reliant	   on	   the	   market	   forces,	   giving	   them	   incentives	   to	   be	   more	  efficient;	   In	   contrast	   to	   private	   firms	   they	   enjoy	   even	   better	   access	   to	   credits	  controlled	  by	  the	  provinces	  (Nee	  1992:	  197).	  Despite	  this	  seeming	  institutional	  advantage,	   private	   firms	   outperformed	   their	   collective	   counterparts	  (Haggard/Huang	   2008:	   343).	   Even	   though,	   during	   the	   second	   decade	   of	   the	  Reform	   Era,	   government	   policy	   actually	   turned	   from	   ambivalent	   to	   restrictive	  towards	   the	   indigenous	   private	   sector.	   This	   is	   illustrated	   by	   a	   fall	   of	   private	  sector	  share	   in	   fixed-­‐asset	   investment	   from	  21%	  in	  the	   late	  1980s	  to	  13.2%	  by	  the	  mid	  1990s	  (Haggard/Huang	  2008:	  353).49	  	  	  The	   missing	   indigenous	   private	   sector	   is	   especially	   underdeveloped	   at	   the	  commanding	   heights	   of	   the	   economy.	   Personalized	   ties	   that	   connect	   policy-­‐makers	   with	   leading	   entrepreneurs	   could	   not	   emerge	   after	   three	   decades	   of	  staunch	  opposition	  to	  the	  private	  sector	  before	  1978	  and	  only	  a	  limited	  embrace	  during	   the	   Reform	   Era.	   Not	   before	   2001,	   at	   the	   very	   end	   of	   the	   period	   under	  discussion,	  Jiang	  Zemin	  held	  his	  famous	  speech,	  endorsing	  private	  businessmen	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  49	  Measured	   in	   percentage	   of	   total	   industrial	   output,	   the	   share	   of	   the	   domestic	   private	   sector	  paints	  a	  similar	  picture	  as	  it	  increased	  during	  the	  1980s	  from	  0%	  to	  5.39%	  and	  then	  contracted	  to	  3.4%	  by	  1995	  and	  slightly	  improved	  by	  the	  end	  of	  the	  century	  (Perkins/Rawski	  2008:	  862).	  As	  Haggard	  and	  Huang	  (2008)	  argue	  though	  this	  measure	  is	  not	  indicative	  of	  policy	  support	  by	  the	  government,	   since	   higher	   private	   sector	   productivity	   might	   partly	   counter	   the	   contraction	   of	  state-­‐controlled	  investment	  funds.	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joining	   the	   Party.	   Chinese	   entrepreneurs	   and	   state	   officials	   have	   never	   formed	  ties	  through	  social	  background	  or	  education.	  The	  relationships	  they	  do	  form	  are	  clientelistic	  and	  tend	  to	  aim	  at	  the	  rent-­‐seeking	  behavior	  described.	  Furthermore,	  being	  inimical	  to	  all	  forms	  of	  autonomous	  interest	  formulation,	  private	  business	  lacks	   a	   comprehensive	   organization	   that	   could	   serve	   as	   a	   feedback-­‐loop	   to	   the	  state	   (Howell	   2006:	   288–289).50	  Almost	   90%	   of	   private	   firms	   in	   2000	   did	   not	  have	  a	  single	  active	  CCP	  member	  (Pei	  2006:	  185).	  What	  does	  happen	  however,	  is	  cadres	  leaving	  state	  offices	  to	  form	  or	  join	  private	  firms	  after	  having	  used	  their	  power	   and	   influence	   to	   prepare	   lucrative	   business	   ventures	   (Pei	   2006:	   154).	  These	   ties	  may	  eventually	   lead	   to	   increased	  embeddedness	  between	   the	  public	  and	   private	   sectors	   but	   further	   undermine	   the	   bureaucracy’s	   insulation.	  Moreover,	   using	   business	   ventures	   as	   an	   exit	   option	   results	   from	   the	   “wrong”	  kind	  of	  personal	  networking	  instead	  of	  the	  institutionalized	  relationship,	  that	  is	  the	  attribute	  of	  a	  Developmental	  State.	  	  	  
Conclusion	  –	  Limits	  of	  a	  Developmental	  State	  Bureaucracy	  	  	  A	   well	   functioning	   Developmental	   State	   requires	   an	   elite	   bureaucracy	   that	  includes	   a	   capable	   staff	   of	   economic	   planners,	   who	   can	   formulate	   a	   long-­‐term	  development	   strategy,	   requiring	  meritocratic	   recruitment	   and	   appraisal.	   Their	  policies	   need	   to	   be	   coordinated	   through	   a	   network	   with	   the	   private	   sector	   in	  order	  to	  receive	  feedback	  on	  what	  works	  and	  what	  doesn’t,	  meaning	  embedded	  autonomy.	  These	  ties	  must	  exclude	  favoritism	  on	  an	  individual	  level,	  preventing	  opportunities	   of	   rent-­‐seeking	   on	   both	   sides.	   Rather,	   they	   refer	   to	   aggregate	  interest	   formulation	   on	   an	   institutional	   level.	   Finally,	   the	   bureaucracy	  must	   be	  insulated	  from	  political	  pressures	  as	  well.	  	  Despite	   moderate	   progress,	   China	   failed	   to	   create	   a	   Developmental	   State	  bureaucracy	   during	   the	   first	   two	   decades	   of	   the	   Reform	   Era.	   The	   main	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  50	  Howell	   (2006:	   290)	   also	   makes	   the	   general	   point	   that:	   „The	   constant	   tension	   within	   the	  Party/state	   between	   retaining	   a	   controlling	   hand	   over	   more	   independent	   organizing	   and	  stimulating	  its	  growth	  for	  purposes	  such	  as	  welfare	  reform	  and	  market	  regulation,	  continues	  to	  inhibit	   the	   development	   of	   predictable,	   institutionalized	   arrangements	   for	   the	   aggregation	   and	  articulation	  of	  interests."	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undermining	  forces	  were	  the	  decentralization	  of	  governance	  capabilities	  and	  the	  underdevelopment	  of	  private	  enterprise.	  	  Meritocratic	   recruitment	   and	   appraisal	   had	   been	   gradually	   introduced,	   but	  mostly	  at	  the	  central	  level	  with	  decreasing	  applicability	  down	  the	  line	  of	  federal	  government.	   The	   Party’s	   dominance	   over	   government	   personnel	   decisions	   has	  prevented	   the	   introduction	  of	   transparent	   criteria.	  This	   effectively	  negates	   any	  insulation	   of	   public	   employees.	   Client	   networks	   within	   the	   Party	   are	   the	  dominant	   factors	   for	   career	   advancement	   and	   due	   to	   decentralization	   of	  economic	  policy	  making,	  the	  provision	  of	  patronage	  has	  shifted	  to	  the	  provinces	  as	   well.	   That	   opens	   up	   opportunities	   for	   rent-­‐seeking	   that	   undermine	   civil	  servant’s	  insulation	  from	  business	  interests.	  	  	  The	   lack	  of	  embeddedness	   is	  mainly	  a	   result	   form	  a	  nonexistent	  private	   sector	  counterparty	   to	   state	   economic	   policy	   agencies.	   Even	   though	   increasingly	  important	  for	  economic	  growth,	  the	  private	  sector	  remained	  unconsolidated	  and	  small	   compared	  with	   the	   state-­‐involved	   sector.	   Decentralization	   has	   led	   to	   the	  emergence	   of	   a	   TVE	   collective	   sector	   with	   its	   private	   counterparts	   reliant	   on	  local	  government	  controlled	  investment	  funding.	  The	  commanding	  heights	  of	  the	  economy	  were	  still	  dominated	  by	  SOEs.	  	  	  In	   effect	   China	   faced	   a	   major	   challenge	   for	   evolving	   a	   capable	   Developmental	  State	  bureaucracy.	  Reorienting	  a	  planned	  economy	  towards	  the	  market	  required	  dismantling	   the	   strong	   central	   state,	  where	   an	   insulated	   and	   powerful	   guiding	  agency	   would	   be	   located.	   This	   was	   a	   function	   of	   the	   political	   logic	   of	  decentralization.	  Meanwhile,	  the	  continued	  dominance	  of	  industry	  by	  all	  levels	  of	  government	   prevented	   the	   emergence	   of	   a	   large-­‐scale	   private	   sector.	   The	   two	  factors	   represent	   prominent	   differences	   to	   the	   South	   Korean	   and	   Taiwanese	  Developmental	   States.	   While	   China’s	   growth	   performance	   has	   evidently	   been	  spectacular,	   it	   is	   useful	   to	   conduct	   a	   closer	   examination	   of	   development	  achievements	  in	  a	  direct	  country	  comparison.	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Chapter	  9	  –	  Development	  outcomes	  in	  comparison	  	  	  	  The	  Developmental	  State	  model	  assembled	  in	  Part	  I	  was	  motivated	  by	  the	  unique	  distinction	  held	  by	  South	  Korea	  and	  Taiwan.	  They	  are	  the	  only	  two	  nations	  with	  large	  and	  diverse	  economies	  that	  joined	  the	  range	  of	  industrialized	  and	  wealthy	  countries	   in	   the	   second	   half	   of	   the	   twentieth	   century	   outside	   Europe	   and	   its	  offshoots.51This	  chapter	  will	  first	  compare	  this	  achievement	  with	  China’s,	  taking	  into	   account	   relative	   levels	   of	   initial	   wealth.	   Subsequently,	   improvements	   in	  health	  and	  education	  are	  studied.	  Finally,	   the	  social	  distribution	  of	   income	  and	  its	   change	   are	   discussed.	   Together	   these	   indicators	   provide	   a	   well-­‐rounded	  yardstick	   to	  measure	   a	   Developmental	   State’s	   success,	   since	   economic	   growth	  figures	  alone	  can	  be	  distorted.52	  	  
Economic	  growth	  	  The	  standard	  yardstick	  of	  an	  economy’s	  size	  and	  progress	  is	  the	  Gross	  Domestic	  Product,	  which	   tries	   to	   capture	   the	   value	   of	   all	   goods	   and	   services	   originating	  from	   the	   territory	   of	   a	   certain	   economy,	   rather	   than	   their	   national	   ownership	  (GNP	  or	  GNI)	  for	  a	  given	  year.	  Nevertheless,	  this	  section	  will	  use	  general	  terms	  such	  as	   Income”,	   “living	   standard”	  or	   “wealth”	   in	   reference	   to	  GDP.	   In	  order	   to	  achieve	  useful	   comparisons,	  only	  per	  capita	  GDP	  at	  purchasing	  power	  parity	   is	  sed.	  53	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  51	  The	   usual	   caveat	   applies	   that	   two	   city-­‐states	   of	   Hong	   Kong	   and	   Singapore	   as	   well	   as	   small	  resource	  rich	  states	  are	  excluded.	  	  52	  A	  crass	  example	  like	  Equatorial	  Guinea	  illustrates	  this	  well.	  With	  a	  GDP	  per	  capita	  between	  the	  UK’s	  and	  Finland’s	  it	  is	  well	  placed	  within	  the	  wealthiest	  quarter	  of	  the	  globe,	  but	  the	  dismal	  state	  of	   education,	  health	   and	   inequality	  dispel	   any	   illusions	  of	  high	  development.	  Of	   course	  vast	  oil	  resources	   account	   for	   it’s	   nominal	   riches.	   A	   different	   example	   reveals	   some	   shortcomings	   that	  even	   the	  extended	  use	  of	   inputs	   fail	   to	   capture.	  The	   Islamic	  monarchy	  of	  Brunei	  would	   fare	  as	  well	  as	  the	  UK	  based	  on	  these	  indices	  while	  widely	  lacking	  political	  freedom.	  	  53	  The	   main	   database	   in	   use	   for	   historical	   comparison	   is	   that	   of	   the	   late	   Angus	   Maddison’s	  Groningen	  Growth	  and	  Development	  Centre.	  As	  explanation	  from	  the	  homepage:	  “Gross	  domestic	  product	   (GDP)	  at	  market	  prices	   is	  an	  aggregate	  measure	  of	  production	  equal	   to	   the	  sum	  of	   the	  gross	  values	  added	  of	  all	  resident	   institutional	  units	  engaged	  in	  production	  (plus	  any	  taxes	  and	  minus	  any	  subsidies	  on	  products	  not	  included	  in	  the	  value	  of	  their	  outputs).	  The	  sum	  of	  the	  final	  uses	  of	  goods	  and	  services	  (all	  uses	  except	  intermediate	  consumption)	  is	  measured	  in	  purchasers’	  prices	  less	  the	  value	  of	  imports	  of	  goods	  and	  services,	  or	  the	  sum	  of	  primary	  incomes	  distributed	  by	   resident	   producer	   units.	   […]	   The	   GDPGK	   series	   is	   expressed	   in	   1990	   U.S.	   dollars,	   and	   it	   is	  available	   for	   all	   of	   the	   123	   countries	   in	   the	   database.	   It	   is	   converted	   at	   “Geary-­‐Khamis”	  purchasing	  power	  parities	  (PPPs).”	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Figures	   5	   and	   6	   offer	   an	   interesting	   comparison	   of	   the	   twenty-­‐five	   wealthiest	  nations	   at	   the	   beginning	   and	   end	   of	   the	   20th	   century.	   In	   1900	   only	   European	  countries	   and	   its	   offshoots	   dominated	   the	   top	   positions,	   with	   Japan	   being	   the	  only	  exception.	  By	  the	  year	  2000,	  Taiwan	  and	  South	  Korea	  take	  the	  ranks	  20	  and	  24	   respectively	  measured	   in	   GDP	   per	   capita.	   In	   1965	   both	   ranked	   around	   the	  100th	  place	  and	  had	  56%	  and	  44%	  of	  the	  world	  average	  GDP	  per	  capita,	  similar	  to	  Angola	   or	  Morocco	   at	   the	   time.	  By	   the	   year	  2000	   the	   ratio	  has	   increased	   to	  280%	  and	  240%.	  	  	  
Figure	  5	  -­‐	  25	  wealthiest	  countries	  in	  1900	  (GDP	  per	  capita;	  fixed	  USD	  1990)	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and	  South	  Korea,	  both	  already	  under	  Japanese	  control,	  had	  a	  lead	  on	  China	  in	  average	  living	  standard	  by	  32%	  and	  57%.	  	  	  
Figure	  6	  -­‐	  25	  wealthiest	  countries	  in	  2000	  (GDP	  per	  capita;	  fixed	  USD	  1990)
	  Source:	  Maddison,	  Angus:	  	  http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/Maddison.htm55	  	  	  Figure	   7	   shows	  China’s	   share	   of	   average	  World	  GDP	  per	   capita	   for	   the	   second	  half	   of	   the	   20th	   century.	   It	   clearly	   reveals	   the	   dent	   following	   the	   Great	   Leap	  Forward	   in	  1958,	   reducing	   the	   share	   from	  26%	  to	  19%	  and	  remaining	  around	  that	  level	  until	  a	  rather	  steady	  growth	  sets	  in	  with	  the	  Reform	  Era.	  Comparable	  relative	  levels	  of	  income	  shares	  that	  South	  Korea	  and	  Taiwan	  had	  in	  1965	  were	  reached	   in	   China	   by	   the	   mid	   1990s	   only.	   This	   clearly	   illustrates	   the	   People’s	  Republic’s	  relative	  backwardness	  even	  at	  the	  outset	  of	  the	  growth	  spurt.	  A	  direct	  comparison	  of	  GDP	  per	  capita	  levels	  of	  the	  three	  countries	  illustrates	  this	  point	  even	  better	  (Figure	  8).	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Figure	  7	  –	  China’s	  share	  of	  average	  World	  GDP	  per	  capita	  
	  Source:	  Maddison,	  Angus:	  http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/Maddison.htm	  	  	  
Figure	  8	  	  –	  GDP	  per	  capita	  Country	  comparison	  (fixed	  USD	  1990)	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Following	  the	  mid-­‐sixties,	  South	  Korea	  and	  even	  more	  so	  Taiwan	  saw	  per	  capita	  GDP	  taking	  off.	  In	  comparison	  China’s	  performance	  seems	  almost	  stagnant,	  since	  the	   initial	   levels	   and	   the	   significant	   time	   lag	   of	   growth	   spurts	   require	   a	   larger	  scale	   of	   income	   levels	   for	   depiction.	   Figure	   15	   in	   the	   appendix	   plots	   China’s	  performance	  in	  isolation	  to	  better	   indicate	  the	  results	  of	  policy	  eras.	  Therefore,	  performance	   should	   be	   assessed	   by	   comparing	   the	   period	   of	   Chinese	  transformation	  under	   consideration	  with	   the	   same	   time	  spans	  of	  Taiwan’s	   and	  South	  Korea’s	  growth	  acceleration.	  Figure	  9	  shows	  annual	  GDP	  per	  capita	  growth	  rates	  between	  1980	  and	  2000	  for	  China	  and	  the	  same	  two-­‐decade	  long	  period	  of	  1965	  to	  1985,	  roughly	  capturing	  the	  spurts	  of	  Taiwan	  and	  Korea.	  	  	  The	   two	   East	   Asian	   developmental	   states	   outperformed	   China	   significantly	  during	   their	   first	  decade	  of	   transformation	  while	  all	   three	  performances	   in	   the	  second	  decade	  were	  remarkably	  similar,	  given	   that	  different	  periods	  are	  under	  consideration.	  Overall	  these	  rates	  indicate	  a	  superior	  performance	  of	  the	  earlier	  two	   countries,	   which	   is	   illustrated	   in	   Figure	   10,	   superimposing	   absolute	   per	  capita	  growth	  of	  the	  two	  periods.	  	  	  
Figure	  9	  –	  GDP	  per	  capita	  growth	  during	  spurts56	  (three-­‐year	  averages)	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Figure	  10	  –	  Growth	  spurts	  of	  GDP	  per	  capita	  (over	  20	  years;	  fixed	  USD	  1990)	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average	   standards	   of	   living.	   The	   next	   section	   examines	   further	   development	  indicators.	  
Measuring	  development	  beyond	  wealth	  	  Since	   1990	   the	  United	  Nations	  Development	   Programme	   (UNDP)	   compiles	   the	  Human	  Development	  Index	  (HDI).60	  The	  aim	  is	  to	  account	  for	  a	  nation’s	  level	  of	  development	  by	  including	  measures	  of	  health	  and	  education	  in	  addition	  to	  living	  standards	   and	   express	   the	   results	   in	   one	   figure	   between	   zero	   and	   one	   with	  higher	  values	  indicating	  more	  development.	  By	  1982,	  South	  Korea	  held	  the	  31th	  rank	   (24th	   if	   small	   and	   resource	   based	   economies	   are	   excluded)	   and	   the	   15th	  place	   in	   the	   report	   released	   in	   2011.	   Since	   Taiwan	   is	   not	   a	   recognized	   UN	  member	   its	   HDI	   is	   not	   included,	   but	   by	   its	   governments	   own	   calculations	   it	  would	  currently	  hold	  rank	  18.	  Since	  the	  methodology	  of	  weighing	  and	  calculating	  the	   index	   has	   changed	   over	   time	   it	   is	   not	   that	   useful	   for	   inter-­‐temporal	  comparison	   and	   plotting.	   Table	   2	   lists	   the	   results	   published	   by	   the	   UNDP	   for	  China61	  and	  South	  Korea.	  	  	  
Table	  2	  –	  HDI,	  China	  and	  South	  Korea	  
Year	   China	   South	  Korea	  
1980	   0.404	   0.634	  
1985	   0.448	   0.69	  
1990	   0.49	   0.742	  
1995	   0.541	   0.793	  
2000	   0.588	   0.83	  
2011	   0.687	   0.897	  Source:	  UNDP	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  60 	  The	   complete	   data	   set	   and	   background	   information	   can	   be	   accessed	   at:	  http://hdr.undp.org/en/	  (Jan.	  2013)	  From	  the	  homepage:	  „The	  first	  Human	  Development	  Report	  introduced	   a	   new	  way	   of	   measuring	   development	   by	   combining	   indicators	   of	   life	   expectancy,	  educational	   attainment	   and	   income	   into	   a	   composite	   human	   development	   index,	   the	  HDI.	   The	  breakthrough	  for	  the	  HDI	  was	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  single	  statistic	  which	  was	  to	  serve	  as	  a	  frame	  of	  reference	  for	  both	  social	  and	  economic	  development.	  The	  HDI	  sets	  a	  minimum	  and	  a	  maximum	  for	  each	  dimension,	   called	  goalposts,	   and	   then	  shows	  where	  each	  country	   stands	   in	   relation	   to	  these	  goalposts,	  expressed	  as	  a	  value	  between	  0	  and	  1.“	  	  61	  Note	   that	   given	  Taiwan’s	  unrecognized	   international	   status	   it	  was	   either	  not	   included	   in	   the	  calculation	  or	  even	  included	  in	  China’s	  figures.	  Since	  its	  population	  is	  only	  1/55	  that	  of	  China’s	  it	  hardly	  dilutes	  the	  values	  though.	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The	  calculations	  do	  not	  go	  back	  to	  the	  1960s	  and	  70s	  but	  the	  bold	  figures	  mark	  the	  end	  years	  of	   the	   two-­‐decade	  growth	  spurts	  used	   in	  above	  comparisons.	  By	  1985	   South	   Korea	   had	   reached	   an	   HDI	   value	   of	   0.69,	   while	   China	   exhibited	   a	  value	  of	  0.588	  by	  the	  year	  2000.	  Taking	  into	  account	  that	  Korea’s	  income	  in	  1965	  was	  only	  caught	  up	  to	  by	  China	  in	  1985	  it	   is	  reasonable	  to	  attribute	  a	   five	  year	  lead,	  but	  Korea’s	  HDI	  for	  1980	  of	  0.63	  still	  lay	  above	  China’s	  result.	  Since	  income	  has	   already	   been	   evaluated,	   the	   evolution	   of	   health	   and	   education	   need	   to	   be	  considered	  next.	  	  To	  assess	  a	  populations	  health	   the	  HDI	  uses	   life	  expectancy	  at	  birth.	  Figure	  11	  shows	   the	   rather	   surprising	   development.	   While	   all	   countries	   experienced	  steady	   increases,	  Chinese	  averages	   life	   expectancy	   increased	  dramatically	   after	  the	  Great	  Leap	  (1958–61)	  and	  leveled	  off	  during	  the	  Cultural	  Revolution.	  During	  Korea’s	   growth	   spurt	   between	   1968	   and	   1984,	   the	   People’s	   Republic	   actually	  surpassed	  its	  fast	  developing	  neighbor’s	  levels.	  Taiwan	  on	  the	  other	  hand	  started	  out	  with	  a	  considerably	  higher	  life	  expectancy	  of	  66	  years	  in	  1966,	  the	  year	  the	  first	  data	  was	  available,	  and	  exhibited	  steady	  growth.62	  Figure	  12	  again	  isolates	  the	  growth	  spurt	  periods.	  Even	  more	  so	  than	  with	  GDP	  per	  capita	  growth,	  both	  Korea	  and	  Taiwan	  experienced	  better	  improvements.	  	  	  The	  nature	  of	  old	  age	  certainly	  makes	  marginal	  improvements	  more	  difficult	  and	  a	  certain	  leveling	  off	  is	  to	  be	  expected	  once	  the	  global	  frontier	  of	  general	  health	  factors	   and	   medical	   provision	   are	   reached.	   The	   curious	   case	   of	   China’s	   rapid	  improvement	  during	  the	  mid-­‐Mao	  Era	   is	  pointed	  to	  by	  Bramall	  (2009:	  296)	  for	  example,	  when	  arguing	  that	  to	  some	  degree	  the	  vast	  programs	  of	  irrigation	  and	  food	   supply	  have	   indeed	   reduced	  poverty	   successfully	   even	  before	   the	  Reform	  Era.	   Similarly	   the	   spread	   of	   school	   enrollment	   has	   been	   positively	   noted	   by	  Brand	  and	  Rawski	  (2008:	  5):	  “School	  enrollments	  [during	  the	  Mao	  era]	  increased	  at	  all	  levels;	  the	  spread	  of	  education	  reduced	  the	  proportion	  of	  Chinese	  aged	  16–65,	  who	  had	  not	  completed	  primary	  school	  from	  74	  to	  40	  percent	  between	  1952	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  62 	  Korea	   caught	   up	   with	   Taiwan	   around	   2010	   when	   both	   countries	   had	   an	   average	   life	  expectancy	  of	  80,	  putting	  them	  among	  the	  global	  top.	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and	   1978.”	   Different	   measures	   of	   educational	   attainment	   have	   also	   been	   the	  third	  input	  in	  composing	  the	  HDI.	  	  	  
Figure	  11	  –	  Life	  Expectancy	  at	  Birth	  in	  South	  Korea,	  Taiwan	  and	  China	  (years)63	  
	  Source:	  Table	  11	  in	  the	  appendix	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Figure	  12	  –	  Average	  Life	  Expectancy	  during	  growth	  spurts	  (21	  years)	  
	  Source:	  Table	  11	  in	  the	  appendix	  	  	  Data	  for	  valid	  direct	  comparison	  in	  educational	  matters	  is	  a	  little	  patchy	  for	  the	  1960s	  and	  70s,	  especially	   for	  Taiwan	  since	   it	   is	  not	   included	   in	  United	  Nations	  surveys	   and	   the	   national	   statistical	   office	   uses	   diverging	   indices.	   Similarly,	  literacy	   rates	   are	   difficult	   to	   appraise	   for	   Taiwan	   and	   South	   Korea.	   Table	   3	  presents	  literacy	  rates	  for	  China	  for	  selected	  years.	  	  
Table	  3	  –	  Adult	  Literacy	  Rate	  as	  Percentage	  of	  Population	  in	  China	  (Ages	  15+)	  
Year	   %	   Year	   %	   Year	   %	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growth	   period,	   Korea	   spent	   3.5	   percent	   of	   GDP	   on	   education,	   while	   China	  expended	  2.5	  percent	  only.	  	  	  
Table	  4	  –	  Education	  Index	  and	  Public	  Expenditure	  on	  Education	  	  
	   Education	  index	  
Public	  expenditure	  on	  education	  	  
(%	  of	  GDP)	  
Year	   South	  Korea	   China	   Year	   South	  Korea	   China	  
1970	   -­‐	   -­‐	   1970	   3.5	   1.3	  
1980	   0.612	   0.372	   1980	   3.5	   2.5	  
1985	   0.692	   0.396	   1985	   4.2	   2.5	  
1990	   0.738	   0.437	   1990	   -­‐	   -­‐	  
1995	   0.81	   0.482	   1995	   -­‐	   -­‐	  
2000	   0.862	   0.535	   2000	   -­‐	   -­‐	  Source:	  UNDP	  	  Having	  looked	  at	  the	  recent	  historical	  measures	  of	  development	  according	  to	  the	  priorities	   set	   by	   the	   Human	   Development	   Index	   a	   clear	   picture	   emerged.	   GDP	  growth,	   Health	   and	   Education	   during	   each	   two-­‐decade	   transformative	   period	  grew	  consistently	   in	  China	  but	  at	  a	   slower	  rate	   than	   in	   the	   two	  Developmental	  States.	  Since	  2011	  the	  UNDP	  also	  calculates	  an	  inequality	  adjusted	  HDI	  by	  taking	  vast	   gaps	   in	   wealth,	   health	   and	   education	   across	   societies	   into	   account.	   Such	  considerations	  are	  essential	  when	  assessing	  a	  Developmental	  State,	  since	  it	  truly	  measures	  how	  much	  of	  the	  population	  is	  actually	  participating	  and	  gaining	  from	  economic	  growth.	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Compared	  to	  all	  previous	  measures,	  China’s	  record	  truly	  departs	  with	  respect	  to	  income	  inequality.	  The	  standard	  value,	  already	  employed	  in	  foregoing	  chapters,	  is	  the	  GINI	  coefficient.	  It	  is	  a	  statistical	  tool	  to	  determine	  how	  widely	  values	  differ	  of	   a	   given	   sample	   yielding	   a	   co-­‐efficient	   between	   zero	   and	  one.	   Transferred	   to	  income	   inequality,	   a	   result	   of	   zero	   indicates	   that	   everybody	   earns	   exactly	   the	  same,	  irrespective	  of	  the	  actual	  amount.	  In	  contrast,	  a	  value	  of	  one	  would	  imply,	  that	  a	  single	  person	  or	  household	  earns	  everything,	  while	  all	  others	  have	  nothing	  at	   all.	   The	   realistic	   values	   for	   modern	   economies	   currently	   range	   from	   under	  0.25	  for	  countries	  like	  Japan	  and	  Denmark	  espousing	  the	  highest	  equality	  levels	  to	  values	  over	  0.6	  for	  the	  most	  unequal	  nations	  such	  as	  Botswana,	  South	  Africa	  or	  Haiti.64	  	  Figure	   13	   shows	   China’s	   income	   GINI	   over	   the	   Reform	   Era	   in	   isolation.	   The	  national	  trend	  over	  two	  decades	  is	  a	  stark	  rise	  in	  inequality.	  To	  some	  degree	  this	  is	  to	  be	  expected	  when	  shifting	  from	  a	  collectivized	  and	  price	  controlled,	  planned	  economy	  to	  one	  extending	  market	  forces.	  With	  regard	  to	  structural	  properties	  of	  inequality,	   Benjamin	   et	   al.	   (2008:	   773)	   have	   found	   several	   trends:	   Both	   urban	  and	  rural	  population’s	  income	  inequality	  has	  increased.	  The	  former	  is	  related	  to	  the	   decrease	   of	   subsidies	   and	   other	   entitlements	   and	   the	   divergence	   of	  wages	  earned	   due	   to	   the	   diversifications	   of	   enterprise.	   Rural	   households	   income	   has	  diverged	  due	  to	  a	  different	  levels	  of	  involvement	  in	  non-­‐farming	  income	  as	  well	  a	  general	  stagnation	  of	  returns	  on	  traditional	  farming.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  64	  Data	   from	   the	  World	  Bank	   at:	   http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.GINI/	   (Jan	   2012);	  The	  year	  of	  surveys	  differs	  between	  nations	  and	  for	  several	  there	  is	  no	  data	  available.	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Figure	  13	  –	  Income	  Inequality	  in	  China	  (1980–2001;	  GINI)	  65	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exactly	  what	   happened	   until	   2001	   and	   has	   even	   increased	   in	   pace	   since	   then.	  How	  did	  the	  Developmental	  States	  fare	  in	  the	  past?	  	  Figure	  14	  maps	  the	  development	  of	  the	  income	  GINI	  for	  China,	  South	  Korea	  and	  Taiwan	  from	  1965	  to	  2001,	  smoothing	  the	  disparity	  of	  available	  annual	  data	  by	  calculating	  five-­‐year	  averages;	  Figure	  15	  again	  compares	  the	  growth	  spurts.	  The	  overall	   difference	   in	   trend	   between	   China	   and	   the	   Developmental	   States	   is	  immediately	   apparent.	   Taiwan’s	   income	   inequality	   has	   remained	   relatively	  stable	   after	   inequality	   dropped	   following	   comprehensive	   land	   reforms	   in	   the	  1950s	  and	  early	  60s	  (Bourguignon	  et	  al.	  2001:	  139).	  	  	  South	   Korea’s	   land	   reforms	   did	   not	   contribute	   to	   comparable	   income	  equalization.	  Inequality	  peaked	  dramatically	  during	  the	  recession	  of	  1979,	  a	  fact	  that	  is	  insufficiently	  captured	  by	  the	  lack	  of	  annual	  data.	  Since	  then,	  the	  GINI	  has	  steadily	  dropped,	  a	  fact	  that	  was	  even	  more	  prominent	  for	  employment	  income	  (Fields/Yoo	   2000).	   Latest	   data	   available	   show	   that	   the	   trend	   has	   continued	   at	  least	  until	  2010,	  when	  Korea’s	  income	  GINI	  was	  0.31.68	  	  	  Studies	  explain	  the	  decline	  in	  both	  countries	  by	  weighing	  the	  influence	  of	  various	  factors,	  with	  education	  and	  broader	  participation	  in	  the	  labor	  market	  playing	  an	  important	   role	   among	   others.69What	   statistical	   studies	   naturally	   omit	   is	   what	  didn’t	   happen	   in	   the	   Developmental	   States	   that	   occurred	   in	   China	   and	   caused	  such	  rapid	  income	  disparity.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  68	  CIA	  World	  Factbook:	  www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-­‐world-­‐factbook/fields/2172.html	  (Jan	  2013)	  69	  For	   Taiwan	   see:	   Bourguignon	   2001,	   concentrating	   on	   the	   period	   1979–94;	   For	   South	   Korea	  see:	  Fields/Yoo	  2000	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Figure	  13	  –	  Income	  Distribution	  (GINI	  5-­‐year	  averages)	  
	  	  Source:	  Table	  12	  in	  appendix	  	  
Figure	  14	  –	  Income	  Distribution	  for	  20-­‐year	  growth	  spurts	  (GINI	  5-­‐year	  averages)	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education	   has	   been	   noted	   as	   a	   key	   factor	   to	   curb	   inequality,	   not	   only	   via	  comparison	   with	   Taiwan	   and	   South	   Korea	   but	   also	   by	   the	   study	   of	   China’s	  experience	  thus	  far	  by	  Benjamin	  et	  al.	  (2008:	  773).	  	  	  In	   conclusion,	   the	   country	   comparison	   has	   illustrated	   the	   performance	   gap	  between	   the	   two	   Developmental	   States	   and	   China.	   While	   GDP	   growth	   was	  formidable	   in	   all	   three	   and	   beyond	   what	   most	   developing	   countries	   have	  achieved	   by	   the	   end	   of	   the	   twentieth	   century,	   China’s	   progress	   was	   slightly	  lagging.	  When	   it	   comes	   to	   the	   essential	   development	   indicators	   in	   health	   and	  education	  the	  gap	  is	  still	  wider	  with	  the	  noteworthy	  exception	  of	  relatively	  early	  improvements	   in	   average	   life	   expectancy.	   Finally,	   the	   main	   deficit	   of	   China’s	  development	  has	  been	  and	  continues	  to	  be	  a	  rapid	  increase	  in	  income	  inequality.	  This	  relative	  gap	  is	  mitigated	  by	  an	  overall	  improvement	  in	  living	  standards,	  but	  the	   ability	   of	   the	   East	   Asian	   neighbors	   to	   better	   reconcile	   growth	  with	   equity	  contributes	   to	   negating	   the	   central	   research	   question	   whether	   China	   has	  followed	  the	  Developmental	  State	  model.	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Conclusion	  	  	  	  The	  impressive	  growth	  of	  China	  over	  the	  past	  three	  decades	  has	  spurred	  a	  range	  of	   scholarship	   trying	   to	   explain	  which	   “path”	   to	   development	  was	   responsible.	  The	   uniqueness	   of	   historical	   circumstance	   often	   repels	   attempts	   at	  generalization.	  Yet,	   interpreting	  past	  experiences	  helps	  narrow	  down	  the	  range	  of	  causal	  relationships.	  Hence,	  nobody	  is	  advising	  a	  developing	  country	  today	  to	  adopt	   a	   socialist	   planned	   economy.	   There	   is	   often	   a	   trade-­‐off	   in	   scholarly	  endeavors	  between	  certainty	  and	  modesty.	  Depending	  on	  the	  format	  a	  different	  balance	   is	   called	   for.	   The	   present	   study	   tries	   to	   contribute	   to	   the	   topic	   of	  development	   paths	   by	   assembling	   one	   model	   and	   asking	   to	   what	   degree	   the	  Chinese	  experience	  conforms	  to	  it.	  Before	  summarizing	  the	  findings	  and	  offering	  some	  conclusions	  it	  is	  vital	  to	  delineate	  clearly	  what	  this	  research	  has	  attempted	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  larger	  debate.	  	  In	  2009	  two	  economists	  led	  a	  written	  argument	  over	  what	  strategies	  developing	  countries	   should	   adopt	   in	   order	   to	   catch	   up	  with	   the	   global	   industrial	   leaders.	  Their	  discussion	   revolved	  around	   the	  question,	  what	   role	   the	   state	   should	   and	  could	  play	   in	   promoting	   sustainable	   growth.	  On	   one	   side	   of	   the	   argument	  was	  Justin	  Yifu	  Lin,	  one	  of	   the	   foremost	  Chinese	  economists	  and	  former	  Senior	  Vice	  President	  of	  the	  World	  Bank.	  His	  scholarly	  opponent	  was	  Ha-­‐Joon	  Chang,	  a	  South	  Korean	  economist	  from	  the	  University	  of	  Cambridge.71	  While	  the	  former	  derived	  his	   line	   of	   argument	   from	   neo-­‐classical	   economic	   theory,	   the	   latter	   is	   a	  proponent	   of	   heterodox	   and	   institutional	   economics.	  Nevertheless,	   even	   at	   the	  lowest	   common	   denominator,	   the	   state	   is	   seen	   as	   an	   essential	   component	   for	  achieving	   economic	   growth.	   This	   is	   in	   contrast	   to	   the	   often	   reductionist	  complaint	  by	  opponents	  of	   the	  Washington	  Consensus,	  used	  as	  a	  short-­‐hand	  to	  encompass	  a	  neo-­‐liberal	  set	  of	  remedies,	  prescribing	  a	  vast	  range	  of	  free-­‐market	  policies	  to	  ailing	  developing	  countries.	  But	  the	  debate	  has	  diversified,	  influenced	  in	  no	  small	  part	  by	  the	  transformation	  of	  China,	  growing	  rapidly	  while	  relying	  on	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  71	  Lin/Chang	  2009	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some	  general	  form	  of	  state-­‐capitalism.72	  What	  the	  argument	  came	  down	  to	  then,	  was	  whether	  successful	  involvement	  meant:	  	  	  
• A	   “facilitating	   state”	   that	   uses	   policies	   in	   accordance	   with	   a	   nation’s	  comparative	  advantage	  	  
OR…	  
• Deeper	   government	   intervention,	   that	   actively	   fosters	   production	  capabilities	  beyond	  what	  current	  factor	  endowments	  would	  suggest.	  	  	  The	   scholarship	   used	   here	   to	   construct	   the	   Developmental	   State	   Model	   was	  based	  on	  work	   that	   focused	  on	   Japan,	   South	  Korea	  and	  Taiwan	  and	  argued	   for	  adopting	   the	   strategy	   advocated	   by	   Chang	   that	   calls	   for	   defying	   ones	  comparative	  advantage	  through	  a	  range	  of	  policies.	  	  	  The	  present	  study	  has	  not	  tried	  to	  weigh	  in	  heavily	  on	  this	  argument	  but	  instead	  focused	   on	   the	   institutional	   setup	   of	   the	   state	   that	   makes	   coordinated	  development	   feasible	   in	   the	   first	  place,	   be	   it	  more	  modest	  or	   far-­‐reaching.	  The	  three	  East	  Asian	  states	  have	  adopted	  relatively	  high	  levels	  of	  state	   intervention	  and	   generated	   institutions	   in	   accordance	   while	   achieving	   high	   levels	   of	  development.	   Though	   the	   entire	   argument	  made	   by	   the	   studies	   in	   Part	   I	  were	  presented,	   the	   input	   extracted	   for	   the	   Developmental	   State	   Model	   focused	   on	  institutions	  of	  state	  capacity,	  not	  specific	  policy.	  	  	  Summing	  up,	  the	  attributes	  of	  a	  Developmental	  State	  are	  as	  follows:	  	  
• A	  long-­‐term	  development	  strategy	  
• A	  centralized	  setup	  of	  government	  agency	   in	  charge	  of	  coordination	  and	  adjustment	  of	  policy	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  72	  Emphasizing	   this	   view	   is	   the	   popularity	   oft	   he	   term	   „Beijing	   Consensus“	   coined	   by	   Joshua	  Cooper	  Ramo	  in	  a	  paper	  offering	  a	  very	  optimistic	  account	  of	  China’s	  economic	  success,	  based	  on	  innovation	   (transcending	   comparative	   advantage),	   broader	   development	   goals	   than	   GDP	   and	  „self-­‐determination“	   in	   both	   economic	   and	   political	  matters.	   (Ramo	   2004).	   A	   recent	   article	   by	  Acemoglu	   and	   Robinson	   succinctly	   frame	   the	   issue	   of	   state-­‐capitalism	   (Acemoglu/Robinson	  2012).	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• The	   insulation	   of	   the	   respective	   bureaucracy	   from	   private	   and	   public	  special	  interest	  
• Embedded	   autonomy,	   allowing	   influence	   over	   and	   feedback	   from	   civil	  society	  in	  pursuit	  of	  national	  development	  
• The	  implementation	  of	  meritocratic	  selection	  criteria	  	  In	   addition,	   a	   set	   of	   historical	   vantage	   points	   was	   identified,	   beneficial	   to	   the	  emergence	  of	  a	  Developmental	  State.	  They	  are:	  	  
• Colonial	  manufacturing	  experience	  
• Disruption	  of	  ownership	  structures	  after	  decolonization	  
• Relatively	  equal	  income	  distribution	  	  The	  central	  research	  question	  then	  is:	  To	  what	  degree	  do	  these	  attributes	  apply	  to	  
the	  Chinese	  experience	  of	  the	  Reform	  Era	  between	  1978	  and	  2001?	   In	  Part	   II	   this	  was	  answered	  the	  following	  way:	  	  Historically,	  the	  colonial	  manufacturing	  experience	  has	  been	  strongly	  diluted	  by	  the	  effects	  of	  the	  civil	  war	  and	  the	  ensuing	  three	  decades	  of	  Maoist	  enforcement	  of	   a	   planned	   economy.	   Its	   main	   feature	   was	   an	   extraction	   of	   capital	   from	   the	  collectivized	   agricultural	   sector	   and	   reinvesting	   it	   in	   heavy	   industry,	   while	  extending	  isolation	  from	  the	  world	  economy.	  Under	  state	  control	  the	  disruption	  of	   colonial	   ownership	   structures	  was	   total.	   The	   all-­‐encompassing	   plan	   led	   to	   a	  relatively	   equal	   distribution	   of	   income.	   Generally	   though,	   China’s	   economy	  stagnated	  and	  the	  nations	  relative	  backwardness	  continued	  to	  increase.	  China’s	  economic	   isolation,	   geographical	   extent	   including	   diversified	   resources,	   the	  world’s	   largest	  population,	  a	  vast	  army	  and	   last	  but	  not	   least	   the	  possession	  of	  nuclear	  arms	  allowed	  the	  regime	  to	   feel	  capable	  of	  resisting	  outside	   threats.	   In	  order	   to	   understand	   the	   changes	   that	   set	   in,	   the	   political	   dynamics	   of	   the	  People’s	  Republic	  were	  subsequently	  examined.	  	  The	  economic	  transformation	  and	  ensuing	  institutional	  set-­‐up	  of	  the	  state	  were	  influenced	  by	  an	  eventual	  disintegration	  of	   the	   social	   and	  political	   structure	  of	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governance	   that	   escalated	   in	   the	   Cultural	   Revolution.	   The	   turning	   point	   is	  significant,	  as	  it	  did	  not	  only	  concern	  the	  population	  at	  large,	  but	  the	  ruling	  elite.	  The	  Communist	  Party	  had	  lost	  internal	  legitimacy	  when	  seeming	  capriciousness	  undermined	   the	   mechanism	   of	   power	   brokerage	   negotiated	   between	   factions	  and	  relational	  networks.	  	  	  The	   new	   leadership	   under	   Deng	   owed	   its	   success	   to	   gradually	   replacing	   the	  single	  focus	  on	  ideology	  with	  an	  agenda	  of	  reforms	  that	  promised	  to	  alleviate	  the	  dire	  state	  of	  the	  economy	  and	  offered	  the	  elite	  broad	  opportunities	  for	  political	  and	  material	   gains	   in	   addition	   to	   increased	  general	   living	   standards.	   Since	   this	  encompassed	   negotiating	   between	   shifting	   interest	   groups	   no	   definitive	  blueprint	  was	   followed	  except	  gradually	  extending	  successful	   reforms	   that	  had	  proven	  to	  be	  beneficial	  implementations	  of	  marketization.	  	  	  The	   absence	   of	   a	   long-­‐term	   development	   strategy	   was	   a	   result	   of	   political	  pragmatism.	   In	  addition,	  competition	  between	   leading	   factions	  was	  reflected	   in	  the	   institutional	   setup	   of	   the	   Party-­‐State,	   precluding	   the	   formation	   of	   a	   pilot	  agency	   in	   charge	   of	   policy	   coordination	   and	   adjustment.	   The	   insulation	   of	   the	  state	   bureaucracy	   from	  public	   special	   interest	  was	   undermined	  by	   the	   logic	   of	  party	   factionalism	   in	   charge	   of	   selecting	   officials.	   Meritocratic	   principles	   for	  choosing	   government	   employees	   were	   extended	   but	   without	   supplanting	  politically	  motivated	  selection.	  	  	  Perhaps	   the	  most	   significant	   deviance	   from	   the	   Developmental	   State	  Model	   in	  China	  was	  something	  not	  initially	  emphasized	  by	  the	  theories	  discussed	  in	  Part	  I.	  Namely,	   the	   nonexistence	   of	   a	   strong	   private	   industrial	   sector.	   Despite	   an	  irregular	  expansion	  of	  private	  business,	  sizeable	  parts	  of	  the	  Chinese	  economy	  at	  the	   turn	   of	   the	   century	   were	   still	   owned	   by	   various	   levels	   and	   institutions	   of	  government,	  especially	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  large	  industrial	  enterprise.	  This	  makes	  the	  point	  of	  a	  bureaucracy’s	   insulation	   from	  private	   interest	  at	   the	  macro	   level	  moot.	   Furthermore,	   embedded	   autonomy,	   the	   public-­‐private	   feedback	  mechanism	  of	  a	  Developmental	  State,	  must	  remain	  equally	  underdeveloped.	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A	  general	  trend	  emerged	  that	  devolved	  power	  from	  the	  center	  to	  the	  provinces	  in	  fiscal	  and	  economic	  matters.	  The	  multi-­‐tiered	  progression	  of	  reform,	  favoring	  the	   coastal	   provinces	  had	   led	   to	   an	   imbalance.	  While	   the	   competition	  between	  regions	   had	   the	   positive	   effect	   of	   local	   governments	   creating	   favorable	  environments	   to	   attract	   business	   it	   also	   fostered	   a	   situation	   of	   duplicating	  sectors	  that	  received	  preferential	  treatment	  as	  well	  as	  inter-­‐jurisdictional	  trade	  wars.	   Most	   leaders	   rise	   to	   the	   top	   after	   proving	   themselves	   in	   governing	   a	  province	  or	  large	  metropolitan	  area.	  The	  provincial	  faction	  in	  the	  highest	  state-­‐	  and	   Party	   organs	   has	   gained	   a	   lot	   of	   ground	   vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   representatives	   of	   the	  central	  government	  and	  military	  representatives.	  	  	  Though	   China	   has	   seen	   remarkable	   GDP	   growth	   and	   poverty	   alleviation,	   its	  record	   compares	   unfavorably	   with	   the	   accomplishments	   of	   South	   Korea	   and	  Taiwan	  during	  their	  first	  two	  decades	  of	  industrial	  catching-­‐up.	  This	  is	  evidenced	  by	   higher	   living	   standards,	   even	   when	   compensating	   for	   a	   head	   start,	   life	  expectancy	   and	   levels	   of	   education.	   The	   primary	   difference	   was	   China’s	   rapid	  increase	  in	  income-­‐inequality,	  a	  trend	  that	  continues	  to	  this	  day.	  	  	  
The	  evidence	  amounts	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  China	  does	  not	  have	  the	  institutional	  setup	  
proposed	  in	  the	  Developmental	  State	  Model.	  The	  two	  primary	  reasons	  for	  this	  are:	  	   1. The	  lack	  of	  a	   long-­‐term	  development	  strategy,	  centrally	  coordinated	  and	  adjusted	  by	  a	  capable	  and	  insulated	  agency.	  
AND…	  2. The	  underdevelopment	  of	  a	  large-­‐scale	  industrial	  private	  sector.	  	  The	  present	  research	  has	  pointed	  to	  some	  underlying	  reasons	  I	  deem	  reasonable	  to	  have	  acted	  as	  obstacles	  to	  evolving	  such	  institutions.	  The	  historical	  legacy	  of	  a	  planned	  economy	  is	  felt	  in	  the	  public-­‐private	  imbalance.	  After	  all,	  neither	  Japan,	  nor	   South	   Korea	   nor	   Taiwan	   had	   started	   their	   industrialization	   under	  comparable	  circumstances.	  In	  addition,	  China	  did	  not	  face	  an	  imminent	  external	  threat	   perceived	   as	   a	   “sink	   or	   swim	   scenario”	   the	   likes	   of:	   Perry’s	   forceful	  economic	  intrusion	  and	  the	  loss	  of	  a	  World	  War	  in	  Japan;	  a	  nearly	  lost	  civil	  war	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splitting	   the	   nation	   down	   the	   middle	   and	   leaving	   it	   surrounded	   by	   powerful	  ideological	  enemies	  like	  South	  Korea;	  and	  losing	  control	  over	  the	  largest	  nation	  to	  be	  left	  exiled	  on	  its	  doorstep	  like	  the	  Taiwanese	  government.	  Arguing	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  such	  historical	  contingencies	  should	  be	  done	  with	  care.	  The	  theories	  of	  Part	   I	   do	   not	   address	   the	   historical	   and	   external	   origins	   of	   the	  Developmental	  State	  sufficiently.	  More	  research	  in	  this	  direction	  would	  be	  welcome.73	  	  Still,	   the	   present	   analysis	   has	   emphasized	   the	   contrasting	   case	   of	   an	   internal	  crisis	  of	  legitimacy	  and	  system	  of	  power	  allocation.	  The	  nature	  of	  China’s	  reforms	  has	  seen	  gradual	  experimentation:	  An	  outcome	  of	  competing	  factions,	  seeking	  to	  restore	   internal	   legitimacy	   while	   rebuilding	   lucrative	   client	   networks.	  Substantial	   efficiency	   gains	   early	   on,	   derived	   from	   simple	  market	   reforms	   like	  the	  Household	  Responsibility	  System	  and	  the	  opening	  up	  of	  light	  rural	  industry	  have	  quickly	  sprouted	  opportunities	  for	  productive	  gain	  but	  also	  for	  rent-­‐seeking	  behavior.	  It	  makes	  sense	  then	  that	  those	  in	  charge	  seek	  to	  continuously	  control	  productive	  assets.	  On	  a	  macro	  level	  this	  concerns	  the	  Party	  and	  its	  hold	  via	  the	  state	   over	   large	   swathes	   of	   big	   business.	   On	   the	   micro	   level	   it	   reflects	   the	  provincial	  and	  local	  power	  brokers,	  channeling	  investment	  funds	  to	  their	  regions.	  	  Both	  undermine	  a	  functioning	  Developmental	  State.74	  	  	  Over	  the	  last	  dozen	  years,	  which	  haven’t	  been	  addressed	  here,	  China’s	  economy	  has	   continued	   to	   grow	   while	   facing	   still	   wider	   gaps	   in	   average	   income	   and	  increasing	   environmental	   backlash.	   A	   debate	   has	   gained	   prominence	   between	  two	   camps	   of	   thought:	   The	   “New	   Left”,	   critical	   of	   the	   pace	   and	   supposed	  excessive	   market-­‐orientation	   of	   the	   reforms	   instead	   favoring	   more	   state	  involvement	  in	  areas	  of	  social	  security	  promoting	  more	  equitable	  growth.	  On	  the	  other	   hand	   the	   “New	   Right”	   represents	   a	  more	  market-­‐liberal	   approach	  while	  also	  relegating	  issues	  of	  increased	  political	  participation.75	  The	  former	  school	  of	  thought	  demands	  the	  kind	  of	  more	  equitable	  development	  seen	   in	  South	  Korea	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  73	  See:	   Cerny	   2007	   for	   a	   discussion	   of	   periodization	   and	   the	   influence	   of	   changing	   political	  globalization	  on	  state-­‐capitalism	  74	  The	  problem	  of	  different	  sector	  requirements	  is	  discussed	  in:	  Segal/Thin	  2011	  75	  See:	   Leonard	   (2008)	   for	   an	   overview	   of	   current	   Chinese	   thinking	   on	   economic	   and	   political	  issues.	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and	  Taiwan.	  Considering	  the	  rapid	  pace	  of	  continuing	  growth	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  tell,	  where	   China	   is	   headed	   in	   terms	   of	   sustainability,	   equality	   and	   even	   political	  system,	  but	  up	  to	  today	  it	  has	  not	  adopted	  the	  Developmental	  State	  Model.	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Appendix	  	  	  	  
Figure	  15	  –	  China	  GDP	  per	  capita	  (1945–2000)	  
	  Source:	  Data	  Table	  7	  	  
	  
Table	  5	  -­‐	  China	  annual	  GDP	  growth	  rates	  
Year	   %	  change	   Year	   %	  change	  
	   	  
1980	   7.8	   1991	   9.2	   	   	  
1981	   5.2	   1992	   14.2	   	   	  
1982	   9.1	   1993	   14	   	   	  
1983	   10.9	   1994	   13.1	   	   	  
1984	   15.2	   1995	   10.9	   	   	  
1985	   13.5	   1996	   10	   	   	  
1986	   8.8	   1997	   9.3	   	   	  
1987	   11.6	   1998	   7.8	   	   	  
1988	   11.3	   1999	   7.6	   	   	  
1989	   4.1	   2000	   8.4	   	   	  
1990	   3.8	   2001	   8.3	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Table	  6	  –	  China	  Inflation	  (GDP	  deflator	  annual	  change	  in	  %)	  
Year	   %	  change	   Year	   %	  change	  
1980	   3.8	   1991	   6.8	  
1981	   2.3	   1992	   18.2	  
1982	   -­‐0.2	   1993	   15.1	  
1983	   1.0	   1994	   20.6	  
1984	   4.9	   1995	   13.7	  
1985	   10.2	   1996	   6.4	  
1986	   4.7	   1997	   1.5	  
1987	   5.1	   1998	   -­‐0.9	  
1988	   12.1	   1999	   -­‐1.3	  
1989	   8.5	   2000	   2.1	  
1990	   5.8	   2001	   2.1	  
Source:	  World	  Bank	  (http://data.worldbank.org/)	  	  	  
Table	  7	  –	  China	  GDP/	  capita	  (constant	  1990	  USD)	  
Year	   GDP	  per	  capita	   %	  change	   Year	   GDP	  per	  capita	   %	  change	  
1950	   448	  
	  
1976	   853	   -­‐2%	  
1951	   491	   10%	   1977	   894	   5%	  
1952	   538	   9%	   1978	   978	   9%	  
1953	   552	   3%	   1979	   1,039	   6%	  
1954	   557	   1%	   1980	   1,061	   2%	  
1955	   577	   4%	   1981	   1,110	   5%	  
1956	   616	   7%	   1982	   1,186	   7%	  
1957	   636	   3%	   1983	   1,258	   6%	  
1958	   690	   9%	   1984	   1,396	   11%	  
1959	   686	   -­‐1%	   1985	   1,519	   9%	  
1960	   662	   -­‐4%	   1986	   1,597	   5%	  
1961	   553	   -­‐16%	   1987	   1,737	   9%	  
1962	   550	   0%	   1988	   1,830	   5%	  
1963	   590	   7%	   1989	   1,834	   0%	  
1964	   645	   9%	   1990	   1,871	   2%	  
1965	   702	   9%	   1991	   1,967	   5%	  
1966	   746	   6%	   1992	   2,132	   8%	  
1967	   707	   -­‐5%	   1993	   2,312	   8%	  
1968	   675	   -­‐5%	   1994	   2,515	   9%	  
1969	   713	   6%	   1995	   2,863	   14%	  
1970	   778	   9%	   1996	   2,892	   1%	  
1971	   795	   2%	   1997	   3,013	   4%	  
1972	   798	   0%	   1998	   2,993	   -­‐1%	  
1973	   838	   5%	   1999	   3,162	   6%	  
1974	   835	   0%	   2000	   3,421	   8%	  
1975	   871	   4%	  
	   	   	  Source:	  Maddison,	  Angus:	  	  http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/Maddison.htm	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Table	  8	  -­‐	  Taiwan	  GDP/	  capita	  (constant	  1990	  USD)	  
Year	   GDP	  	  
%	  	  
change	   Year	   GDP	  	  
%	  
change	   Year	   GDP	  	  
%	  
change	  	  
1945	   742 
	  
1965	   2,056 4%	   1985	   8,113 4%	  
1946	   806 9%	   1966	   2,205 7%	   1986	   9,088 12%	  
1947	   904 12%	   1967	   2,395 9%	   1987	   9,641 6%	  
1948	   931 3%	   1968	   2,539 6%	   1988	   9,623 0%	  
1949	   932 0%	   1969	   2,706 7%	   1989	   9,665 0%	  
1950	   924 -­‐1%	   1970	   2,980 10%	   1990	   9,886 2%	  
1951	   991 7%	   1971	   3,324 12%	   1991	   10,522 6%	  
1952	   1,063 7%	   1972	   3,767 13%	   1992	   11,204 6%	  
1953	   1,140 7%	   1973	   4,091 9%	   1993	   11,877 6%	  
1954	   1,193 5%	   1974	   3,942 -­‐4%	   1994	   12,597 6%	  
1955	   1,250 5%	   1975	   3,958 0%	   1995	   13,284 5%	  
1956	   1,270 2%	   1976	   4,566 15%	   1996	   13,985 5%	  
1957	   1,314 3%	   1977	   5,020 10%	   1997	   14,795 6%	  
1958	   1,382 5%	   1978	   5,542 10%	   1998	   15,333 4%	  
1959	   1,462 6%	   1979	   5,831 5%	   1999	   16,040 5%	  
1960	   1,492 2%	   1980	   5,869 1%	   2000	   16,859 5%	  
1961	   1,551 4%	   1981	   6,229 6%	  
	   	   	  1962	   1,632 5%	   1982	   6,446 3%	  
	   	   	  1963	   1,804 11%	   1983	   7,036 9%	  
	   	   	  1964	   1,977 10%	   1984	   7,790 11%	  
	   	   	  Source:	  Maddison,	  Angus:	  	  http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/Maddison.htm	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Table	  9	  –	  Republic	  of	  Korea	  GDP/	  capita	  (constant	  1990	  USD)	  
Year	   GDP	  	   %	  change	   Year	   GDP	  	   %	  change	   Year	   GDP	  	   %	  change	  
1945	   683 	   1965	   1,436 3%	   1985	   5,670 6%	  
1946	   686 1%	   1966	   1,569 5%	   1986	   6,263 10%	  
1947	   719 5%	   1967	   1,645 10%	   1987	   6,916 10%	  
1948	   768 7%	   1968	   1,812 13%	   1988	   7,621 10%	  
1949	   819 7%	   1969	   2,040 6%	   1989	   8,027 5%	  
1950	   854 4%	   1970	   2,167 8%	   1990	   8,704 8%	  
1951	   787 -­‐8%	   1971	   2,332 5%	   1991	   9,409 8%	  
1952	   835 6%	   1972	   2,456 15%	   1992	   9,810 4%	  
1953	   1,072 28%	   1973	   2,824 7%	   1993	   10,234 4%	  
1954	   1,124 5%	   1974	   3,015 5%	   1994	   10,959 7%	  
1955	   1,169 4%	   1975	   3,162 10%	   1995	   11,809 8%	  
1956	   1,149 -­‐2%	   1976	   3,476 9%	   1996	   12,507 6%	  
1957	   1,206 5%	   1977	   3,775 8%	   1997	   12,962 4%	  
1958	   1,234 2%	   1978	   4,064 6%	   1998	   11,966 -­‐8%	  
1959	   1,243 1%	   1979	   4,294 -­‐4%	   1999	   12,994 9%	  
1960	   1,226 -­‐1%	   1980	   4,114 5%	   2000	   13,985 8%	  
1961	   1,247 2%	   1981	   4,302 6%	  
	  
	   	  
1962	   1,245 0%	   1982	   4,557 10%	  
	  
	   	  
1963	   1,316 6%	   1983	   5,007 7%	  
	  
	   	  
1964	   1,390 6%	   1984	   5,375 7%	  
	  
	   	  Source:	  Maddison,	  Angus:	  	  http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/Maddison.htm	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per	  capita	   China	   %	   Year	  
World	  
Average	  GDP	  
per	  capita	   China	   %	  
1950	   2,111	   448	   21%	   1975	   4,087	   871	   21%	  
1951	   2,197	   491	   22%	   1976	   4,213	   853	   20%	  
1952	   2,258	   538	   24%	   1977	   4,309	   894	   21%	  
1953	   2,329	   552	   24%	   1978	   4,422	   978	   22%	  
1954	   2,363	   557	   24%	   1979	   4,500	   1,039	   23%	  
1955	   2,467	   577	   23%	   1980	   4,512	   1,061	   24%	  
1956	   2,534	   616	   24%	   1981	   4,523	   1,110	   25%	  
1957	   2,578	   636	   25%	   1982	   4,501	   1,186	   26%	  
1958	   2,607	   690	   26%	   1983	   4,541	   1,258	   28%	  
1959	   2,675	   686	   26%	   1984	   4,668	   1,396	   30%	  
1960	   2,773	   662	   24%	   1985	   4,748	   1,519	   32%	  
1961	   2,831	   553	   20%	   1986	   4,833	   1,597	   33%	  
1962	   2,914	   550	   19%	   1987	   4,932	   1,737	   35%	  
1963	   2,978	   590	   20%	   1988	   5,056	   1,830	   36%	  
1964	   3,130	   645	   21%	   1989	   5,130	   1,834	   36%	  
1965	   3,228	   702	   22%	   1990	   5,150	   1,871	   36%	  
1966	   3,335	   746	   22%	   1991	   5,137	   1,967	   38%	  
1967	   3,390	   707	   21%	   1992	   5,165	   2,132	   41%	  
1968	   3,505	   675	   19%	   1993	   5,200	   2,312	   44%	  
1969	   3,624	   713	   20%	   1994	   5,304	   2,515	   47%	  
1970	   3,729	   778	   21%	   1995	   5,446	   2,863	   53%	  
1971	   3,803	   795	   21%	   1996	   5,552	   2,892	   52%	  
1972	   3,904	   798	   20%	   1997	   5,690	   3,013	   53%	  
1973	   4,083	   838	   21%	   1998	   5,709	   2,993	   52%	  
1974	   4,099	   835	   20%	   1999	   5,833	   3,162	   54%	  
	   	   	   	  
2000	   6,038	   3,421	   57%	  Source:	  Maddison,	  Angus:	  	  http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/Maddison.htm	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Figure	  16	  –	  Growth	  spurts	  of	  GDP	  per	  capita	  (over	  20	  years;	  Log	  scale)	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Table	  11	  	  –	  Average	  Life	  Expectancy	  at	  Birth	  in	  South	  Korea,	  China	  and	  Taiwan	  
Year	   South	  Korea	   China	   Taiwan	   Year	   South	  Korea	   China	   Taiwan	  
1960	   53	   43	   	   1985	   69	   68	   74	  
1961	   54	   44	   	   1986	   69	   69	   74	  
1962	   54	   45	   	   1987	   70	   69	   74	  
1963	   55	   46	   	   1988	   70	   69	   74	  
1964	   56	   49	   	   1989	   71	   69	   74	  
1965	   57	   51	   	   1990	   71	   69	   74	  
1966	   58	   54	   66	   1991	   72	   70	   75	  
1967	   59	   57	   66	   1992	   72	   70	   75	  
1968	   59	   59	   	   1993	   73	   70	   75	  
1969	   60	   61	   	   1994	   73	   70	   75	  
1970	   61	   63	   70	   1995	   73	   70	   75	  
1971	   62	   64	   70	   1996	   74	   71	   75	  
1972	   63	   65	   	   1997	   74	   71	   76	  
1973	   63	   65	   	   1998	   75	   71	   76	  
1974	   64	   65	   	   1999	   75	   71	   76	  
1975	   64	   66	   72	   2000	   76	   71	   77	  
1976	   64	   66	   72	   2001	   76	   71	   77	  
1977	   65	   66	   	   2002	   77	   72	   78	  
1978	   65	   66	   	   2003	   77	   72	   78	  
1979	   65	   67	   	   2004	   78	   72	   78	  
1980	   66	   67	   73	   2005	   78	   72	   78	  
1981	   66	   67	   73	   2006	   79	   72	   78	  
1982	   67	   68	   73	   2007	   79	   73	   79	  
1983	   67	   68	   73	   2008	   80	   73	   79	  
1984	   68	   68	   73	   2009	   80	   73	   79	  Source:	  World	  Bank;	  Taiwan	  before	  1982	  -­‐	  ROC	  Ministry	  of	  the	  Interior	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Table	  12	  	  –	  Income	  Distribution	  (GINI)	  Taiwan,	  South	  Korea,	  China	  
Year	   Taiwan	   South	  Korea	   China	   Year	   Taiwan	   South	  Korea	   China	  
1965	   3.20	   3.50	   	   1985	   0.29	   3.67	   	  
1966	   	   	   	   1986	   2.95	   	   	  
1967	   	   	   	   1987	   2.96	   	   2.99	  
1968	   	   	   	   1988	   3.01	   3.2	   	  
1969	   	   	   	   1989	   3.01	   	   	  
1970	   2.94	   3.32	   	   1990	   3.09	   	   3.24	  
1971	   2.95	   	   	   1991	   3.06	   	   	  
1972	   	   4.02	   	   1992	   3.11	   3.49	   	  
1973	   	   	   	   1993	   3.14	   3.24	   3.53	  
1974	   2.93	   	   	   1994	   3.17	   	   	  
1975	   	   	   	   1995	   3.15	   3.34	   	  
1976	   2.8	   3.91	   	   1996	   3.15	   3.26	   	  
1977	   2.85	   	   	   1997	   3.17	   3.16	   	  
1978	   2.81	   	   	   1998	   3.20	   3.72	   	  
1979	   2.86	   	   	   1999	   3.19	   	   3.9	  
1980	   2.77	   3.89	   	   2000	   3.20	   	   	  
1981	   2.80	   	   2.91	   2001	   	   	   4.48	  
1982	   2.83	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
1983	   2.87	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
1984	   2.86	   3.5	   2.77	   	   	   	   	  Source:	  Taiwan	  -­‐	  Directorate-­‐General	  of	  Budget,	  Accounting	  and	  Statistics	  1974	  (1965),	  1974),	  UNU	  WIDER	  World	  Income	  Inequality	  Database	  (other	  years);	  South	  Korea-­‐	  Jomo	  K.S.:	  Growth	  with	  Equity	  in	  East	  Asia?	  (DESA	  Working	  Paper	  No.	  33	  ST/ESA/2006/DWP/33/	  September	  2006)	  –	  (1965,	  1970,	  1976,	  1980);	  World	  Bank	  (1998),	  UNU	  WIDER	  World	  Income	  Inequality	  Database	  (other	  years);	  China	  –	  World	  Bank	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Zusammenfassung	  (Abstract)	  	  	  	  Mit	  Beginn	  umfangreicher	  Reformen	  in	  der	  Volksrepublik	  China	  vor	  gut	  dreißig	  Jahren	  setzte	  eine	  bislang	  anhaltende	  Periode	  starken	  Wirtschaftswachstums	  ein.	  Eine	   Reihe	   von	   Autoren	   begründete	   vorangehende	   Entwicklungserfolge	  ostasiatischer	  Nationen	  mit	  dem	  Vorhandensein	   einer	   charakteristischen	  Form	  eines	   interventionistischen	   Staates.	   Ziel	   der	   vorliegenden	   Arbeit	   ist	   es	   anhand	  dieser	  Literatur	  und	  den	  Fallbeispielen	  Japan,	  Südkorea	  und	  der	  Republik	  China	  (Taiwan),	   ein	   institutionelles	   Modell	   eines	   „Developmental	   State“	   zu	   erstellen	  und	  des	  Weiteren	  zu	  prüfen	   inwiefern	  es	  auf	  die	  Volksrepublik	  China	  während	  der	  Reformperiode	  zwischen	  1978	  und	  2001	  zutrifft.	  	  	  Das	   Hauptaugenmerk	   liegt	   auf	   einer	   langfristig	   orientierten	   Entwicklungs-­‐strategie	   und	   zentralen,	   fachlich	   besetzten	   und	   ausreichend	   ausgestatteten	  Institutionen,	   um	   diese	   zu	   koordinieren.	   Dabei	   sollte	   Unabhängigkeit	   von	  politischen	   wie	   auch	   privaten	   Sonderinteressen	   vorliegen,	   jedoch	   gleichzeitig	  Rückinformation	   aus	   dem	   zivilen	   Sektor	   zur	   Anpassung	   der	  Wirtschaftspolitik	  herangezogen	  werden	  können.	  	  Die	   Analyse	   nach	   diesen	   Maßstäben	   hat	   ergeben,	   dass	   die	   chinesische	  institutionelle	  Struktur	  nicht	  dem	  „Developmental	  State“	  Modell	  entspricht.	  Die	  zwei	   Hauptargumente	   dafür	   sind:	   Einerseits	   keine	   langfristige	   Strategie	   für	  strukturelle	   Reformen,	   hingegen	   ein	   Trend	   zur	   Dezentralisierung	  wirtschaftspolitischer	   Kompetenzen	   der	   die	   Koordination	   von	   Peking	   aus	  erschwerte.	   Andererseits	   blieb	   die	   Entwicklung	   eines	   starken	  privatwirtschaftlichen	   Sektors	   aus,	   insbesondere	   im	   Bereich	   der	  Schwerindustrie	   und	   führender	   Großkonzerne.	   Eine	   abschließende	   Analyse	  entwicklungsökonomischer	   Kennzahlen	   zu	   Lebensstandard,	   Gesundheit,	  Ausbildung	   und	   Einkommensverteilung	   veranschaulichen	   relative	   Defizite	  Chinas	  gegenüber	  Südkorea	  und	  Taiwan.	  	  	  
  






Geburtsdatum: 10. November 1984 
Geburtsort: Wien 










Master of Advanced International Studies 
(Diplomatische Akademie Wien) mit einer Arbeit über 
„Democracy in India and Economic Transformation” 
 
2008– Masterstudium der Wirtschafts- und Sozialgeschichte 
(Universität Wien) 
 
2004–2008 Bachelor of Arts in Geschichte (Universität Wien) 
 
2003–2004 Grundwehrdienst an der Landesverteidigungsakademie, 
Institut für höhere militärische Führung 
 
1995–2003 Theresianische Akademie (Humanistisches Gymnasium 
mit dritter lebender Fremdsprache) 
 
 
Arbeit und zusätzliche Erfahrung 
 
Okt. 2011 bis 
Jun. 2012 
 
Diplomatische Akademie Wien: Economics Editor für die 
Studentenzeitung „Polemics“ 
 
Mär. bis Jul. 
2010 
 
Universität Wien: Tutor am Institut für Wirtschafts- und 
Sozialgeschichte  
 
Okt. 2009 bis 
Feb. 2010 
 
Österreichischen Nationalbank: Rechercheassistent für 
das SEE Monetary History Network  
 
Aug. bis Sep. 
2009 
Absolvierung der 'China Know How' Summerschool in 
Peking (Eurasia Pacific Uninet) 
 
	   129	  
Mai bis Jun. 
2009 
Universität Mannheim: Rechercheassistent für das von der 
EU gesponserte Projekt 'Intune – Integriert und Vereint'  
 
Mär. bis Jul. 
2009 
Universität Wien: Tutor am Institut für Wirtschafts- und 
Sozialgeschichte 
 
Sept. 2008 Stipendiat beim Europäischen Forum Alpbach 
 
Feb. bis Jun. 
2008 
Austauschsemster an der Universität St. Gallen, 
(International Affairs and Governance) 
 
Okt. bis Nov. 
2007 
Projektassistent bei Management Results GmbH 
 
 











Englisch (TOEFL: 118/120) 
Französisch (DELF B1) 
Chinesisch/Mandarin (A2) 
 
EDV Microsoft Office, Adobe Photoshop 
 
Interessen Literatur, Malen, Klassische Musik, Tennis, Wandern 
 	  
